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ABSTRACT
When King Philip's War erupted in the summer of 1675, 
the New England colonies entered a quarter-century of almost 
constant trial and tension. Colonial leaders consistently 
interpreted each successive crisis and the lingering 
legacies as warnings from God against backsliding and sin. 
Interpreting the causes of the colonies' troubles was just 
the beginning of the struggle, however; understanding, 
solving, and learning from the trials of the period 
represented the ongoing challenge for the future of the New 
England mission.
The most obvious victims of King Philip's War were the 
natives of the colony. Even the Praying Indians who lived 
under English jurisdiction became targets of the colonists' 
anxiety and prejudice. The persistence of any bands in the 
region, friendly or hostile, provided a source of continuing 
tension for the colonists.
Economically, demographically, even politically, the 
effects of King Philip's War lingered throughout the ensuing 
decades. The colony's effort to recoup the costs of the war 
led to a persistent struggle as citizens and towns attempted 
to avoid the increased tax rates. The need to secure the 
frontier communities either threatened or actually abandoned 
during the conflict represented an ongoing campaign in the 
region. In the area of politics, the war made the colonists 
more sensitive and more assertive, and this new spirit 
appeared in town politics as well as in the constitutional 
upheaval in Boston.
The uneasiness resulting from the accumulated tensions 
led to a period of self-examination among New Englanders. 
Puritan clergy exhorted their followers to reform in order 
to ward off the forces of evil which threatened the mission. 
The jeremiads of the period bemoaned the spiritual decline 
in the region, but in the end, their message remained 
optimistic. The errand would continue, but with a new sense 
of secular interest incorporated into the New England 
mentality. Although King Philip's War was not the sole, 
direct cause of ail of the problems that plagued 
Massachusetts during the troubled decades of the late 
seventeenth century, it was the first in a series of crises 
and the event which set the tone for the whole period.
viii
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INTRODUCTION
Samuel Eliot Morison hailed Dougals Leach's Flintlock 
and Tomahawk (1958) as "the first comprehensive history of 
King Philip's War to appear since the seventeenth century." 
Morison characterized the book as "not only a military but a 
political and social history" of "an intensely dramatic 
struggle, decisive for the survival of the English race in 
New England, and the eventual disappearance of the Algonkian 
Indians." Leach himself called King Philip's War "the first 
major test for the budding civilization which had been 
planted in New England." He claimed that the conflict 
represented "a crisis of staggering proportions" which 
threatened "to undo much of the careful work that had been 
accomplished. No society," he surmised, "can pass through 
such a crisis without experiencing deep and abiding 
changes."1
For all of the recognition of the long-range importance 
of King Philip's War to the New England mission and of the 
"deep and abiding changes" that the conflict brought,
Leach's much-acclaimed work focused overwhelmingly on the 
fifteen-month-long period of open hostilities rather than on 
the continuing significance of the struggle. This narrow 
approach toward the war has been the norm in histories of 
2
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3the topic from the time that contemporaries such as William 
Hubbard and Cotton Mather penned their accounts all the way 
to the twentieth century. Actually, some of these early 
chroniclers, in an attempt to exhort their readers to 
reform, came closer to fitting the war into a larger context 
than have many modern historians. Still, the common 
portrayal of the victory over the Indians has remained an 
image of ultimate challenge and heroic accomplishment.
Thus, King Philip's War has generally been viewed as a 
solution to the problem of how the native and English 
cultures would coexist in New England. Leach and Morison, 
in fact, saw English domination as inevitable and therefore 
viewed the war as the conclusive means to that end.
Far from being a climax, however, King Philip's War 
represented an important transition, and in many ways, the 
beginning of a new phase in New England history. This study 
therefore portrays the conflict as the focal point in the 
ensuing quarter century of tension and crisis rather than as 
the conclusion of a half-century of development. The 
colonists defeated the natives in 1676, but the fears, 
tensions, and doubts of the war years did not end with 
Metacom's death. The lasting significance of King Philip's 
War rested not merely in the colonists' ability to meet the 
military challenge but more importantly in their responses 
to the legacies which continued to affect them.
King Philip's War erupted in a period of relative 
tranquility in New England. Not since the late 1630s had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4the natives of the region caused serious alarm; religious 
uniformity was still required in the colony, in spite of the 
initially controversial Half-Way Covenant; the missionary 
effort had finally begun to bring significant numbers of 
natives under colonial jurisdiction; Massachusetts' 
political autonomy went virtually unquestioned; and English 
settlement was thriving and expanding. New Englanders may 
not have been completely confident of success— the clergy 
regularly delivered jeremiads against degeneracy— but they 
certainly were not prepared for a crisis of the magnitude of 
King Philip's War. Therefore, the war could not end as an 
isolated incident. Rather, it left lingering problems and 
generated nagging questions for years to come. Recovery 
from the conflict was not quick; responding to the 
unprecedented challenges represented an ongoing struggle.
On both the local and provincial level, King Philip's 
War left deep marks in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Leach 
was correct in his assertion that the conflict posed "a 
major test" for the English provinces, but the long-term 
significance of the trial was not a matter of "the survival 
of the English race in New England" versus "the eventual 
disappearance of the Algonkian Indians," as Morison 
suggested. In the long run, the real challenges revolved 
around the ways in which the colonists solved the various 
problems caused by the conflict and reacted to the new 
tensions generated during the postwar period. This study 
attempts to analyze the legacies of King Philip's War in a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5number of areas and thereby to determine how the conflict 
affected the future of the English errand into the 
wilderness.
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CHAPTER 1 
PUNISHMENT AND REPENTANCE
In June 1675, King Philip's War erupted in Plymouth 
colony, and though the colonists could not have known it at 
the time, the conflict initiated a long period of persistent 
and far-reaching adversity in the region. Although the war 
was not the only cause of the changes that occurred during 
this crucial period, the fifteen-month-long struggle with 
the natives under Metacom's leadership came to represent a 
focal point for viewing the troubles of the ensuing decades. 
Few New Englanders were prepared for the economic, social, 
political, and intellectual upheaval that followed. In the 
beginning, very few colonists were prepared for the trauma 
of aggressive Indian warfare. Misunderstanding the causes 
and nature of the conflict, the white residents could not 
immediately cope with the stunning initial setbacks or with 
their apparent inability to bring the natives to bay. 
Throughout the war, Puritan leaders ignored the physical 
realities, concentrating instead on spiritual causes, cures, 
and lessons. Thus, the war could not be an isolated episode 
which ended with Metacom's death, but rather represented a 
lingering shadow which loomed over New England during the
troubled decades of the late seventeenth century.
7
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On January 29, 1675, John Sassamon, a member of 
Metacom's Wampanoag tribe, was murdered shortly after 
warning English authorities of a native conspiracy against 
the colonies. Five months later, in early June, three 
Wampanoags were brought up on dubious charges, summarily 
tried, and executed for the crime.1 Within three weeks, on 
June 24, a Wampanoag war party attacked the town of Swansea, 
killing nine people; King Philip's War had begun.
Obviously, though the events surrounding the murder of 
John Sassamon and the ensuing trial provided the spark which 
ignited the conflict, they were not the sole sources of 
tension which led the natives to initiate hostilities 
against the colonists. In general, Metacom and his people 
were troubled by the growth of the English population in New 
England, the expansion of colonial settlement, and 
increasing efforts to bring the natives under provincial 
authority. During the half century since his father 
Massasoit concluded a mutual peace treaty with the Plymouth 
Pilgrims, Metacom watched New England grow from a small 
settlement on the coast to a thriving complex composed of 
four separate colonies which contained English settlement 
not only around Massachusetts Bay and Cape Cod, but along 
Narragansett Bay and the Connecticut River as well.
The Wampanoags did not idly watch this expansion 
progress, and during the two decades before the war, 
colonial officials maintained a wary vigil against any hint 
of native opposition. The troubles basically arose because
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Englishmen— and Europeans in general— displayed an inability
2
to understand native values and needs. The Puritans of 
New England, as did their brethren in other colonies, 
believed that they dealt fairly with the Indians in matters 
such as land purchases and legal proceedings. But in all 
cases, colonial leaders measured the exchanges strictly 
according to their own standards, not those of the Indians.
This dichotomy of attitudes compounded the outrage felt
by resistant tribes such as the Wampanoags over the physical
incursions on their domains. But their feelings of loss
undoubtedly went much deeper; as members of a close, proud
group imbued with traditional values and beliefs, Metacom's
people could trust in their moral superiority and resent the
insults cast upon them by a contending, yet seemingly
inferior culture.3 Feeling their position unfairly
threatened, lashing out at the aggressor represented a
perfectly rational response in the Wampanoags' frame of
mind. So in addition to the struggle for land and political
sovereignty, the conflict known as King Philip's War also
contained an ideological core, not only on the part of the
well-publicized English mission but also for the natives 
4
involved.
The colonists, of course, considered none of the 
psychological bruises suffered by their native adversaries, 
instead taking every opportunity to tighten the pressure on 
the recalcitrant Wampanoags. From the time Metacom 
succeeded his brother Alexander (Wamsutta) to the sachemship
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in 1664, Plymouth officials demanded assurances from him 
that he would not sell or in any way alienate any Wampanoag 
lands without their consent. But by the end of the decade, 
Plymouth authorized the town of Swansea to purchase and 
annex land from the natives for the expansion of the 
community. Feeling their sovereignty threatened, Metacom's 
Wampanoags became restless, and the Plymouth General Court 
responded by calling the sachem to account for a rumored 
conspiracy against the colony. On April 10, 1671, colonial 
officials ordered Metacom to turn in all of his people's 
weapons, fined him for his actions, and forced him to affirm 
that he and his people had always been subjects of the 
Plymouth colony. This strong-armed tactic most directly 
affected the natives, though at least one historian 
maintains that the Taunton Treaty, as this agreement was 
called, was intended as much as a tool in the land squabbles 
between Plymouth and Massachusetts as a device to control
5
the Wampanoags.
Not to be outdone, the Bay Colony called Metacom to 
Boston and made him agree to a similar treaty, acknowledging 
himself "Subject to his Majesty the King of England, and the 
Government of New-Plimouth, and to their Laws." At the same 
time, the authorities of both colonies forced the sachem to 
take full responsibility for any tensions felt between the 
two cultures. "I having of late through my Indiscretion, 
and the Naughtiness of my Heart," grovelled Metacom, 
"violated and broken this my Covenant with my Friends, by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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taking up Arms, with evil intent against them, and that 
groundlessly . . . The key idea expressed was that the 
natives acted maliciously with "nothing of any Provocation 
from the English."6 Thus, colonial officials could claim 
innocence in the event of hostilities and could voice horror 
at any "unprovoked" attacks.
Prevalent English opinion, according to the Reverend 
William Hubbard, a contemporary historian, contradicted any 
notion that the troubles sprang from "some Irregularities 
and Miscarriages in our Transactions and Dealings with the 
Indians themselves." To the contrary, the United Colonies 
"endeavoured by the sharpest and severest Laws imaginable to 
prevent any Miscarriages of such a Nature." In reality, it 
was the natives who felt the sharpness and severity of 
colonial laws. Further, Hubbard asserted, if Metacom and 
his people had any reason for complaint, the offenses came 
"only from such Places and Persons as border upon us round 
about," but certainly not from the New England colonies.7 
Although not all New Englanders were caught so blindly 
unaware when the war broke out, the majority of colonists 
held the view that the natives had no just reason to harbor 
animosity against the English.
To the contrary, the Indians of Metacom's Wampanoag 
band complained about many key points in their relations 
with the English colonists. In a parley with the native 
chief just before the actual initiation of hostilities, a 
group of Rhode Island magistrates heard a list of grievances
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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from the powerful chieftain himself. In the most general 
terms, he claimed that the Indians "had dun no rong, [but] 
the English ronged them." The troubles dated back to the 
early days of the colony, Metacom said, when his father, 
Massasoit, "was a great man and the English as a litell 
Child"; the Wampanoags at the time "Constraened other 
indians from ronging the English and gave them Coren and 
shewed them how to plant." Since then, the tables had 
turned. Most of the chief's complaints centered on the 
colonists' land dealings. They often claimed more land than 
was originally agreed upon. The "English made [petty 
chiefs] drunk and then cheted them in bargens." When chiefs 
resisted colonial land grabs, the English found or created 
"a nother king that wold give or seell them there land."
With colonial settlement spreading so rapidly, the natives 
found "thay Could not kepe ther coren from being spoyled" by 
English livestock, "thay never being iused to fence." 
Whatever the issue, Metacom felt that the Indians could not 
get a fair hearing from colonial courts or authorities, "all 
English [being] agred against them, and so by arbetration 
they had had much rong."8 The natives' grievances and the 
underlying warnings contained therein went unanswered by 
Massachusetts and Plymouth officials, and hostilities began.
Since the colonists viewed the initial attacks on the 
southwestern towns of Plymouth colony as unprovoked and 
unjustifiable, the other New England colonies, particularly 
Massachusetts, leaped into the fray. Massachusetts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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officials acted on the belief that "He that will not help to 
quench the Fire in his Neighbours House, may justly fear to 
lose his own."9 Residents of other colonies, however, were 
dubious about the Bay Colony's intentions. John Easton, a 
Rhode Islander, left an account of the early stages of the 
conflict which reflected as much a fear of Massachusetts' 
encroachments as of Indian depredations. These fears came 
true when, in 1675, Massachusetts troops came first to 
negotiate with the powerful Narragansett tribe "without 
[Rhode Island's] Consent" and then attacked the natives 
"without proclemation." From the Rhode Island point of 
view, the desire of the Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies 
for the Indians' lands "was the greatest Case of the war 
against them."10 Massachusetts authorities, of course, 
disagreed.
The myopic view that the English were innocent of any 
affront against the natives allowed Puritan leaders to 
attribute the war to God's punishment of the colonists' own 
sins. Warnings from the clergy about backsliding preceded 
the war, but the violent eruption by the unconverted 
Indians, the targets of the New England mission, brought a 
virtual flood of literature condemning the colonists' 
wrongdoings. The belief that God's displeasure might be 
unleashed in an Indian war was well established in Puritan 
thought. The "sins of men provoke the justice of Almighty 
God both to visit and chastise" His people, wrote an 
anonymous author in 1642; it was certainly conceivable that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the visitations could take the form of Indian attacks.11
This tradition mirrored the covenant agreement which
comprised the Puritan relationship with the Creator; He
would never punish them arbitrarily or maliciously, but in
response to inconstancy, Puritan backsliders could expect
just retribution.
Expressions of this sentiment, both written and oral,
abounded throughout the conflict. Mary Pray, appropriately
named, wrote from Providence in January 1676 that "sin is
the cause of our sorrow." Searching for a positive motive
for the affliction, she expressed hope that "the lord in
much mercy [would] make us as sencabl of the caus as we are 
12of the punishment." Colonial officials also hoped to 
make the people sensible of their sins and omissions.
During the fall of 1675, the governor's Council of 
Massachusetts publicized a catalogue of offenses prevalent 
among the supposedly godly population. The Council began by 
pointing out that "God, for severall yeares past, hath not 
only warned us by his word, but chastized us with his rods," 
all to no avail. Among New England's sins, the Council 
cited "a neglect of discipline in the churches"; an "evill 
of pride in apparrell" and hairstyles; toleration of 
Quakers and their "damnable haeresies, [and] abominable 
idolatrys"; "much disorder & rudenes in [the] youth"; 
prophanity "by common swearing and cursing in ordinary 
communication"; "contempt for authority"; and "idlenes." 
Possibly most "shamefull and scandelous" of all, the Council
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
condemned the "loose & sinfull custome of going or riding
from towne to towne, . . . oft times men & weomen together,
upon pretence of going to lecture," when the true purpose
was "meerely to drincke & revell in ordinarys &
13tavernes." These various offenses seemed to reflect a 
growing sense of worldliness. According to both civil and 
religious authorities, Massachusetts congregations reeked 
with corruption.
Colonial officials also warned that simple recognition 
was insufficient; true repentence had to follow. The 
Council noted that the people needed "to be effectually 
humbled for our sinns, to repent of them, reforme, and amend 
our wayes." In doing so, New England Puritans would "turne 
againe unto the Lord our God, from whom wee have departed 
with a great backsliding."14 All of these calls for 
repentence— and they came from individuals as well as from 
legislative bodies— suggest that the Puritans saw both the 
causes and the progress of the conflict in spiritual terms. 
The path to victory involved not only military campaigns 
against Metacom; in fact, military success was only 
secondary, a result of the more important spiritual 
reformation. The true struggle was between good and evil, 
personified by the English and native forces, but New 
Englanders were constantly reminded that each of them also 
had to fight the same battle within themselves.
By 1675 the Puritans had devised a plan for dealing 
with such a struggle in times of trouble. To purge their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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souls and congregations of sin, secular and religious 
leaders alike advised recurrent days of humiliation and 
fast, as well as regular individual self-examination.15 In 
the early stages of the war especially, Massachusetts 
officials seemed at least as concerned with preparing for 
days of public humiliation as with planning expeditions 
against the natives. In fact, one of the Council's major 
worries was a fear that many people were "so selfe wise & 
improvident" that they would not take repentence seriously 
until it was too late.16 Such a scenario would surely 
prove damaging to New England's cause.
Of special concern to the Council was the behavior of 
the Massachusetts militiamen. Since they embodied the 
outward signs of the battle against the forces of evil, 
colonial soldiers had to display representative attributes 
of the good. Therefore, the Council ordered commanders to 
set for their soldiers "a good example in piety & vertue" 
and to make their camps places of "holynes to the Lord."17 
All of Puritan society had to repent in order to regain 
God's favor, but the requirement that the militia maintain a 
high moral standard was essential to victory over the 
natives.
Early in the war, however, no segment of New England 
society reformed itself adequately, at least in the eyes of 
the Massachusetts leadership. The colonies would not taste 
relief or victory, according to the orthodox view, until 
individual and communal repentance righted their wrongs.
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Both civil and ecclesiastical leaders publicized this point.
In the winter of 1675-76, when the colonies feared the
return of spring and Indian attacks, Increase Mather warned
that "people are not [yet] Humbled and Reformed." The
powerful cleric exhibited some partisan bias in accusing the
magistrates and especially Governor John Leverett of having
"no Heart to doe what they might in order to
Reformation.1,18 Later, in contemporary histories of the
war, both Mather and Hubbard agreed that in 1675, "although
[the] Wound was not incurable, yet much more Blood must be
taken away before it could be healed." "All humane
endeavours shall arrive at no other Success," added Hubbard,
"than the Counsel of God hath preordained."19
That the clergy expressed such exhortations should
surprise no one; perhaps more revealing are examples of
almost identical sentiments from a layman, albeit a highly
placed one, like Maj . John Pynchon. On September 8, 1675,
the major wrote to Governor Leverett, "The Lord effectually
humble us; the little success of our forces speaks we are 
20not yet truly humbled . . . ." Such examples reflect the 
degree to which devout New Englanders from various walks of 
life saw the hand of God in every aspect of their existence. 
The recurring defeats indicated to Puritans the need for 
continued repentance in order to regain favor in the divine 
plan.
Not only did God deny the colonies military success;
He also seemed to aid their enemies. "He is not going forth
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with our Armies as in former times,11 lamented Increase
Mather, "but giving up many of our Brethen to the mouth of
the devouring Sword . . . . »21 Mary Rowlandson, a
minister's wife captured from Lancaster along with her three
children on February 10, 1676, expanded on the cleric's
amazement at "the strange providence of God in preserving
the heathen." Correcting herself from questioning the
Creator's "strange providence," she later noted "admiration"
at how "the Lord preserve[d] [the natives] for his Holy
ends," which for the time involved "further affliction to 
22our poor country." New Englanders saw no contradiction 
in their insistence that Indians constantly portrayed as 
heathens and devil-worshippers were enjoying direct aid from 
God. The Book of Job gave adequate precedent for such 
punishment. Since the Puritan belief system attributed 
every event to divine providence, the colonists' setbacks 
could not be viewed as merely military defeats; the natives 
could nor possibly gain such success without direction from 
above. Consistent with their failure to recognize their 
enemies' motivations in the conflict, New Englanders never 
considered that Metacom's followers were guided by their own 
strategy and expertise.
Despite the conviction that the war represented an 
expression of God's anger, the same leaders who pointed to 
the colonists' shortcomings also predicted an ultimate good 
resulting from the troubled times. The Lord would not 
punish His chosen people without a purpose, and when they
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had been sufficiently humbled and reformed, the mission 
would continue as intended. Carrying the inconsistency one 
step further, Daniel Gookin predicted one ironic benefit of 
the war. The heathen Indians, who were temporarily serving 
the Almighty in the punishment of New England, would 
eventually face destruction due to their evil role in the 
conflict.23
In addition to the removal of the recalcitrant tribes, 
other Massachusetts residents foresaw regeneration within. 
Twenty years earlier, Pynchon wrote to John Winthrop,
Jr. that when the Lord lays His people low, "he knows how to 
raise [them] up again in his due time." He carried that 
trust with him through New England's ultimate trial. "These 
are trying times," he confided to his son Joseph in 1675, 
"and it is good knowing in whom we have believed and 
treasured in heaven is abiding when the greatest earthly 
enjoyment may soon fail us and come to nothing."24 
Proclaiming the wisdom of the divine plan, one chronicler 
exhorted the devout "to wait upon Gods Will, and attend his 
Work in this thing." Then, in the end, the Puritans would 
recognize the saving grace of the Lord and have cause to 
sing "How great is his Goodness! and how great is his 
Beauty!"25 Before any such joyous salvation could be 
celebrated, however, New Englanders had to come to terms 
with the natives who constantly reminded them of their sins.
The largest problem for most New Englanders was that 
they simply could not view the Indians as rational beings
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driven by human needs and desires. At best, during tranquil 
times, the natives might be regarded as ignorant pagans 
worthy of conversion and possible salvation. But in periods 
of conflict such as King Philip's War, English writers 
characterized their enemies as irredeemable members of the 
animal kingdom. In 1676 Nathaniel Saltonstall likened 
native warriors to "Wolves and other Beasts of Prey, that 
commonly do their Mischiefs in the Night, or by 
Stealth."26 Such accusations reflected the colonists' 
frustrations in being unable to comprehend or counteract 
Indian warfare.
Englishmen could not understand native warfare because 
it was totally alien to their idea of civilized, 
institutionalized military action. They denigrated native 
strategy because it seemed to lack organization and purpose. 
Since New Englanders viewed the war solely as God's 
punishment for their own backsliding, they could not 
recognize that the natives had a secular motive for their 
actions. Throughout history, war has served as an outlet 
for suppressed tensions within or between contending 
nations. The Wampanoags and other tribes in the region 
certainly felt enough agitation due to the encroaching 
colonies to warrant a hostile response, according to their 
cultural perception of the situation.
Further, by assuming that the Wampanoags had no real 
tactics or strategy, Englishmen denied that native societies 
took any care to train, prepare, or plan for their military
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operations. Quite to the contrary, virtually every attack 
made by Metacom or his allies corresponded to 
well-established patterns common among American Indian 
groups and actually among tribal peoples throughout the 
world. Mobility and surprise attacks, especially at dawn, 
were basic elements of aboriginal warfare. American natives 
combined quick offensive action and overwhelming initial 
fire power to make debilitating shock work to their 
advantage. Such tactics were ordinarily employed by the 
Indians during King Philip's War. Attacks did not acquire 
or display these characteristics randomly; the fact that 
the same successful practices recurred with such regularity 
indicated that the natives gave conscious thought to their 
methods. In claiming that this brand of warfare, including 
the frequent use of ambushes, represented barbarism, 
Englishmen judged native actions by European standards that 
did not necessarily apply in North America.27 To the 
Indians, their actions were not formless, purposeless, or 
barbaric— they were proven effective tactics.
New Englanders seemed to take offense even at the 
suggestion that the natives could proceed in a rational 
manner on their own initiative. According to the prevalent 
opinion, "when sent by God in way of Judgment, [the Indians] 
act as if they were under Military Conduct," but in no way 
could such an appearance result from their own training or 
expertise.28 "Military Conduct" was not a virtue which 
Englishmen generally attributed to native Americans, instead
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crediting their martial successes more to "perfidious 
Subtlety and Falsehood, or to the Advantage of Season,
Place, and Number than any Valour or Courage."29 Civilized 
Europeans refused to admit that their supposedly savage 
counterparts could best them without divine aid, guile, or 
luck.
Massachusetts chroniclers noted that New England 
natives preferred and benefitted from action in rough 
terrain. The swamps of Plymouth and Rhode Island presented 
special advantages to the Indians while compounding the 
confusion and frustration of colonial troops. The swamps, 
which Hubbard characterized as "Habitations of Darkness," 
were "so full of Bushes and Trees, that a Parcel of Indians 
may be within the Length of a Pike of a Man," said Nathaniel 
Saltonstall, "and he cannot discover them." In addition, 
the natives, "being so light of Foot," travelled easily 
through bogs where the English "could by no Means pursue 
them."30 Admittedly, New Englanders displayed definite 
shortcomings in wilderness combat, and they were no match 
for the natives in tracking through heavy cover, but the 
troopers and most of their leaders seemed to develop a 
debilitating sense of pessimism about fighting the Indians. 
Perhaps they believed that the ability to maneuver in swamps 
was less than civilized, but the colonists decided, at least 
while the war was going badly, that they simply could not 
follow the natives through the bogs.
Massachusetts authorities were disappointed that their
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forces failed to defeat Metacom during the summer of 1675,
before the war got out of hand. According to John Pynchon,
the English were "somewhat awk[ward] and fearful in scouting 
31and spy mg." In one case, related by Capt. Benjamin
Church, English soldiers hesitated to enter an area 
reportedly infested with rattlesnakes, "which the little 
company seem'd more to be afraid of than the black Serpents 
they were in quest of." In other cases, troopers lacked a 
healthy degree of caution. Maj. Daniel Gookin recalled a 
soldier who wore "a new pair of shoes that made a creaking 
noise as [he] travelled" on a campaign. The company's 
Mohegan guide refused to continue "until he had persuaded 
the fellow with the creaking shoes to take his moccasins and 
wear them, and the Indian carried the Englishman's shoes at 
his back, and went himself barefoot." Another soldier wore 
"a pair of leather breeches, which being dry made a rustling 
noise"; again, the Mohegan halted "until he had persuaded 
the man to take off his breeches, or else to wet them in 
water to prevent their rustling."32
These instances represent somewhat humorous examples of 
English incompetence in combating hostile natives in a 
wilderness environment. English ineptitude, however, 
sometimes proved fatal. Mather related an incident in which 
English soldiers were so disconcerted by the thick cover 
that they fired at each other rather than at their enemies. 
Certainly, Mather's account was full of symbolism— the 
English blinded by evil forces and becoming their own
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enemy— but unfortunately for the colonists, this event and
others like it actually occurred. Indian warfare definitely
had colonial militiamen spooked. Early in the war they
continually overestimated native strength and shrank away
from opportunities to attack. In November 1675, Capt. David
Henchman's company came upon a wigwam full of Indians, but
because of the "cowardice of most of his men, [the
opportunity] followed not to [the natives1] capture."33
During an attack near Springfield the following March, a
small band of Indians scared off the militia detachment
assigned to escort a group of civilians to church. The
Massachusetts Council denounced the incident "as a matter of
great shame, humbling to us." Even more humiliating, a
contemporary poet mocked the soldiers with the lines, "Seven
Indians, and one without a Gun,/ Caused Capt. Nixon, and 40 
34men to run." The inability to defeat the natives early 
in the war definitely caused a great deal of consternation 
among colonial authorities; it also caused a great deal of 
debate over the best tactics to employ.
These references seem to contradict Hubbard's 
suggestion that many English defeats "proceeded from our too 
much Confidence in our own Weapons, Courage and Martial 
Discipline."35 The natives certainly had enough firearms 
by 1675, a fact Hubbard admitted, and examples abound which 
indicate that the English had no edge in courage. Only in 
the area of "Martial Discipline" could the colonial forces 
claim superiority, and it must be a matter of debate whether
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that attribute represented an advantage in wilderness 
combat. A widely held opinion after the defeats, however, 
was that the militia should not attempt "to deal with the 
Indians in their own Way." Hubbard blamed the loss of 
nearly all of Capt. Thomas Lathrop's Essex Company near 
Deerfield in September 1675 on "a wrong Notion" that the 
colonists could defeat the natives "by skulking behind 
Trees, and taking their Aim at single Persons." The 
companies would have been more successful, he maintained,
"if they had kept together in a Body, and fought marching." 
Pynchon went even further; he advocated the garrisoning of 
vulnerable towns in preparation for attacks, pointing out 
the uselessness of sending roving bands of militia to track 
the Indians down on their own terrain.36 Pynchon and other 
military officials came to realize that the struggle against 
the native warriors required a serious commitment and a 
cohesive strategy.
Benjamin Church was one of the few New Englander 
writers who consistently advised and presented a secular 
approach to the war. If colonial authorities really 
"intended to make an end of the War," he warned, "they must 
make a business of the War, as the Enemy did."37 
Practically the only colonial leader who openly admitted to 
appreciating native martial skills, Church felt that New 
Englanders had to lay aside all other concerns and fully 
commit themselves to a realistic struggle against an 
imposing opponent. Obstacles appeared, however, not only in
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convincing the Puritan leadership to adopt a practical view 
of the conflict or in formulating an effective strategy; 
Massachusetts experienced difficulty merely getting men into 
the ranks. When "the Country calls for their service," the 
Council lamented in late 1675, "sundry persons are found 
absent." Some engaged in the "hainous" practice of running 
away from service, even after being "Impressed or Commanded 
by Lawfull Authority." In an attempt to prevent such 
irresponsibility, Massachusetts passed an act making it 
unlawful for any "Listed Soldier . . .  to Conceale or hide 
himselfe or Armes from the Country service at any time."38
While the colonies had trouble actually fighting the 
war, they had no trouble justifying their involvement in it. 
Aside from the immediate assurance that the conflict 
resulted from God's punishment of their backsliding, Puritan 
leaders could draw on numerous precedents in both scripture 
and Judeo-Christian thought as sanctions for their battle 
against the forces of evil in New England. The Old 
Testament, of course, is replete with examples of the 
Hebrews engaging in religious wars, ordained and aided by 
God, against the pagans. At a later date, Martin 
Luther— echoing the thoughts of Thomas Acquinus— laid out 
his ideas on just wars as a means of doing God's work. 
Arguing against the misguided opinion that soldiers "engaged 
in a very unchristian work and one entirely contrary to 
Christian love," Luther maintained that they performed a 
"precious and godly" service in protecting their families,
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communities, homes, and property. "Self-protection is 
certainly a sound reason for war . . . and he who kills 
another in self-defense," according to the author, "is 
innocent in everyone's eyes." Further, Luther assured his 
readers that "the losers were almost always those who 
started the war." He concluded with the phrase "The Lord 
scatters those who desire war"(Psalm 68:l).39 New England 
Puritans could not have found a better justification for 
their struggle to destroy the hostile natives. They 
believed that they acted in self-defense against unprovoked 
attacks by an evil force. They definitely accepted none of 
the blame for causing or starting the conflict, so they 
could trust that in the final outcome the Lord would scatter 
the culpable Indians.
In the end, of course, the New England colonies finally 
defeated Metacom and his allied bands during the summer of 
1676. Virtually all New England writers, consistent with 
their earlier view of the war itself, attributed the victory 
to the will of God, who allowed them to "find some Way to 
cut off the bloody and deceitful Enemies of his People."40 
Just as they had preached throughout the conflict, the 
Puritan leadership viewed the outcome as a sign that the New 
England congregations had reformed their ways sufficiently. 
After the colonies suffered setback upon setback due to 
their lack of repentance, signs of God's returning favor 
finally appeared in 1676. "God himself hath sent from 
Heaven and saved us," wrote an anonymous New Englander, "by
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wasting [the Indians] with Sickness, Starving them through
want of Provisions, Leaving them to their own Divisions,
Taking away their Spirits, putting the Dread of us upon
them, [and] cutting off their Principal men, Sachems and 
41others." Indeed, after the poor performance of the
colonial militia in 1675, there was something almost
miraculous about the quick demise of the natives. As the
chronicler suggested, the ultimate victory resulted at least
as much from disease, starvation, and attrition as from
English military exploits, and probably more so. Even the
secular-minded Church attested that his troopers "had
[their] Lives for the most part, wonderfully preserved, by
the over-ruling Hand of the Almighty, from first to 
42last." Coming from a person like Church, such a
statement may seem surprising. Perhaps he realized that for
his work to be acceptable and popular in New England he
needed to give credit to God, but more likely his
acknowledgment exemplifies how deeply the Puritan message
reached, even among the reputedly less devout.
"It appears thus by the Sequel of things . . ," wrote
Hubbard after Metacom's death on August 12, 1676, "that
[God] is beginning to call his Enemies to an Account, and
punish them for the Pride of their Hearts and for all their
43Treachery and Cruelty against his Servants." The
Puritans saw no inconsistency in this notion. Just as they
had explained that God employed a supposedly heathen and 
satanic people to punish their backsliding, the New England
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faithful had no trouble believing that their loving God 
would turn on the natives who carried out His plan. In this 
view, the Almighty used the Indians as pawns to accomplish 
His ends and then cast them aside when they were of no more 
use to Him. This God sounds little like the one who called 
for the natives' conversion and salvation, but throughout 
the seventeenth century the Puritans saw themselves as the 
center of the Lord's attention. They believed with 
confidence that He would employ any means available to teach 
His people a lesson and ensure their repentance.
The immediate lesson to be learned was that New 
Englanders had to reform their ways, but more important 
perhaps, the lesson they drew from the whole experience was 
that God intended the mission— the errand into the 
wilderness— to continue. Increase Mather found deliverance 
from the Indians "a token for [the] good." No matter much 
they suffered "through Oppression, Affliction, and Sorrow," 
he pointed out, "yet our God will have compassion on us, and 
this his People shall not utterly perish."44 What reason 
would God have to spare "his People" if not as a mandate to 
carry forward their holy mission? This perception did not 
suddenly appear in 1676 out of the ashes of the 
Massachusetts frontier; it had precedents in both Puritan 
experience and Christian tradition. "This is not the first 
Time," wrote Hubbard, "that Christian People have been 
exposed to many Outrages, and barbarous Calamities from 
their Pagan Neighbors," and yet Christianity survived and
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flourished. In the recent New England past, in reference to
an illness, John Pynchon reflected the Puritan view of
providential punishment, in praying that "The Lord help me
to make a right profitable use of this and all other his
visitations that they may indeed turn to my spiritual
advantage . . . ." Pynchon expressed a desire "to lie at
his foot and to submit to his good pleasure that I may not
be found to despise his chastening nor yet to be weary of 
45his correction." New England Puritans viewed their 
errand as an ongoing commission. God's servants, throughout 
history, suffered setbacks and, because of their human 
nature, needed correction at times; but as long as they 
experienced the return of God's favor in the form of victory 
over their enemies, the faithful could believe in a 
continuing sanction for the City upon a Hill.
One danger of such assurance among New Englanders was 
overconfidence in their position as God's chosen people. 
Hubbard proclaimed, for instance, "though the Righteous fall 
seven Times, let not their Enemies rejoice; for the 
Righteous shall rise again, but their wicked Enemies shall 
fall into Mischief, and rise no more." He exhibited no 
doubt that the Lord would, in due time, "bring down their 
Enemies to lick the Dust before them."46 Hubbard seemed to 
forget, in this statement at least, that it was the Puritans 
who needed to learn humility from the conflict. If God had 
made anyone "lick the Dust," He should have forced all of 
New England to prostrate itself before Him. In the view
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expressed by Hubbard, the chosen few could not lose because 
the Almighty would always rescue them and humiliate their 
enemies. Such self-righteous gloating represented a 
complete antithesis to the repentance and reformation which 
the Puritan clergy tried to inspire. Trust in God was one 
thing; the expectation that New England inherently deserved 
His succor was quite another.
Perhaps if New Englanders had been able to recognize 
the real issues which drove Metacom's Wampanoags to 
hostilities, the trauma of the Indian war might have 
affected them less seriously. They could have made "a 
Business of the War," defeated the natives, healed their own 
wounds, and put the whole affair behind them. The beliefs 
of Puritanism were so ingrained in the region, however, that 
colonial authorities saw the hand of God controlling all 
events which affected His people. Far more than merely an 
attempt by the natives to repel the incursions of English 
culture, New Englanders perceived the conflict as the Lord's 
punishment for backsliders, as a call for repentance, and 
finally as a message for the continuation of the assigned 
errand. Therefore, although King Philip's War officially 
ended in 1676, its legacies lingered on as the colonists 
struggled to rebuild their estates, their communities, their 
institutions, and their mission during the troubled decades 
which followed.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE VICTORS AND THE VANQUISHED
If King Philip's War represented the focal point of a 
transitional phase for the white residents of New England, 
it did so in an even more poignant way for the native 
inhabitants of the region. Before the war, two basic types 
of Indians existed in the colonies, at least in English 
eyes— those who submitted to Puritan missionaries and civil 
authorities, and those who remained unconverted and 
recalcitrant. The one patterned their lives according to 
English norms; the other attempted to resist imposed 
restrictions. The distinction hardly made life any easier 
for the conformists, however. Praying Indians, so called, 
were caught between two cultures, alienated from aboriginal 
society but never fully accepted by white New Englanders. 
When King Philip's War erupted in 1675, the hatred focused 
particularly on the hostile Wampanoags and their allies; 
but the underlying malice toward and distrust of the 
converted natives also became manifest in ugly expressions 
of racial animosity. In many instances, New Englanders 
seemed to abandon their cherished standards of civility in 
combating the Indian threat, and in the process virtually
destroyed the refractory tribes. Thus, the conflict
38
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directly affected all of the natives in the region in 
varying degrees. King Philip's War also transformed most 
New Englanders' attitudes toward the Indians and allowed 
them to complete the domination aimed at since 1620.
William Hubbard probably reflected the hard feelings 
held against Indians in general better than did any other 
contemporary writer. They could not be trusted, he 
maintained, for "though their Words were smoother than Oil, 
yet were they drawn Swords." Of course, the natives could 
have said the same about English trustworthiness on many 
occasions, but no matter. The Wampanoags and their allies 
clearly did not adhere to the civilized standards by which 
writers such as Hubbard attempted to judge them. Describing 
an attack on an Indian camp near Sudbury in March 1676, he 
stated, "it was so dark that an Indian could hardly be 
discerned from a better Man."1 In the eyes of most New 
Englanders, their own moral superiority over the natives was 
unquestionable and, for all practical purposes, permanent. 
Tribes that initiated hostilities against the colonists 
deserved relentless retribution; those allied with the 
colonies merited little more than thinly veiled suspicion 
and prejudice.
One powerful group of Indians apparently straddled the 
fence, at least early in the conflict, and colonial 
authorities originally sought to ensure the cooperation of 
the Narragansett tribe. Soon after the initial attacks by 
Philip's warriors, Massachusetts commanders entered Rhode
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Island, without that colony's consent, and, by treaty, made
the Narragansetts pledge complete allegiance to the English.
Although elements of the tribe almost certainly sympathized
with the Wampanoag warriors at the time, the colonists as
yet had no reason to doubt Narragansett neutrality. In
formulating the treaty, and very likely at least hinting to
the natives of the repercussions should they reject it,
authorities entirely ignored the sovereignty of the tribe.
Political scientists have argued that in such situations
belligerent forces often attempt to influence neutrals with
threats of invasion and by pointing out the "loftiness" of
their own aims and the "sordidness" of the actions of their
enemies.2 Certainly these stratagems must have played a
part in the negotiations of July 1675. Very few New
Englanders probably believed that the treaty would hold up,
but even when it collapsed and Narragansett warriors under
Canonchet joined Metacom's bands, the pact worked to the
colonists' advantage. When it became apparent that the
reluctant allies were abetting New England's enemies,
colonial officials could lay aside "all Scruples as to the
Justness and Necessity of the War"; the only question
remaining was "whether it were Feasible and Expedient [to 
3attack] in the Winter?" While the treaty did not succeed 
in drawing the Narragansett tribe into the English fold, its 
failure allowed colonial forces to eliminate one more 
recalcitrant band. Either way, colonial ends were served.
Although later events justified the colonists'
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uneasiness about the Narragansett's intentions, the English 
had no cause for their wholesale distrust of the Praying 
Indians, the converted natives who lived under colonial 
authority in organized towns. Both to reflect and to 
enhance their missionary success, evangelists such as John 
Eliot encouraged the organization of these Praying Towns 
within the English sphere of control. Daniel Gookin, a 
long-time friend of the cooperative converts, said that the 
main reason for the move was "to secure places of habitation 
for them" in which "they [could] cohabit together compactly 
for good of religion & civility." Thus, Praying Towns 
contributed not only to the proselytization of the natives 
but also to the extension of English hegemony over them. In 
addition, Gookin noted that the arrangement would "prevent 
differences and contention among the English and 
Indians . . . about the propriety of land."4 Despite all 
good intentions— and there were many— New Englanders could 
not have missed the point that placing Indians in towns with 
circumscribed boundaries would free thousands of acres for 
their own expansion.
If the Praying Towns were designed to provide the 
Indians secure places of habitation and to prevent 
contention about the propriety of land, cases arose early in 
their history which contradicted these intentions. For 
instance, the most famous Indian town in Massachusetts, 
Natick, experienced a series of land disputes with the 
neighboring English settlement of Dedham. The Dedham
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residents resented the presence of the natives from the 
inception of Natick in the early 1650s. In 1653 Dedham 
requested of the Council and received a "drake" cannon, 
ostensibly for protection against dangerous Indians.
Between 1655 and 1663 the two towns engaged in a judicial 
contest over several thousand acres of land claimed by both. 
In the end, the natives kept the disputed territory, but the 
Dedhamites received a grant of 8,000 acres on the 
Connecticut River as compensation.5
Similar disagreements occurred between natives and 
whites in other towns, such as Sudbury and Marlborough. In 
each case, while the grants may have provided the Indians 
with places to live, they clearly failed to relieve tensions 
over land. More important, the resentment of the native 
residents could not have fostered an optimal environment for 
their civil or religious tutelage. As Eliot attested, 
though the converted Indians generally "esteem[ed]" the 
English, "the business about land giveth them no small 
matter of stumbling."6
Although Gookin claimed that by 1674 approximately 
1,100 Indians in Massachusetts alone lived "subject to the 
gospel," the success of the missionary effort was always 
exaggerated. The population of Praying Indians probably 
exceeded 2,000 in all of southern New England at the time; 
of that number at least 168 received full church membership 
and 350 were baptized. The Bay Colony boasted seven 
established Praying Towns on the eve of King Philip's War:
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Natick (29 families), Punkapaog (12), Hassanamesitt (12), 
Okammakamesit (10), Wamesit (15), Nashobah (10), and 
Maqunkaquog (11). Of these, only Natick and Hassanamesitt 
had organized churches. All of the natives in these towns 
came from the tribes around the bay, but the colony was in 
the process of forming seven new towns, totalling as many as 
one hundred and thirty families among the Nipmuck Indians of 
the interior. Unfortunately, the conflict put an end to the 
plan because most of the Nipmucks, "being but raw and lately 
initiated into the Christian profession, fell off from the 
English and joined the enemy."7 Still, despite the 
shortcomings, criticisms, and difficulties associated with 
the effort, the missionaries were proud of their charges. 
Writing specifically of the natives at Okammakamesit, near 
Marlborough, but probably referring to all of the converts, 
Eliot stated in 1670, "our godly Indians do obtain a good 
report of the godly English, which is an argument that 
bringeth light and evidence to my heart, that our Indians 
are really godly."8 Unfortunately, the bulk of the 
colonial population did not share "the Apostle's" 
conviction.
Had the colonists shown less bias and suspicion toward 
their converted neighbors, the natives' martial expertise 
might have been employed to the colonies' advantage against 
Metacom. Gookin, superintendent of the Praying Indians 
since 1656, suggested that the Massachusetts government 
should have fortified the established Praying Towns "as a
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wall of defence" and as bases for combined Indian-white 
scouting parties. They "were greatly ambitious to give 
demonstration to the English of their fidelity and good 
affection," he stated, and a cooperative effort possibly 
could have helped secure the colonial frontier. But it was 
not to be; "the most holy God for the chastisement of the 
English and Indians disposed otherwise.1,9 Somehow, New 
Englanders attributed their distrust of the friendly natives 
to God's program of correction.
Examples of the converts turning on their English 
neighbors were greatly exaggerated, if not entirely 
fabricated. Most of the reports reflect more a bias against 
Indians in general— and against the vulnerable Praying 
Indians in particular— than any firm evidence of treachery. 
"They that wear the Name of Praying Indians," claimed 
Nathaniel Saltonstall, "have made Preys of much English 
Blood." Likewise, Mary Pray charged that "those Indians 
that are caled praying Indians never [shoot] at the other 
Indians, but up into the tops of the trees or into the 
ground" in an attempt to warn New England's enemies. Later, 
Mary Rowlandson reported that during her captivity she heard 
of supposed English allies cooperating with King Philip 
"without any scruple, but that they should prosper, and gain 
the victory."10 These citations have at least one common 
characteristic; all three are based on hearsay or 
suspicion, without presenting any clear evidence.
Certainly, some Praying Indians turned against the English
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in response to individual experience, and even Gookin 
admitted as much.11 But as a whole, the native residents 
of the anglicized towns did not deserve the accusations 
leveled against them at the beginning of King Philip's War.
The first insult involved an attempt to restrict the 
free movement of the Praying Indians. In August 1675, the 
Massachusetts Council ordered that "all those Indians that 
are desirous to Approve themselves Faithfull to the English, 
be confined to their several Plantations" of Natick, 
Punkapaog, Nashobah, Wamesit, and Hassanamesitt. Further, 
the act prohibited them from travelling "above one mile from 
the center of such of their dwellings unless in [the] 
company of some English . . .  on peril of being taken as our 
enemies, or their abettors." Massachusetts officials put 
the burden of obedience squarely on the natives; the 
Council declared itself "wholly Innocent" of any injuries 
inflicted on Indians who defied the restrictions, 
proclaiming "their Blood or other dammage . . . will be upon 
their own heads."12 This act indicated that, at least in 
time of war, the colonists really saw no distinction between 
recalcitrant natives and those who lived under English 
authority. The Praying Indians were to be confined and 
supervised closely, and anyone who violated the letter of 
the law for whatever reasons— innocent or otherwise— merited 
summary judgment.
With popular feeling against all natives so widespread, 
it became increasingly dangerous for any New Englanders to
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defend the Praying Indians. Gookin clearly sympathized with 
"the poor Christian Indians, who [were] much weakened or 
diminished by the conflict."13 Feelings ran so strongly 
against persons such as Eliot, Gookin, and Thomas Danforth 
that they were openly accused of treason and even threatened 
with violence. Gookin was defeated in his bid for 
reelection as an Assistant in 1676. At one point, he 
recorded that "he was affraid to go along the Streets; the 
Answer was made," by his overzealous detractors, "you may 
thank yourself."14 Magistrates and missionaries were not 
the only ones subject to such criticism. Capt. Daniel 
Henchman, for instance, became unpopular with some of his 
men due to his moderate view toward the natives. The 
soldiers blamed Henchman's approach for his lack of success, 
and when they refused to fight for him, the General Court 
gave in and replaced him.15
Despite the criticism he suffered, Gookin suggested 
that the colonists had ample cause for their bias, even if 
he did not condone their actions. He did not blame them 
directly but rather "the malice of Satan against Christ's 
work among those Indians" designed "to hinder their progress 
in religion.1,16 Just as they denied playing any role in 
antagonizing the Wampanoags to the point of hostility and 
saw the war as God's punishment for their backsliding, the 
colonists rationalized away any sense of guilt they may have 
felt due to their prejudice against the Praying Indians by 
blaming "the malice of Satan." Another New Englander cited
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the behavior of "some few of the praying Indians." "I say 
it is not to be wondered at," he argued, "that they were 
under a Jealousie by us. . . .1,17 For a people who 
believed that the sole cause of the war was their own 
sinfulness, the Puritans certainly claimed an inordinant 
amount of innocence in all areas of actual contact with the 
natives.
New Englanders did not stop at confining the Praying 
Indians to their settlements. During the late summer and 
fall of 1675, white neighbors of the Praying Towns wrongly 
accused the natives of a series of transgressions against 
their lives and property. In spite of the absence of any 
proof of native guilt, group after group faced indictments 
and eventual deportation to wind-swept islands in Boston 
Harbor. For instance, eleven Indians from Hassanamesitt 
were implicated in the August 22 attack on Lancaster by 
Capt. Samuel Mosely, who "found much Suspicion 
against . . . them, for Singing and Dancing, and having 
Bullets and Slugs, and much Powder hid in their Baskets." 
Despite their acquittal in Boston, most of them were sent to 
the harbor "for better Security, and for preventing future 
Trouble in the like kind."18 Since the English were more 
guilty of wrongs against the natives than were the 
Hassanamesitts of injury to the residents of Lancaster, it 
is difficult to determine just whose "better Security" was 
served by the removal. In any case, the General Court 
sought to ease the peoples* minds by punishing a scapegoat;
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the real enemy continued as elusive as ever.
Even the residents of the colony's oldest Praying Town 
did not escape suspicion; the long history of contention 
between them and the white inhabitants of Dedham stood as a 
backdrop to the events of 1675. On October 13, the 
Massachusetts Council, upon an unspecified suspicion of the 
Naticks having "some designe against the English," ordered 
that "all the Naticke Indians be forth with sent for, & 
disposed of to Deare Island" in the harbor. The Council 
proclaimed that "none of the said Indians shall presume to 
goe off the said islands voluntarily, upon paine of death," 
making it lawfull for any Englishman "to destroy those that 
they shall finde stragling off from the said places of 
theire confinement." Again, colonial officials claimed that 
the incarceration of the natives served "their own & the 
countreys security.1,19 Admittedly, innocent Praying 
Indians could and did suffer from violence by prejudicial 
colonists, but this concern could not have been primary in 
the legislators' minds. Their actions clearly answered the 
fears and biases of their constituents, who doubted the 
fidelity of the Praying Indians.
The natives on Deer Island fared poorly, uprooted from 
their homes and placed on desolate spurs of land in the 
middle of Boston Harbor. In the Council's defense, 
Massachusetts legislators initially instructed the 
provincial treasurer to provide for the Indians on the 
islands. With approximately five hundred detainees confined
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by the end of 1675, however, the resources proved 
insufficient. According to Gookin, during that winter they 
"endured inexpressible hardships," but did so "patiently, 
humbly, and piously, without murmuring or complaining 
against the English for their sufferings." All the while, 
the oppressed natives exhibited "much practical Christianity 
in this time of their trials," a trait which unfortunately 
their English counterparts failed to display.20 Eventually 
the Council took notice of the natives* "present distressed 
condition, . . . they being ready to perish for want of 
bread, & incapacitated to make provission for the future."
In response, the government ordered that someone be hired to 
catch fish for them and authorized that some of the natives 
could be hired out as scouts or laborers to augment the 
sustenance of those left on the islands.21 Such small 
gestures, though made with good intentions, did little to 
remedy the wrongs already perpetrated against the natives.
With the colony "full of murmurings, and unreasonable 
Rage against the enemy,"22 the Praying Indians were not 
entirely secured in their exile even by the expanse of water 
which separated them from the Massachusetts mainland. In 
February 1676, Thomas Sheppard of Charlestown testified to 
the Council that he had been approached by certain 
individuals about a plan to attack Deer Island. The 
motivation for the plot apparently resulted from recent 
raids on Medfield and Lancaster. The revenge-minded 
conspirators "could not come at the enemy Indians, for they
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were too crafty and subtle for the English," mocked Gookin, 
"therefore they would have wreaked their rage upon the poor 
unarmed Indians our friends."23 While not many New 
Englanders at that specific juncture considered even the 
Praying Indians their "friends,"— and certainly did not 
treat them as such— enough consciences fortunately were 
awakened in time to prevent such a cowardly act. The 
General Court received information on the plan and squelched 
it; the legislators could not give in to public sentiment 
to the extent of allowing indiscriminate violence against 
the natives. But the Indians remained in the harbor.
The Indians on Deer Island faced a serious lack of 
provisions and the occasional threat of attack by angry 
whites. Those peaceful natives who were permitted to remain 
on the mainland faced the latter, in addition to 
depradations by New England's enemies. Hostile Indians, 
especially the Nipmucks of central Massachusetts, attacked 
Praying Towns directly, but more importantly, they attempted 
to damage the already tenuous reputations of their converted 
brethren with their white neighbors. The most serious and 
long-lasting case involved the Wamesit Indians and the 
inhabitants of Chelmsford. The white residents were alarmed 
during the fall of 1675 by a series of burnings, generally 
haystacks and barns, in the town, and they immediately 
suspected the Wamesits, several of whom subsequently stood 
trial in Boston. Evidence, however, indicated that the real 
culprits were Nipmucks, whose motive was to drive a wedge
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between the Praying Indians and the townspeople, thereby 
forcing the Wamesits to join Metacom's resistance.
When the fires continued, two Chelmsford residents took
matters into their own hands, killing one twelve-year-old
Wamesit boy and wounding five women and children. The
murderers were arrested and tried for the crime, but the
white jury "pretended want of clear evidence," and released
them, "to the great grief and trouble generally of the
magistracy and ministry and other wise and godly men." As
Gookin correctly lamented, there was no lack of evidence but
"rather a mist of temptation and prejudice against these
poor Indians that darkened [the jury's] way."24 In
December, while Chelmsford petitioned the General Court to
remove the "Dangerous" Wamesits, the Council formed a
committee composed of Maj. Simon Willard, Gookin, Eliot, and
Danforth "to examine those Indians there . . . [and] to
settle them" either at Wamesit or Deer Island "so that they
who are friends [of] the English may be secured & the
2 5English m  those parts also secured." Sensing they were 
involved in a situation they could not win, caught between 
hostile enemies and not-so-friendly allies, most of the 
Wamesits fled during the winter and joined the neutral 
Penacooks under the sachem Wannalancet on the upper 
Merrimack River. "We are not sorry for what we leave 
behind," wrote the refugee chief Numphow to Captain 
Henchman, "but we are sorry the English have driven us from 
our praying to God and from our teachers."26 Whether or
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not this simple yet eloquent statement caused Massachusetts 
residents any guilt is difficult to determine, but it does 
clearly indicate that English actions, as well as those of 
the enemy during King Philip's War, damaged the progress of 
the mission to convert the natives of the region.
Had the Massachusetts government made effective use of
their resident Indians instead of confining or alienating
them, the war effort would have proceeded much more
efficiently. Despite early admonitions from military
figures like John Pynchon that it was "absolutely necessary
to engage some Indians with us, whereby we may understand
the motions of Philip," the colonies took few steps in that 
27direction in 1675. The Council did authorize the use of 
fifty-two Praying Indians under Maj. Thomas Savage during 
the first Mount Hope campaign of July 1675; although "most 
of them acquitted themselves courageously and faithfully," 
their terms of service ended within a month, and apparently 
most of them went home to face eventual exile on Deer 
Island.28 The General Court must have recognized the 
natives' clear superiority in scouting because finally in 
December 1675 it ordered Gookin to "ingage two of the 
trustyest & fittest of the Indians at Deare Island to goe 
forthe as spyes to gaine Intelligence of the enimy." The 
two chosen, James Quanapaug and Job Kattenamit, brought back 
valuable information concerning impending assaults on 
Lancaster, Groton, Marlborough, Sudbury, and Medfield. For 
some reason, however, their intelligence "was not then
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credited as it should have been," and the attacks proceeded 
when English action could have deflected them.29 
Massachusetts had a golden opportunity to spring a trap of 
their own on their enemies and to save valuable English 
lives and property, but in failing to respond to the 
warnings provided, they paid a high price for their 
distrust.
Not before the following spring did the colony again 
arm a body of Praying Indians. In April 1676, the Council 
authorized Gookin to help raise a company of Naticks to 
serve with other colonial troops. The next month 
Massachusetts created "a flyeing or Moving Army" of three 
hundred soldiers, including one hundred Indians, to 
"discover & Annoy the enemy upon their approach towards any 
of our plantations.1,30 Of all the colonial commanders, 
Benjamin Church made by far the most extensive and effective 
use of native troops. He did so not out of any special 
feeling for them but rather out of a recognition of their 
proficiency in wilderness warfare. Church, however, did not 
employ Praying Indians so much as he did enemies captured by 
his company. He approached captive warriors with the 
promise that "if any would behave themselves well, he would 
do well by them, and they should be his men."31
Church definitely valued his Indian soldiers, and 
Gookin predictably credited the Praying Indians with 
faithful service. He claimed that once Massachusetts began 
employing native companies, "the balance turned [to] the
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English side." Of probably greater significance was the 
praise given by various colonial military commanders.
Capt. Samuel Hunting, who commanded a company of Natick 
warriors, wrote that "the said Indians behaved themselves 
courageously and faithfully to the English interest." Major 
Savage echoed these same sentiments, while Captain Henchman 
cited "the sobriety, courage, and fidelty of the generality 
of those Indians."32 Furthermore, the natives believed 
that they provided a positive force for the colonies in the 
war. "We have . . . been sundry times in your service to 
the hazzard of our lives, both as spyes, messengers, scouts, 
and souldiers," wrote four Natick leaders, "and have through 
God's favor acquitted ourselves faithfully. . . . »33 
Unfortunately, most New Englanders did not share that 
opinion.
Despite the good showing that the natives displayed in 
battle and on campaigns, "the vulgar spared not to load them 
with reproaches." Even the white soldiers "conceived much 
animosity against" their Indian allies. Contradicting the 
good reports of the commanding officers, colonial troopers 
alleged "that [the natives] were cowards and skulked behind 
trees in a fight, and that they shot over the enemies' 
heads." Such slanderous statements, Gookin surmised, 
reflected "the rude temper of those times."34 If the 
Praying Indians could get no better reviews from the popular 
sort, the hopes of people like Eliot and Gookin that service 
in the war would improve New Englanders' feelings about the
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natives seemed remote. In fact, even when the colonial
government felt secure enough to release the refugees from
Deer Island, the Council sent them back to assigned towns
under restrictions only slightly less stringent than those
enforced early in the war. Ironically, Gookin felt that
this action indicated a softening of English hearts toward
the natives, "by little and little." The distrust
continued, however, as the government appointed white
guardians to oversee them and report on their behavior. Two
men assigned to observe the Naticks testified soon after the
war how their charges "behaved themselves both religiously
toward God, and respectively, obediently, and faithfully to 
35the English." Had this image penetrated deeper into New 
England society, white prejudice against the Praying Indians 
would have decreased and native assimilation would have 
increased in the long run.
Prejudice against the enemy Indians was understandably 
widespread during the war, and a marked double standard 
appeared in English judgment of their actions as compared to 
those of the colonial militia. Members of the two forces 
practiced some of the same extracurricular activities 
against their enemies, but colonial chroniclers 
characterized the natives' actions as barbaric atrocities 
while giving little or no adverse notice to white excesses. 
If the ambushes of Capt. Thomas Lathrop's detachment at 
Bloody Brook and of Capt. Richard Beer's company near 
Northfield in September 1675 were "massacres," so too were
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English attacks at the Narragansett Swamp in December 1675 
and at Turner's Falls in May 1676. In fact, in the former 
instances, the English casualties all were militiamen or 
their support units. Native casualties at the Swamp and 
Falls fights, conversely, consisted overwhelmingly of old 
men, women, and children, with only a small percentage of 
fighting men involved.36
Of course, Metacom's forces did attack New England 
towns, and women and children were victims of such assaults. 
But the Indians seemed more interested in taking 
noncombatants as hostages rather than in killing them. The 
English, on the other hand, seemed to make no "separation 
betwene the gilty and the inosent," while contemporary 
international law advised that belligerents should do so. 
Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist, wrote, 
"it is the bidding of mercy, if not justice, that, except 
for reasons that are weighty and will affect the safety of 
many, no action should be attempted whereby innocent persons 
may be threatened with destruction."37 The key disclaimer, 
however, was that New Englanders viewed all of Indian 
society as guilty, or at least suspect, and believed that 
native atrocities broke and voided rules of military 
justice. Indians, regardless of sex or age, were all 
"Serpents of the same Brood."38 The survival of any 
hostile elements was, to the colonists, a "weighty" matter 
which did "affect the safety of many," so native society, 
including noncombatants, had to be purged.
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Since New Englanders felt so strongly about their
enemies, and since they saw the struggle as a test of their
religious commitment, the colonies readily justified using
any means available to gain victory. The "Lord calls alowd
to a speedy & vigorous prosecution of the warr," maintained
the Massachusetts Council in December 1675.39 This
assurance in virtually a blanket sanction, combined with
criticism and misrepresentation of the natives'
"uncivilized" practices, produced the dichotomy in English
minds regarding the behavior of the contending forces. For
instance, Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote in reference to female
captives in the hands of their enemies, that "they first
forced them to satisfie their filthy Lusts and then murdered
them." This citation reflects the depth of contemporary
English fears, but the evidence contradicts Saltonstall
entirely. No New England women, including Mary Rowlandson,
recorded any instances of their Indian masters threatening
their virtue. Fortunately, some writers, notably William
Hubbard, reported of "those poor captive Women and Children,
that they found so much Favour in the Sight of their
Enemies, that they offered no Wrong to any of their Persons,
save what they could not help, being in many Wants 
40themselves." Regrettably, native women and children did 
not get the same consideration from their English enemies, 
either in combat or afterwards in captivity.
The native practice which seemed to incense the 
colonists the most was the mutilation of their victims,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
especially by beheading. Hubbard accused the enemy of
"insolent Rage and Cruelty" in the case of some of Captain
Beer's soldiers having their heads "fix[ed] upon Poles near 
41the Highway." Actually, instances of the colonists
committing the same atrocities date all the way back to the
Wessagusset incident of 1623. In 1671, the son of the
Nipmuck sachem Matoonas was executed in Boston for murdering
an Englishman, and his head was placed on a pole, "where it
long remained, as the terrific memorial of justice."
Fittingly, as frequent executions became commonplace on
Boston Commons during 1676, Matoonas, described by Hubbard
as an "old malicious Villian," himself faced the same fate,
his head placed "upon a Pole near the Gibbet where he was
hanged up." In perhaps an even more extreme case, when
colonial soldiers found the drowned corpse of Metacom's ally
Weetamoo, the Queen of Pocasset, they cut her head off and 
42set it on display m  Taunton. The chieftain himself had 
a bounty of L50 placed on his head by the Massachusetts 
Council, and when he was killed by an Indian in the English 
service, the successful marksman demanded the right to 
mutilate the body. Captain Church definitely did not 
object. In fact, he authorized that after Metacom was 
quartered and beheaded, in retribution for his causing "many 
an English mans body to lye unburied and rot above
43[ground], . . . not one of his bones should be buried."
New Englanders did not stop at beheading in their 
search for satiating revenge. Early in the war, for
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example, proposals came before the Council suggesting the
use of dogs to hunt down Indians. On October 16, 1675,
Captain Mosely wrote to Governor Leverett relating the fate
of an old squaw captured near Springfield. "This aforesaid
Indian, . . . was ordered to be torn in peeces by Doggs," he
stated rather matter-of-factly, "and she was soe dealt with 
44all." In another instance, some English sailors decided
to test the rumor that all Indian children could swim
instinctively, like animals, and so overturned a canoe
carrying a woman and child. The sailors got their answer;
the child, offspring of an important sagamore in Maine,
drowned. It was no wonder that a particular group of native
hostages escaped from the colonists holding them, according
to Hubbard, "trusting more to the Celerity of their own Feet
than to the Civility of their English Friends." And yet,
despite this long history of colonial excesses, Hubbard
criticized the Mohegan allies for torturing a captive turned
over to them by the English. "Instances of this Nature
should be Incentive unto us," he sermonized, "to bless the
Father of Lights, who hath called us out of the dark Places
45
of the Earth, full of the Habitations of Cruelty." He 
offered no criticism of the colonists who knowingly provided 
the torture victim nor regret at comparable English 
practices against their captives.
While the natives tortured and mutilated their enemies, 
they did so for far different reasons than did their English 
counterparts. The colonists seemed to be driven by no other
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motives than intense racial hatred and a desire to punish 
their enemies with vengeful finality. North American 
natives, conversely, did not mistreat their captives' bodies 
merely to inflict punishment; rather, these practices 
represented highly ritualized acculturation tools, designed 
to teach bravery through the example of the victim and to 
transfer that spirit through his body parts to the 
executioners.46 In native societies, torture and 
mutilation held deep spiritual meaning for both the captive 
and his captors.
Perhaps, in the long run, the Indians who faced summary 
execution by New England authorities were actually more 
fortunate in their fate than were their compatriots who 
survived. Unwilling to let any hostile elements remain free 
in the region, the colonial governments sold away into 
slavery or bonded servitude those captives who escaped 
death. While no record of the exact numbers of Indians 
transported as a result of King Philip's War exists, New 
Englanders were well accustomed to the practice, which dated 
back to the Pequot War. The only relevant Massachusetts law 
concerning the sale of prisoners was a 1641 statute which 
prohibited "Bondslavery, Villenage or Captivity . . . unless 
it be lawful Captives taken in just Wars. . . . ” Colonial 
officials, of course, viewed the struggle as a just war, and 
as a result, hundreds of Wampanoag, Narragansett, and 
Nipmuck Indians found themselves sold as slaves in such 
diverse places as Spain, Portugal, Bermuda, the West Indies,
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47the Azores, and Virginia.
The immediate impetus for pressing captives into 
servitude was embodied in various Council orders and 
commissions. Early in the war, the Council directed Captain 
Mosely to "kill none that he took alive, but secure them in
Order to a Transportation." Likewise, after the victory
over the Narragansetts in December 1675, Gen. Josiah Winslow 
received orders from the Massachusetts government 
"Concerning the disposall of the Indian prisoners." "Our 
Advice," wrote Secretary Edward Rawson, "is that if any 
[are] present to buy them, they may be sould there & 
delivered by your Orders. . . . "  Even Captain Church, who 
employed native captives, had the stipulation in his 
commission that "it shall be lawfull, and is hereby
warrantable for him and [his soldiers] to make Sale of such
Prisoners as their perpetual Slaves."48 From the start of 
the war, and even before, the colonial governments had 
established a policy of disposing of Indian captives by 
selling them out of the region as slaves, but not all 
company commanders, including those who received the above 
orders, implemented the policy consistently.
In July 1675, shortly after the assault on the Plymouth 
town of Dartmouth, 160 natives who played no part in the 
attack agreed to surrender to local military authorities 
under a promise of protection and amnesty. The response of 
the provincial government, however, was to sell all except 
six of them out of the country and into slavery. In a
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similar case, a group of about 200 Maine Indians fled to
Cocheco (Dover, New Hampshire) under a promise of protection
from the local garrison commander, Maj. Richard Waldron, but
they were captured by Massachusetts troops and marched to
Boston. Of the group, seven or eight of the men faced
49execution, and the rest were transported. Whether 
attributable to human inconsistency, lack of communication, 
or merely insensitivity, the broken promises undoubtedly 
hurt the colonial war effort. "Had their promises to the 
Indians been kept, and the Indians farely treated," Church 
wrote, '"tis probable that most if not all the Indians in 
those Parts, had soon followed the Example of those that 
had . . . surrendered themselves; which would have been a 
good step towards finishing the War."50
Of course, not all captives faced a life of servitude. 
The criterion employed to judge their fate involved their 
behavior during the war, whether proven or suspected. 
Regarding "Indian ennemyes seized," the Massachusetts 
Council on September 16, 1676 proclaimed that "such of them 
as shall appeare to have imbrued their hands in English 
blood should suffer death here" and not receive the 
favorable treatment of transportation "into forreigne 
parts."51 None of the surviving records states just how 
authorities decided which captured enemies had "English 
blood" on their hands, but since New Englanders considered 
all of Indian society guilty, at least by implication, 
perhaps the distinction was not really significant to those
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sitting in judgment. The most dangerous captives— warriors 
and their leaders— deserved death, while noncombatants 
needed to be secured for the safety of New England society. 
Either way, the ultimate goal of eliminating any potentially 
hostile elements was accomplished.
While the majority of colonists approved of Indian 
slavery, a small number of men, generally the same ones who 
also defended the Praying Indians, spoke out against the 
policy of transportation. John Eliot began a 1675 petition 
to the General Court with the warning that "the terror of 
selling away such Indians, unto the Islands for perpetual 
slaves . . . may produce, we know not what evil 
consequences, upon all the land. Christ hath saide, blessed 
are the mercyfull, for they shall obteine mercy." Eliot 
reminded the legislators, "when we came, we declared to the 
world . . . the indeavour of the Indians conversion, not 
theire exstirpation." "My humble request is," he pleaded, 
"that you would follow Christ his designe, in this matter, 
to promote the free passage of Religion among them, & not to 
destroy them." The evangelist did not advocate total 
amnesty; those who deserved death should face it. But as 
for the rest, he declared, transportation was "worse than 
death." Eliot warned the court that "to sell soules for 
money seemeth to me a dangerous merchandize," which would 
result in untold evils to the mission in the long run.52
Far preferable in the view of people such as Eliot and 
Gookin, especially in cases involving children, was to place
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harmless captives with Christian families in the colony as 
servants. The General Court concurred and in May 1677 
regulated the system to insure that native youth bonded as 
servants "be instructed in civility & Christian religion" by 
their masters. The court also decreed that these children 
remain in servitude until the age of twenty four.53 After 
that period of tutelage, the former enemies would apparently 
be ready for assimilation into the Praying Towns, but 
certainly not acceptance into the mainstream of New England 
society.
Eliot's fear that a result of the war would be an 
"exstirpation" of the region's native population did not 
come true, at least physically. Studies have suggested that 
in most wars the victorious society does not completely 
destroy its defeated enemy, but rather subjects the remnants 
and imposes its own brand of culture upon them.54 Such was 
the case in New England. At the close of the war, any 
natives not residing in English houses as servants or 
apprentices were assigned to live at Natick, Punkapaog, 
Hassanamesitt, or Wamesit, "where they may be continually 
inspected." At least once each year, authorities were to 
compile a list of all the residents of each town, so that 
the provincial government could keep close watch on its 
native residents. By the early 1680s, the Council saw fit 
to punish natives who violated the imposed restrictions by 
placing them in their local "House of Correction.1,55 Such 
qualifications hardly classified the natives, whether
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previously Praying Indians or captives who finished their 
period of servitude, as free and equal members of New 
England society. The outcome of King Philip's War did not 
eliminate Indians from the region; it just made those 
remaining strictly subject to colonial authority.
Hubbard credited "the special Hand of God" with shaping 
the post-war situation, clearing the former recalcitrant 
tribes from their lands and "making way to settle a better 
People in their Rooms and in their Stead."56 Although New 
Englanders felt superior to the natives throughout the 
seventeenth century, the war hardened English attitudes of 
themselves as the "better People." The colonists seemed to 
feel truly secure only when they could hold all proximate 
natives in a subordinate position. And when authorities had 
the remaining natives restricted to the existing Praying 
Towns, New Englanders seemed to lose interest in the mission 
to Christianize them. Of course, the question of just how 
widespread the commitment had ever been is a matter of 
debate. But by effectively placing the Indians under 
English authority, the colonists attained the ultimate goal 
of making their counterparts dependent and controllable. In 
the end, secular power played more of a role than did 
religious conversion, but the result was the same.57 New 
England's native population was no longer a force to be 
feared or proselytized but rather a collection of weakening 
bands to be impounded and dominated.
However, the rhetoric of missionary responsibility
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survived among the more zealous clergy after 1676. "There
are many [Indians], which maintain a Christian
conversation. . . . "  wrote Cotton Mather in 1710. He
expressed optimism about the future of the mission, noting
the natives' own desire "to preserve and improve the
Christianity already professed among them, and prevent the
loss of a noble work by some degeneracies," such as
alcohol.58 Mather and others were quick to publish tallies
of the numbers of native congregations, Indian teachers, and
Praying Indians, but by all accounts, the majority of the
figures came from Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, and
Plymouth, where the missionary efforts had always proven
more successful. Missionary activities never seemed to 
59revive in Massachusetts. Four Praying Towns there 
survived, but the spread of Christianity stagnated, at least 
at the end of the seventeenth century, and many New 
Englanders who had participated in the missionary effort 
recognized the damage done by the war. Gookin openly 
lamented the "ill conceit" and unjust prejudice against the 
natives, which greatly increased after the conflict, and 
Increase Mather rhetorically questioned "how hath the Indian 
work, I mean the work of Christ among them . . . been 
slighted, scorned, [and] vilified?"60 John Eliot provided 
the answer for all of New England to hear. "There is a 
cloud," said the Apostle at the point of his death in 1690, 
"a dark cloud upon the work of the gospel among the poor 
Indians." His last prayer was that "The Lord revive and
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prosper that work, and grant it may live when I am 
dead."61 Unfortunately, the missionary effort in 
Massachusetts reached a state of ill health, for all intents 
and purposes, almost as serious as that of its founder.
King Philip's War resulted in the end of the 
ambivalence with which New Englanders approached their 
Indian neighbors. The rhetoric of missionary responsibility 
was at the heart of the colonial experiment from the start, 
but the promises always outweighed the results. Even those 
Indians who accepted Christianity and English authority in 
the Praying Towns faced the ever-present ambiguity. The war 
deepened the distrust already held against the Praying 
Indians and transformed any mixed feelings concerning 
resistant tribes to unqualified malevolence. After 1676, 
Massachusetts authorities brought cooperative natives under 
strict supervision and virtually eliminated the rest; 
either way, life could never be the same again for New 
England's native element. For the English, their handling 
of the Indians represented a satisfactory solution to at 
least one of the many problems facing the colony during the 
post-war years. The colonists, however, were not so 
fortunate in resolving other matters of contention.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HIGH COST OF WAR
King Philip's War cost Massachusetts and the other New 
England colonies dearly. Especially hard hit were the 
frontier areas of the Bay Colony, such as the Connecticut 
River Valley towns. Since most of the fighting occurred 
there, the Hampshire County settlements suffered the 
greatest numbers of casualties, both military and civilian. 
Because of the vulnerable position of frontier communities, 
many towns had to be abandoned, and other settlements had to 
bear the burden of absorbing the refugees.
The problems were not all local in nature, however. 
Provincial treasuries were also strained by the conflict, 
and colonial officials had to pass the deficits on to the 
citizenry in the form of unprecedented levels of taxation. 
Much attention during the decades following King Philip's 
War necessarily focused on recovering the vast expenditures 
of the conflict. But the colonial treasury was not alone in 
its search for reimbursement. While their government 
demanded multiple levies, countless Massachusetts 
individuals and numerous towns petitioned for direct 
payments or tax exemptions as recompense for their wartime 
losses. The wounds left by the war were deep.
76
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Massachusetts colonists faced constant reminders of the high 
price of the war, both in memories of their dead comrades 
and in the persistent economic legacies. The effort to 
regain material stability represented a nagging and 
troublesome problem in the postwar years.
In any war, the human cost is the most closely felt, 
and the most difficult to recoup. At a time when the total 
white population of New England reached only perhaps 52,000, 
the colonies lost over six hundred men— or close to 
one-tenth of all adult males— in the fighting. This figure 
does not even include the countless noncombatants who 
perished in isolated raids or who never returned from Indian 
captivity.1 Naturally, such a traumatic loss had a lasting 
effect on the surviving population.
The trauma was especially severe in the frontier areas. 
At least 145 persons lost their lives in Hampshire County 
alone in 1675? another 64 died the next year and 16 more 
were slain in 1677, for a three-year total of 225. Many of 
these victims were soldiers brought from other parts of the 
colony to protect the frontier, but more than 80 of the 
total lived in the county prior to the conflict.2 The two 
bloodiest days of the war for the English occurred on 
September 18, 1675, at Bloody Brook in Deerfield, when 74 
men under the command of Capt. Thomas Lathrop lost their 
lives, and May 19, 1676, at Turner's Falls, when the natives 
reversed an apparent English victory, killing 38 troopers. 
Included among the 74 casualties at Bloody Brook were 14 of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16 Deerfield men employed by Lathrop as wagon drivers.
These 14 men, who ranged in age from 15 to 58, left 9 widows 
and at least 40 fatherless children. Since the victims 
represented over one-third of the town's adult male 
population at the time, the remaining residents 
understandably agreed to abandon their exposed community 
indefinitely.3 At the Falls Fight, where most of the 
soldiers came from the Connecticut Valley towns of 
Springfield, Northampton, Hadley, and Hatfield, 26 of the 33 
casualties whose places of residence are listed in the 
records resided in Hampshire County. The largest number of 
dead— 12— were from Northampton, with 6 from Hadley, 4 from 
Hatfield, 3 from Springfield, and 1 from Deerfield.’ These 
two engagements alone accounted for the deaths of 39 
Hampshire residents, with Deerfield and Northampton 
suffering most heavily. Such examples support Thomas 
Hutchinson's claim that "Every person, almost, [in the 
colony] lost a relation or near friend, and the people in
5
general were exasperated."
Naturally, one of the main concerns both of the 
individual towns and of the provincial government was 
finding a way to defend the vulnerable communities. 
Relatively new and undeveloped plantations like Deerfield, 
Northfield, and Westfield obviously could not supply all 
their own needs and at the same time defend themselves from 
the elusive natives. Therefore, towns throughout the 
province were protected by resident garrisons apportioned
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from the militia regiments. The fact that "sundry persons" 
sought to avoid service by absenting themselves when local 
militia committees issued calls to fill their quotas must 
have frustrated efforts to secure the frontier.6 Requests 
for help kept coming from frightened colonists, and the 
Massachusetts government did its best to meet the increasing 
demands on its meager resources.
Raising troops to serve on the frontier was one matter; 
paying and supporting them was another. Part of the 
soldiers' salaries was paid by the Massachusetts treasurer, 
at least early in the war, but the bulk came from the towns. 
The families of soldiers on campaign or garrison duty 
received payment from their local treasurers, and as 
recompense, the towns were granted an equal credit toward 
their provincial tax rates.7 The responsibility for 
supplying garrison troops with provisions and other 
necessities fell to "the families in the several 
fortifications where they [were] placed." When Capt. Joshua 
Scottow requested supplies for his soldiers in November 
1675, the Council replied that according to practice, "the 
country soldiers are provided for with victualls by the 
people they secure."8 Even this requirement represented a 
heavy burden for many frontier towns. The residents of 
Northampton, for instance, while expressing reluctance "to 
burden the country, whose expenses have been great already," 
related their inability to support a garrison unassisted, 
since "the losses & expenses by reason of the war have been
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such, as renders us uncapable of such a thing.”9 From the 
start, the war drained the resources of the Massachusetts 
colony; individual towns could not afford the costs of 
their own defense, and the resources of the provincial 
government were far too limited to assure the complete 
protection of all the exposed frontier communities.
As a result, many frontier residents had to abandon 
their plantations and flee to safer areas. In addition to 
the obvious trauma felt by the refugees themselves, the 
unsettled situation placed pressure on the towns which 
received the frightened fugitives. In an attempt to staunch 
the flow of colonists from the frontier— both for the better 
defense of the colony and for the relief of the towns which 
strained under the weight of the evacuees— Capt. Samuel 
Appleton issued an order on November 12, 1675, to the 
soldiers and inhabitants of Springfield, Northampton,
Hadley, Westfield, and Hatfield forbidding anyone to abandon 
those towns without his permission.10 This order affected 
only the most secure settlements in the Connecticut Valley; 
Deerfield and Northfield, the two most exposed areas, had 
already been abandoned in September. The residents of these 
northernmost towns naturally followed the river south in 
their retreat, returning in many cases to the communities 
from which they had originally emigrated.
Regardless of ties of affinity or even simple sympathy, 
towns along the escape route must have felt adverse effects 
from the sudden influx, as evidenced by attempts of the
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colonial government to compensate for the situation. On 
November 3, 1675, the Council declared that "such 
persons . . . who are so forced from theire habitations & 
repaire to other plantations for reliefe, shall not, by 
virtue of theire residenc in said plantations they repaire 
unto" become burdens to the communities, "according to law, 
title Poore." In cases of extreme need, the Council allowed 
their care to "be supplied out of the publicke 
treasury."11 Whether it was supplying exiled Indians on 
Deer Island, outfitting garrison troops on the frontier, or 
providing for the refugees of abandoned towns, the colonial 
government lacked the resources to meet the immediate and 
increasing demands caused by the war. As a result, 
authorities had to become more selective and stringent in 
allowing stragglers to impose themselves on the already 
encumbered localities.
In the spring of 1676 the Massachusetts Council 
authorized town selectmen "to take a particular account of 
all Persons and Families so coming unto them," inquiring 
specifically into their means of support. The order further 
required selectmen "to take effectual care that the 
Incomers . . . settle themselves, or be by them settled in 
some orderly and diligent way of Imployment and Government." 
The concern evidently focused "especially [upon] single and 
younger persons," the unattached element which traditionally 
represented an internal threat to New England's communal 
cohesion.12 To justify their presence in the safe havens,
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refugees had to provide some positive contribution to their 
protectors. The most obvious service involved participation 
in the defense of their adopted localities. In May 1676 the 
Council countered those "forced to remoove to other places, 
[who] doe account themselves free from duty in those 
places," by ordering "that all such persons . . . shall 
stand, in respect of charges and duty to the publicke, in 
the same capacitie wth the propper inhabitants amongst whom 
they make their aboade or residence.1,13 There were no free 
lunches in seventeenth-century Massachusetts.
While such reluctance to welcome their brethen
unconditionally in their time of need may seem callous, the
tradition of tightly guarded community conformity was as old
as the colony itself. The restrictions were no less
apparent in frontier plantations than in established towns.
As early as 1642, for instance, Springfield forbade its
inhabitants "under the Coulour of friendship or otherwise,
[to] Intertayne" any strangers "for longer tyme then one
month . . . without the generall consent and alowance" of
the other residents. This ordinance was no mere formality;
the selectmen used the law to evict outsiders who "Thrust
themselves" into the town and to punish citizens guilty of
14encouraging unwelcome strangers to linger. Springfield 
was not alone in "warning out" undesirable interlopers; on 
the eve of King Philip's War, for example, Lancaster evicted 
a William Lincoln "in his majesties name," "utterly 
disclaim[ed]" his right to live within the town, and ordered
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him and his family to depart immediately. In doing so, the 
selectmen took the opportunity to repeat their injunction 
against "any that should com to inhabit without [their] 
consent."15 Some writers, notably Douglas Leach, maintain 
that the experience of King Philip's War lessened the 
restrictions imposed by communities against strangers, but 
town studies suggest that if any liberalization occurred 
during the conflict, the results were temporary at best. 
During the early 1680s, Springfield continued to warn out 
persons of questionable motives or means and to require 
established residents to post bond for newcomers admitted 
into the town. Likewise, in 1680 a committee assigned to 
oversee the selectmen of Groton— ironically a town which 
itself was abandoned in 1676— implored them to keep a 
constant watch against any transient persons who might 
"becom a charg to the towne" by their prolonged 
presence.16 Even after the shared upheaval of King 
Philip's War, New England towns still did not want to be 
burdened by outsiders who would interrupt the tranquility 
and prosperity of the majority.
Against this backdrop of Puritan tribalism, New England 
also possessed a tradition of charity and communal concern, 
dating back to 1630, when John Winthrop reminded his 
compatriots, "wee must be knitt together in this worke as 
one man." In times of trouble, "wee must be willing to 
abridge our selves of superfluities, for the supply of 
others necessities," he warned. Winthrop reasoned that God
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had a purpose in causing some people to be wealthy and some 
poor, or in allowing some to suffer while others flourished. 
The result of such a configuration, as interpreted by the 
governor, was that "every man might have need of other[s], 
and from hence they might be all knitt more nearly together 
in the Bond of brotherly affeccion." In theory, all New 
England Puritans were united parts of the "one body in 
Christ"; they were "made soe contiguous in a speciall 
relacion as they must needes partake of each others strength 
and infirmity, joy and sorrowe, weale and woe."17 
Admittedly, New England had become a much more complex and 
diversified milieu between the establishment of 
Massachusetts Bay in 1630 and King Philip's War in 1675.
But the summons to Christian charity never faded, at least 
in the sermons of the orthodox clergy. Over a decade after 
the conflict, Cotton Mather still reminded his fellow 
colonists that "every Christian should Readily and 
Chearfully Venture his All to serve the people of God, when 
a Time of Distress and Danger calleth for it."18 Such 
exhortations, at least at first glance, seem to indict New 
England townsmen for serious transgressions in their 
reluctance to unconditionally welcome their needy brethren.
Puritans saw no shame in poverty, as long as it 
resulted from ill fortune or divine providence rather than 
from personal negligence, and they did not question why God 
would present some members of His flock with such adversity. 
"The only reason why God sets his love on one man and not
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upon another," said the Reverend Solomon Stoddard, "is 
19because he pleases." New Englanders were not entirely 
devoid of sympathy for their less fortunate brethren, but 
they showed a marked preference for aiding members of their 
own local community. Before the war, poor relief came 
almost entirely through the town meeting and the selectmen. 
For instance, in early 1667 Springfield residents voted to 
allow their selectmen to provide "4 or 5£ to help a little 
against the want of some familyes." The meeting also voted, 
in consideration "of the poore estate of Some in the 
Plantation, who it is thought by Some need releife," to 
empower a committee to study the overall degree of privation 
in the community and to report on the most "convenient" 
solutions.20
Relief for familiar neighbors naturally continued 
during the war, but the emphasis shifted from solving simple 
cash poverty to replacing material estates destroyed by the 
Indians. The effectiveness of these efforts varied from 
town to town. In response to petitions from people like 
Preserved Clapp, who had his home and barn burned, 
Northampton formed a committee "to view what other Land may 
be found to Suite other Persons in the like Condition & to 
Accomodate them as far as may be." By the end of 1673, the 
committee had "laid out Sundry Small Parcels of land to 
Several persons on Condition they build on it & live on it 
three years." The good intentions of this plan were not 
entirely realized in all cases, however; William Smead, who
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had lived in Northampton since 1660, asked for relief after 
his home, barn, and crops were destroyed in 1675. Two years 
later, the town awarded him a half-acre house lot in the 
town. Apparently frustrated by this slight allowance, Smead 
packed up and moved to Deerfield, where land was more 
obtainable, even if security was not.21 Other towns made 
efforts to acquire title to parcels of land vacated by local 
Indians during the war and to confirm those tracts to 
townspeople who sustained losses in the conflict, still, 
most of these efforts were designed to aid established 
residents and generally excluded recent arrivals.22
With provincial resources insufficient to completely 
meet the new needs and with towns unwilling to encourage 
refugees to seek aid from them, the answer had to come from 
private sources or church collections. During specified 
fast days, congregations collected voluntary donations "for 
the distressed Families Relief." On three days in August 
1676 alone, for example, the "Old Church" (First Church) in 
Boston procured f.69, the "North Church" (Second Church) ii68, 
and the Charlestown congregation i/78 for the needy.23 This 
represents a shift in relief measures from a system of 
direct aid granted to specific persons who were well 
acquainted with the donors to a more general system in which 
strangers contributed to the maintenance of persons in need 
throughout the colony. When the residents of Brookfield had 
to leave their plantation in September 1675, they fled to 
Boston, "where they were plentifully relieved out of the
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Church Stock there."24 This sort of aid corresponded
closely to the spirit of charity and "brotherly affeccion"
Winthrop had outlined in 1630. Expressions of generosity
even came from England, in the form of money, provisions,
and clothing. On December 13, 1677, the Massachusetts
Council drafted a letter of thanks for "the Charity of those
many Pious Christians" in England, describing how their
contributions helped "thousands of persons in great Distress
without Habitation or Succor & Many familyes consisting only
of weomen & children utterly uncapable to subsist 
25themselves."
Among the most publicized and widely renowned 
charitable efforts involved raising the funds needed to 
ransom captives taken by the Indians. Mary Rowlandson, 
captured from Lancaster on February 10, 1676, benefitted 
from -£20 "raised by some Boston gentlemen," and the ransom 
of in paid for her son was raised by the people of 
Portsmouth. Upon their release, unable to return to 
Lancaster, the Rowlandson family lived in a house rented for 
them by the South Church of Boston. Their trials were eased 
considerably because, in the former captive's words, "the 
Lord so moved the hearts of these and those [i.e. diverse 
strangers] towards us, that we wanted neither food, nor 
raiment for ourselves or ours."26 Similarly, public 
contributions played a large role in securing the return of 
hostages captured from Deerfield and Hatfield by a raiding 
party of Canadian natives in 1677. In that instance, on May
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designated the proceeds for the support of the redeemed 
captives and their families, who incurred significant 
expenses in tracking them down.27 Such signal examples of 
need naturally brought benevolence from total strangers who 
sought to help specific, dramatic causes.
When New England's charity toward the victims of King 
Philip's War is viewed as a whole, town orders to strictly 
regulate unattached intruders do not indicate any real 
stinginess or callousness. New Englanders, either 
individually or collectively through their churches, 
responded with an outpouring of contributions to meet 
specific solicitations as well as the general needs of the 
masses who suffered materially during the conflict. The 
traditional means of providing aid through the town 
governments could not meet the unprecedented demands created 
by the great Indian war because they were never designed to 
do so. Charity had to come from larger and more general 
efforts. Towns in vulnerable positions had to maintain 
their standards in order to keep their own resources from 
becoming overburdened and to hope that outside sources could 
compensate for the new exigency. Not surprisingly, the bulk 
of the private contributions to the cause came from the more 
secure towns which were most able to share their wealth.
One asset which the New England provinces gained from 
the conflict was the vast amount of land vacated by the 
defeated natives. In March 1679 the Commissioners of the
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United Colonies "agree[d] that the severall Collonies shall 
fully posesse and freely dispose to theire owne advantage 
all such lands as lye within theire owne precincts 
Respectively.1,28 The largest expanse of real estate which 
fell to Massachusetts was the interior frontier, or the 
Nipmuck Territory— the largely unsettled land between the 
coastal towns and the Connecticut River Valley communities. 
One of the major postwar expenses facing the government 
involved compensating soldiers and other persons who had 
provided services to the colony, and therein rested the 
value of the Nipmuck Territory.
The years after 1675 witnessed numerous petitions for 
land reimbursements. Joseph Sill, for example, eloquently 
requested from the General Court in 1685 "a small number of 
acres of that land which hath bin recovered from the enimy, 
that so a little part of what he hath seen with his eyes and 
trod with his feet, in your service, may be committed into 
his hands, and that so he may the more comfortably share in 
the blessings of these peaceful days wherein men may beat 
theyr swords into plow shares." The deputies saw fit to 
grant Sill a parcel of land within a new plantation 
established in the Nipmuck country "for the Accommodating 
such as were souldiers in the Late Warr."29 Countless 
individuals wanted pieces of the newly secured land.
The colonies began promising land to their soldiers 
even before the war ended and before they removed the 
natives. Before the campaign against the Narragansetts in
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December 1675, for instance, officials assured the troopers
that "if they played the man, took the Fort, & Drove the
Enemy out of the Narragansett Country . . . they should have
a gratuity in Land, besides their Wages."30 Despite this
pledge and the success of the expedition, however, dividends
did not follow immediately. In fact, veterans of the battle
petitioned nearly a decade later for "some good Tract of
Land" with which to maintain their families, reminding the
General Court that during the war the "Petitioners left what
was Dear to them & preferred the publique weal above their
own private enjoyments.1,31 In the end, it took over fifty
years for the soldiers or their descendants to secure the
promised land from the Massachusetts government. Not until
1728 did the Council authorize the selection of "two Tracts
of lands for Townships of the contents of six miles square"
for "all such Officers and Soldiers now surviving, and the
legal representatives of those that are deceased."
Massachusetts eventually chartered seven new townships for
the Narragansett veterans or their heirs; the bulk of the
claimants resided in the eastern sections of the colony, but
Township Number IV (Greenwich) included grants to residents
of Northampton, Hadley, Deerfield, Worcester, and
Brookfield, while Township Number VI (Templeton) contained
32claimants from Groton and Lancaster. Naturally, by the 
1730s, when the Narragansett Townships were formally 
assigned, very few of the original soldiers were still alive 
to enjoy their long overdue reward.
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The inordinate delay in providing these soldiers their
land pensions reflected not so much a lack of concern on the
part of Massachusetts legislators as an inability to
effectively manage the enormous flood of petitions for
various sorts for compensation from King Philip's War
veterans. Long before the war ended, the Council began to
receive requests for aid from wounded soldiers and from the
survivors of the deceased, and the petitions poured in for
many years after the conflict. Countless requests arrived
from soldiers like John Barnes, wounded at Brookfield, who
in January 1676 reported that "he yet remains under the
Chirurgions hand: and is altogether unable to doo any
business." He was awarded 40s as compensation. Entreaties
also came from widows, such as Ruth Upham, who was left with
seven children. She received L10 for the loss of her 
33husband. The numbers of such petitions and the costs to 
the colonial government compounded during the years 
immediately following the war.
To cope with the worsening situation, colonial 
officials attempted to handle the requests in an organized 
fashion. On October 17, 1678, the Council, in response to 
the many soldiers who "Lost the use of their limbs and Are 
becom uncapable of Labor: or maintaining themselves,"
ordered an "annuall Alowance or pention paid by the 
Country . . . for the relief of Such as Are soe Reduced into 
distress." The order provided for "the orderly Regulating 
of this matter, [that] the Court of Each County Concider the
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cases of such as make Application to them," and report
worthy petitioners to the provincial treasurer. To further
regularize the system of compensation, the General Court set 
up a committee the following year to hear the cases of all
those "men wounded in the late warr, who moove for
releife."34 Later, in 1684, the Court authorized anyone 
owed money by the colony "for salleries or 
otherwise, . . .  to receive their pay in the Towns where 
they lived out of the Country Rates."35
Soldiers and their dependents were not the only persons 
requesting compensation from Boston. Civilians who had 
provided services to the colony or its soldiers also swelled 
the ranks of those seeking financial satisfaction. These 
petitions for reimbursement covered a wide range of services 
rendered, including supplying garrisons, boarding wounded 
soldiers, operating ferries, making shoes, and repairing 
firearms, and the amounts requested varied from only a few 
shillings to hundreds of pounds.36 Although the requests 
came from all over the colony, a good number of them came 
from the frontier areas, where most of the war-time activity 
took place.
Estimates of the charges of the people of Hampshire 
County alone suggest an amount over 4.5,000. The Connecticut 
Valley was experiencing economic decline even before the 
war. Many of the towns were relatively young and had as yet 
no economic base beyond subsistence agriculture. In the 
more established communities, men who had relied on the fur
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trade as the major entrepreneurial venture in the region 
suffered a decline in that traffic. The Valley fur trade 
peaked during the 1650s; thereafter, commerce deteriorated 
due to competition from the Dutch and Mohawk attacks on the 
tribes of western New England. Even so wealthy and 
influential a person as John Pynchon of Springfield 
reflected despair when he wrote to his son Joseph in 1671,
"I am altogether out of trade, wampum being fallen . . . and 
besides there is no trade at all by reason of the Indian 
wars.” Four years later, just after the beginning of King 
Philip's War, he expressed further frustration, "having been 
wholly out of trade." We "are now reduced to our best 
contrivance for our comfortable living," he confided to 
Joseph, "and much ado to make things hold out."37 
Admittedly, Pynchon had diversified investments and economic 
interests; he was by no means left destitute. But if even 
he felt the adverse effects of commercial decline and Indian 
hostilities, less fortunate residents of the frontier must 
have been affected far more acutely. On October 20, 1675, 
Pynchon recounted his losses from attacks in the area and 
added that "my farmers [are] also undone, and many in town 
that were in my debt utterly disabled; so that I am really 
reduced to great straits."38 The whole fabric of the 
frontier economy, therefore, was racked by the war, which 
erupted on the heels of a period of economic decline.
Not surprisingly, many Connecticut Valley residents 
sought recompense for their wartime expenses. For instance,
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prominent Northampton residents David Wilton, Lt. William 
Clark, and Medad Pomeroy all applied for reimbursement, 
ranging from £20 to £40, for quartering or supplying 
garrison soldiers.39 Similar claims came from all over the 
colony. Such individual expenses, multiplied by hundreds of 
cases, inevitably compounded the strain on the colonial 
treasury and forced the provincial government to initiate 
drastic measures to recover the financial losses.
In September 1678 the United Colonies claimed total 
expenditures resulting from the war of over £80,000, with 
Massachusetts alone reporting an outlay of £46,292.40 Such 
a huge deficit proved as long-lasting as it was 
unprecedented. So great were the demands on the colony's 
finances that in 1678 the Council had to inform its agents 
in England, "in very trueth the whole country is now . 
greatly impoverished by our late trouble wth the Indians, 
sicknesses, & mortallity, &tc." Due to this situation, the 
Council reported "that wee are not able to procure any more 
money to be sent over to yow, our treasury being not only 
empty, but many thousands of pounds indebted to merchants 
here and in England." Early the next year, the General 
Court ordered the treasurer to send the agents, William 
Stoughton and Peter Bulkeley, £150 each as "an expression of 
our good affection to them" and "a personall gratuity," but 
this action does not necessarily indicate that the colony's 
financial problems disappeared so quickly.41 More than a 
decade after the conflict had ended, the deficits continued.
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By 1690 Massachusetts still counted a debt of £40,000, with 
"not a penny in the treasury to pay it withal."42 King 
William's War, which began in 1689, compounded the problem 
and sustained the chronic indebtedness which began in 1675.
To compensate for the unprecedented demand on its 
funds, Massachusetts had to resort to greatly increased 
taxation, in the form of multiple tax rates. Colonists in 
seventeenth-century New England generally paid two types of 
taxes: town levies, assessed by the selectmen to meet
normal operating expenses, and a "country rate" for the 
support of the provincial government, assessed on towns by a 
quota of one penny per pound of estate value plus ls/8d per 
poll. Town constables had responsibility for collecting the 
tax and presenting it to the country treasurer, either in 
cash if a "rate in money" was demanded or in bushels of 
grain at values set by the General Court.43 During the 
years preceding King Philip's War, the burden on 
Massachusetts colonists was fairly light; the bulk of the 
levies came from the towns and the provincial treasury 
generally survived on a single rate per year. But on July 
9, 1675, the Court instituted a policy of multiple rates, 
ordering three rates, and it followed up on October 12 with 
an additional "seven single country rates . . . three of
the said rates to be payed at or before the last of November 
next, & the other fower rates at or before the last of March 
next." The Court allowed payments in kind, with wheat 
valued at 6s per bushel, rye at 4s/6d, barley and peas at
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4s, Indian corn at 3s/6d, and oats at 2s. Those who paid in 
cash received a twenty-five percent abatement. A single 
rate for the whole colony amounted to iil553/5s/4d, sc this 
initial levy of ten rates for the year must have come as a 
shock to the colonists. Boston, naturally, paid the highest 
amount— L300 in a single rate— but even the oppressed 
frontier towns received warrants from the treasurer. 
Springfield, for instance, was assessed i.26/5s/5d per rate, 
Northampton fi22/2s/10d, Hadley il8/10s/9d, Lancaster 
■L11/16S, Westfield iill/16s, Groton ill/10s, and Hatfield 
■L8/12S.44 Multiplied by ten, this burden brought immediate 
hardship, especially to frontier towns where other anxieties 
also mounted.
The multiple taxation did not end in 1675. In fact,
the General Court issued sixteen country rates in 1676 and
nine more in 1677. Fortunately, in its May 1676 levy, and
again the following October, the Court "provided that such
of the frontier townes as are considerably weakned . . .  be
allowed a meet abatement of their proportions in the 
45rates." This allowance must have saved the beleaguered 
settlements invaluable resources both in cash and in taxable 
provisions. On the other hand, rates represented an 
advantage to those owed money by the colonial government, as 
they received either direct payments out of the funds 
collected or credits in their assessments to cover their 
claims. To those who did not receive such allowances, 
however, the multiple rates must have seemed exorbitant, and
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1675 and 1680 Massachusetts colonists suffered through 
47-1/2 separate rates, and throughout the early 1680s the 
Court continued to assess at least two or three rates per 
year.46
All the while, the towns continued to levy their own 
rates for local projects and expenses. These assessments 
usually did not fluctuate in direct response to the war, the 
largest and most constant charges being the minister's 
salary and local capital expenses such as the upkeep of the 
meeting house. In Springfield, for instance, both before 
and after the war, annual town debts generally fell between 
£.120 and £.150; the major charge was invariably the 
minister's salary, which by the late 1670s reached £.100.47 
The constancy of town rates, however, did not mean that 
residents felt no inconvenience at the cumulative demands.
Despite noting "the Townes Poverty by reason of the 
warr," on August 24, 1676, the Springfield town meeting 
voted to go ahead with plans to build both a new meeting 
house and a suitable residence for the minister.
Undertaking such ambitious projects at a time when people 
like John Pynchon were complaining of financial strictures 
may seem improvident. Indeed, in January 1677 the selectmen 
were instructed "to take care from time to time for the 
making & Collecting of Such Rates [as necessary] for the 
Carying on of the worke," and the building project resulted 
in an inordinately high town debt of over £.400 as of
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February 1683.48 Perhaps Springfield bit off more than it 
could chew, because by early 1685 the town meeting enacted a 
restrictive economic policy. "For the satisfaction & ease 
of the Town respecting Charges," the residents voted that 
"the Select men shal contract no bargain or engage any sum 
above Twenty pounds for the Inhabitants to pay by Rate, 
without first advising with & consulting the Town, & having 
their approbation concerning the same."49 The residents of 
Springfield obviously wanted to keep an eye on the 
expenditure of their tax money.
They were not alone in this concern. In 1682 some 
inhabitants of Groton petitioned "that the reats mad by 
[the] salackt men be Justly proporshaned to every man his 
Just dew to pay and no more." As in other towns, the poor 
of Groton especially felt the strain of increased taxation, 
and since many found themselves unable to meet their 
obligations, the town meeting authorized the selectmen to 
search for some way of easing the demand.50 Unfortunately, 
no such practical plan presented itself, and many New 
Englanders found no recourse to the high rates short of 
simply refusing payment.
Not surprisingly, some colonists chose just that 
option, to the chagrin of many town constables charged with 
the increasingly difficult task of collecting the rates. 
Whether out of inability or unwillingness to pay their 
taxes, recalcitrant colonists made the post of constable an 
undesirable one in some towns because constables were
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responsible not only for collecting the assessments but also
for turning over the collection to the provincial treasurer,
regardless of any delinquency by their fellow townsmen.
Some shortcomings were unavoidable. As late as 1681
Constable Samuel Reade of Mendon testified to the General
Court that a L13/12S discrepancy in his payment of the 1675
town rates resulted from an Indian attack which interrupted
his collection and caused the deaths of some of the town's
taxpayers. In response, the Court finally remitted his 
51obligation.
In a similar case a decade later, however, Cyprian 
Stevens of Lancaster defended a shortcoming of iil/19s/7d in 
his town's country rate with the claim that the number of 
people moving from the town or dying had upset the 
assessment, and he had the support of the selectmen in the 
matter. Stevens also noted the continuing difficulty of 
collecting both grain and money; "the scarcity of the [one] 
& not haveing the other, the Loss in a great meashur became 
the Constabls," he feared. The Court agreed; the constable 
was still responsible for the sum, and either he or the 
selectmen had to provide the balance due.52 With the 
provincial treasury in such a depressed state, the General 
Court could allow very little leniency in tax collection.
At times, constables found themselves caught in an 
uncomfortable position between their town meeting or 
selectmen who chose to resist specific levies en masse and 
the colonial authorities who demanded payment of the
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assigned quotas. Two such cases occurred in Hampshire
County during the decades after the war. In 1685, the
Springfield town meeting voted, "after serious debate," not
to pay a certain money rate in cash, but rather in corn.
The residents agreed to remit extra grain in the hope of
keeping constable Samuel Bliss out of trouble, but Bliss
could not have felt comfortable with the responsibility of
presenting to the provincial treasurer the product of his
town's arbitrary decision.53 In an even more extreme case,
Northampton authorized its "Selectmen not to deliver [a
1692] rate to the Constable & did also engage to Secure the
Select[men] from any Damage for their not delivering the 
54Same." Again, the constable, whether or not he agreed 
with the actions of the residents, had to fear confrontation 
with a colonial government which was desperate to clear its 
war-related debts.
Complaints against constables delinquent in their 
accounts also occurred on the town level. In 1684 the 
selectmen of Springfield complained to the Hampshire County 
Court that Thomas Merick, Sr., was short £2/9s/3d from an 
authorized town rate of £35. The court ordered Merick to 
pay the amount "out of his owne estate" if he could not 
raise it from the appropriate taxpayers.55 Not 
surprisingly, constables also heard from their neighbors 
when townsmen suspected any discrepancy in the opposite 
direction. Therefore, in 1681 Springfield created a 
committee to "make inquisition and search After the overplus
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
[i.e. surplus collected] off all the severall Country rates 
in the severall yeares past since the unhappy Indean war & 
to endevour the recovery of it out of the hands of the 
severall Constables or any other person or persons in whose 
hands they shall find the sayd Monies." The town vowed its 
willingness to take legal action if necessary, and no amount 
proved too small for scrutiny.56 Given such examples, it 
comes as no surprise that filling the office of constable 
often was not an easy task in the years following King 
Philip's War.
Not all towns had to resort to obstinacy to escape 
their rates. In 1676 the General Court granted certain 
frontier towns special abatements; of the Hampshire County 
settlements, Springfield was allowed L150, Northampton 
i,18/12s/6d, and Hadley -£9/3s/4d.57 These liberal 
allowances helped meet immediate needs at the end of the 
war, but just as multiple taxation and indebtedness 
continued for years, so too did municipal attempts to avoid 
the increased burdens. In 1679 Groton inhabitants led the 
way with an eloquent petition to the General Court, 
presenting themselves as a people "who have been great 
Sufferers, by the hand of God, in the late wars by our 
heathenish enemyes, as is well knowne to all."
"Apprehending it our duty, to addresse ourselves; not onely 
to our heavenly father; but earthly fathers also, in this 
time of need," the selectmen "humbly begg[ed] our case may 
be seriously considered, & weighed, & that some direction,
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and releife may be affoarded unto us." Groton's desired 
solution was that the Court release them from the country 
charges until order returned to the town. The magistrates 
and deputies concurred, in part, abating Groton residents 
one rate per year for the ensuing three years.58
Ironically, Springfield proved to be one of the most 
vocal and persistent communities involved in the effort to 
seek relief from the country rates, at the very time when 
the town undertook two major capital projects. On May 2, 
1677, less than one year after receiving the generous 
abatement of -L150 from their rates, Springfield residents 
instructed their deputy in the General Court "to get a 
settlement of [our] accounts," taking care that every 
allowable credit from the war be applied to the town's 
ledger.59 By 1684 Springfield took the initiative in 
trying to convince the General Court that conditions on the 
frontier still prevented those towns from paying rates in 
money. The town meeting petitioned instead for the 
privilege of paying all their rates in produce, even when 
the Court requested cash, and voted to seek "the concurrence 
of the Neighbor Townes of [Hampshire] County therein."60 
The General Court found fault with sections of the 
Springfield petition, judging "sundry expressions therein 
doe deserve sharpe reprooffe," and apparently the 
magistrates initially refused to grant the blanket request.
In the end, however, the Court took into consideration "the 
difficulty of procuring money in those places" and allowed
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the residents to pay their rates "in good merchantable 
corne," in lieu of money, "at one third part lesse price 
then is set in the country rate," provided they "deliver the 
same to the Treasurer, at Boston, at their owne charge."61 
Springfield residents received their wish, but it cost them 
extra grain. Apparently, the shortage of hard cash in the 
region made such an arrangement worthwhile.
Paying rates in grain instead of money did not relieve 
the financial strain, however. As the colony's economic 
dilemmas persisted, along with lingering Indian threats, 
especially in Maine, frontier communities continued to 
experience difficulties in meeting their assigned rates.
The outbreak of King William's War exacerbated the problem; 
the colonial treasury had not yet recovered completely from 
the last conflict and neither had individual frontier town 
economies, at least by their own appraisals. Again, 
Springfield was in the forefront, petitioning the General 
Court on May 26, 1690, "that [our] want of Corn to live on 
[necessitated] some abatement and that what we must pay may 
be accepted in cattle, or may be forborne til we are able." 
Less than a month later, Springfield residents again 
addressed the Court about their extreme lack of provisions, 
due to which "many of the Petitioners have not their daily 
bread, but what they procure by their daily labors." The 
multiple tax rates had long ago become "an insupportable 
burden."62
Northampton echoed Springfield's resistance to the tax
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
104
burden. In fact, in 1690 Northampton hosted a meeting of 
commissioners from other Hampshire County towns whose 
mission was to choose special representatives to send to 
Boston with the message that the frontier towns simply could 
not pay their money rates in specie. Further, by 1692 
Northampton had to claim an inability to meet its 
obligations for the year lfin money or Provisions.1,63 The 
same types of complaints resounded all over the frontier 
during the 1690s; Springfield, Northampton, Deerfield, 
Lancaster, and Groton residents, among others, complained 
about the rates, drove their constables to distraction, and 
repeatedly petitioned the General Court for relief.64 
Frontier residents seemed to have reached their practical 
limit in providing support for the overextended colonial 
economy.
The price which the Massachusetts frontier particularly 
had to pay as a result of King Philip's War certainly placed 
a strain on the relationship between individuals, local 
governments, and the provincial administration. Colonists 
faced the immediate shock of physical casualties and burned 
property, and frontier residents felt constant reminders of 
the high price they paid in the form of unprecedented 
multiple tax rates. No colonial records specifically 
document opposition to the government's overall handling of 
the war and its legacies, but indications of dissatisfaction 
surface in colonists' reactions to aspects of Boston's 
policies. The difficulties which the colony experienced in
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drafting men for the militia certainly revealed that 
willingness to fight was not universal. Even more revealing 
of discontent were the stratagems and devices employed by 
individuals and communities to lessen or escape entirely 
their financial obligations to the colony. Constables could 
make neither their fellow citizens nor, on occasion, their 
town selectmen comply with the provincial treasurer’s 
levies. Mere inability to pay the taxes was accompanied by 
obstinacy evident in many of the petitions for abatement.
King Philip's War started a pattern of chronic economic 
shortcomings in the Massachusetts treasury and thus a period 
of sustained financial burden on the towns of the colony, a 
burden which weighed especially heavily on the disrupted 
frontier communities. The war left many legacies in the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, but perhaps the most durable, 
widely felt, and difficult problem proved to be recovering 
the many and varied costs of the conflict.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY
When Metacom's warriors surged along the Massachusetts 
frontiers in 1675 and 1676, they left behind scenes of death 
and destruction in numerous towns. Throughout the 
Connecticut Valley, the Merrimac region, and even the 
interior frontier, communities suffered from Indian attacks. 
While the government expressed concern that the "out towns" 
hold firm against the assaults, some of the more exposed 
plantations succumbed, and their residents retreated to 
safer areas. After the war, when colonists began to show 
interest in returning to their ruined homes, provincial and 
local authorities advocated caution. Even in the towns 
which survived the conflict, an emphasis on compactness and 
increased defense appeared in instructions for the ordering 
of settlement. Recovery from the trauma of King Philip's 
War often proved to be difficult. In no area was this 
difficulty more apparent than in reestablishing order in the 
frontier communities. In most cases, the task would have 
proceeded much more smoothly had not the fear of native 
hostilities continued into the 1680s, culminating finally in 
King William's War. In some places, the search for a 
stable, settled community configuration never really ended.
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
From the start of King Philip's War, the Massachusetts 
government showed concern for the safety of individuals 
subject to native attacks, but authorities also enunciated a 
policy of maintaining the frontier towns and defenses at all 
reasonable costs. On October 13, 1675, the General Court 
ordered the militia committees of towns throughout the 
colony to organize garrisons and otherwise look to their own 
defense. Further, the court required "all persons in the 
severall townes, upon poenalty of five shillings per 
day, . . .  to labour in and provide such fortiffication or 
fortiffications as they shall agree upon." While 
emphasizing the protection of the frontier, the order 
reflected the legislators' concern for their fellow citizens 
in providing that "the severall smale frontier townes which 
are judged not able of themselves to bear the distress of 
the warr shall have theire weomen and
children . . . remooved" to the closest secure position.1 
By October, however, Deerfield and Northfield, the most 
exposed plantations on the Connecticut River, and 
Brookfield, isolated in the interior, had already been 
abandoned, and the frontier was reeling from the initial 
assaults. Thus the General Court attempted to stabilize the 
situation by compelling the remaining settlements to 
maintain a military presence, if not complete community 
order.
In a further effort to prevent a stampede from the 
frontier, Capt. Samuel Appleton issued an order on November
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12, 1675, to the residents of the upper Connecticut Valley
towns prohibiting their withdrawal "without liberty under
the hand of the Commander in chiefe." In "this time of
trouble & danger," he proclaimed, "noe person shall remove
from or desert any of these townes soe longe as forces are
continued heer for their defence." Appleton even made it
unlawful for anyone to "goe out of the Townes without a 
2pass" from him. On May 3, 1676, the General Court 
sustained Appleton's injunction, noting "the great 
inconveniency that will ensue, if persons be left at liberty 
to wthdraw from the frontier townes . . . thereby enfeebling 
the remote parts of the country, and tending to the dammage 
of the whole." This ordinance required that each militia 
committee arrange and execute daily scouting expeditions to 
secure their towns and that neighboring communities commit 
themselves to aid each other against attacks.3 Frontier 
settlements began to take on the appearance of besieged 
outposts, with soldiers and refugees swelling their 
populations, plans implemented for quick removal to 
fortified garrison houses, and all of the residents' 
activities regulated by virtual martial rule. Such measures 
were central to the government's efforts to prevent the 
frontier from crumbling entirely.
All around the relatively secure garrison sites in the 
spring of 1676 lay the ruins of communities and homesteads 
which had been destroyed by the natives. The colonists who 
left these exposed plantations generally followed
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predictable patterns of retreat— in many cases the same 
paths previously travelled to reach the ill-fated towns.
For instance, during the 1650s through the early 1670s, 
settlement advanced steadily northward up the Connecticut 
Valley from the older villages; substantially the same 
route was traversed in reverse in 1675. Likewise, residents 
of the Merrimac and interior regions tended to flee to the 
towns around Boston Harbor, whence they originated.4 The 
actions of the frightened refugees reflected common sense 
and the human drive for survival; they retired to the most 
accessible secure sites. In addition, however, they 
revealed a preference for familiar communities where they 
had either personal experience or the benefits of close 
relatives, or in many instances both.
Frontier residents generally did not race headlong back 
to the deserted plantations, nor would the provincial 
government have permitted such a precipitous action.
Instead, Boston prescribed a cautious, orderly approach. On 
October 22, 1677, the General Court addressed the towns in 
Hampshire County, in particular, as "being in more hazard of 
the incursions of the heathen ennemy then some others." 
Because New Englanders still feared further incursions, the 
court ordered that "each towne there doe endeavor the new 
moddelling the scittuation of their houses, so as to be more 
compact & live neerer together, for theire better deffence 
against the Indians." To oversee resettlement and to ensure 
that the instructions concerning compactness were followed,
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colonial authorities formed a committee for Hampshire County 
composed of Maj. John Pynchon of Springfield, Lt. John 
Mosely and Ens. Samuel Loomis of Westfield, Lt. William 
Clarke of Northampton, Peter Tilton of Hadley, and 
Lt. William Allis of Hatfield.5 Nearly two years later, in 
May 1679, the court reiterated that "for the greater comfort 
& safety of all people who are intended to resetle the 
villages deserted in the late warr, or the planting any new 
plantation wthin this jurisdiction . . .  no deserted towne 
or new plantation shallbe inhabitted untill the people first 
make applycation unto the Governor & council, or to the 
County Courts wthin whose jurisdiction such plantation is." 
This new order again required "a principall respect to 
neerenes & conveniency of habitation for security against 
ennemyes, and more comfort for [Christian] communion and 
enjoyment of God's worship, & education of children in 
schooles, & civility, with other good ends."6 Doubtless, 
the Indian assaults on the frontier towns and the fact that 
a number of the exposed plantations had to be abandoned 
during the war inspired the General Court to recommend an 
orderly pattern of settlement, but there was nothing new in 
such an emphasis.
From the inception of the colony, Massachusetts leaders 
stressed the importance of tight community structure and 
cohesion. When expansion began to draw groups of colonists 
away from the established harbor towns and into the 
wilderness, concern over the maintenance of communal
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organization increased. In 1645, for instance, when 
granting a charter for the town of Nashaway, the General 
Court enjoined the new planters to "sett not their howses 
to[o] farr asunder."7 The motivations behind this policy 
were not entirely linked to military defense, as the order 
of May 1679 suggests. In large part, Puritan New Englanders 
insisted on community cohesion as both a support and a 
reflection of their congregational religious orientation; 
community and congregation went hand in hand. As John Eliot 
stated of frontier planters, "it is necessary that they have 
the Ministry of Gods Word, and some other godly persons with 
them, who may carry on Church-work among them."8 New 
Englanders were thus strongly discouraged from setting out 
on their own, in solitary or isolated enterprises, without 
the benefits of the traditional close communal and religious 
structure.
Contemporaries and historians alike have cited the
emphasis on community bonds as a major support in helping
New Englanders to survive troubled times such as King 
9Philip's War. Certainly, the admonitions for compact 
settlement after the conflict reflected a recognition that 
the most healthy and defensible pattern involved close, 
communal relationships. But in contrast to the announced, 
official position, colonists continually branched off into 
smaller and more dispersed settlements in the wilderness as 
land became crowded or social conditions became 
uncomfortable in the established towns. Cotton Mather,
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among others, recognized the paradox between the commitment 
to expand and conquer the wilderness and the insistence on 
community cohesion. In a 1690 election sermon he pondered 
the problem of "how at once we may Advance our Husbandry, 
and yet Forbear our Dispersion; and moreover at the same 
time fill the Countrey with a Liberal Education" as well as 
a strict congregational structure.10
This problem presented itself during the decades 
following King Philip's War. While provincial authorities 
advised a cautious approach to resettlement and future town 
ordering, especially in the Connecticut Valley, within a 
decade after the return of peace Hampshire County residents 
began petitioning for expansion of their town grants or even 
for entirely new satellite communities. Naturally, such 
requests came from established and relatively populous towns 
like Springfield and Hadley, which survived the war 
substantially intact, but even so isolated and vulnerable a 
plantation as Deerfield showed a tendency toward expansion 
within a short time of its reestablishment. Not all of 
these efforts proved successful, and continuing Indian 
threats, especially with the outbreak of King William's War 
in 1689, discouraged and dispersed many of the potential 
settlers.
The trend reflected a common pattern apparent in 
seventeenth-century New England. In times of extreme 
danger, colonial officials loudly emphasized the doctrine of 
compact community cohesion, and the affected colonists at
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least gave lip service to the requirements. As soon as even 
the semblance of safety returned, however, some colonists 
sought more elbow room and personal latitude in new 
communities. Such was definitely the case after King 
Philip's War. Seventeenth-century New Englanders certainly 
were not the hearty, individualistic pioneers of American 
legend; they almost invariably moved in prearranged groups 
with an eye toward establishing communities.11 Still, 
significant elements of the population, for a variety of 
reasons, either were not content or were not permitted to 
become sedentary but moved on to cast their lots elsewhere. 
The task for the provincial government was to see that 
distant frontier settlements were defensible and adhered to 
established models of communal and congregational 
responsibility. Such concerns were apparent in the postwar 
experiences of towns across the Massachusetts frontier.
Springfield
Springfield was the social anchor of the Connecticut 
Valley. Settled in 1635 by a group from Roxbury led by 
William Pynchon, it was the first and, throughout the 
century, the largest Massachusetts town in the region.
Largely through the efforts of Pynchon and his son John, 
probably the most influential man in the history of 
Hampshire County, it spawned every successive plantation in 
the Valley. Evidence of this involvement was clearly 
apparent in both the origins and the subsequent struggles of
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the other Hampshire plantations.
By 1675, Springfield consisted of four distinct
villages: the original town center; a suburb opposite on
the west bank of the Connecticut River; Longmeadow, four
miles south of the town center; and Skepnuck, three miles
northeast. Maj. John Pynchon viewed this settlement pattern
as a liability after the start of hostilities with the
natives. "We are very raw," he informed Connecticut
authorities in August 1675, "and our people of this town 
12extremely scattered." He clearly believed that the 
situation invited disaster.
The major noted a "desire to rely on all sufficient 
God," fearing an imminent Indian assault in early August.
On August 7, Pynchon wrote to Connecticut Governor John 
Winthrop, Jr., informing him of the growing apprehension 
among Springfield's residents. The townspeople reportedly 
were "so extremely frighted that, in the very heart of the 
town, people remove from their own houses to any next that 
they judge more strong." Pynchon himself had neighbors 
flocking to his house, "all our people being in fear of a 
sudden surprisal at home."13 As the eminent authority 
figure in the region, he understandably inspired confidence 
in the local people, who looked to him for protection.
The anticipated attack came on October 5, 1675, and 
cost the community some thirty houses, twenty-five barns, 
and John Pynchon's mills. Reportedly, only thirteen houses 
were left standing in the town center after the attack. On
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the day of the assault, Pynchon wrote to the Reverend John
Russell of Hadley, informing him of the destruction. "I
believe 40 families are utterly destitute of subsistence,"
he claimed, and "I see not how it is possible for us to live
here this winter." With grain stores and mills ruined, "the
14sooner we were holpen off the Better." By October 8, 
however, Pynchon had moderated his opinion. In a report to 
Governor John Leverett in Boston, he stated that "I would 
not have the place deserted nor give such advantage to the 
Indians if possible." He admitted that many residents had 
"nothing at all left" and therefore were "discouraged 
exceedingly." Although opposed to abandoning Springfield, 
Pynchon warned Leverett of the difficulty of "holding the 
place" and of reassuring the people "without many 
soldiers."15
The governor referred the matter to Captain Appleton, 
the newly appointed commander of the Connecticut Valley 
forces. "If there should be a necessity of deserting 
Springfield as Major Pinchon intimates it will be very awful 
but," Leverett conceded, "the conclusion thereof must be 
left with you on the place." In response, Appleton 
acknowledged that "the people are full of fear & Hazzarding 
in their thoughts as to their Leaping or Leaving of the 
place. Those whose houses & provisions are Consumed," he 
wrote, "incline to leave the place as thinking they can 
better labor for a living in places of lesser danger than 
that where now they are." Despite the apprehension of the
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populace, however, Appleton advised holding Springfield, at 
least as an "incouragement and help to others." Abandoning 
the town would result in "great discouragement to others and 
hazzard to [our] passage from one place to another."16
This continuing debate over the fate of Springfield 
reflected the important role it filled in the Connecticut 
Valley. The decision to hold or leave the town affected not 
only the residents of the community but also the security of 
the other plantations in the Valley. Obviously, quitting 
Springfield would have adverse effects on the defenses of 
the other river towns, but as the oldest and most stable 
community in Hampshire County, Springfield also supported 
the upriver settlements psychologically. In fact, the 
decision to prohibit townspeople from leaving important 
centers such as Springfield reflected concern more for the 
overall defensive scheme of the region than for the 
sentiment of the residents themselves. The panic among the 
Springfield colonists eventually subsided, and the town 
resumed its position as the linch pin of the Connecticut 
Valley defenses.
The ties between Springfield and the neighboring 
plantations cannot be emphasized too strongly. Aside from 
the fact that newer communities were composed largely of 
emigrants from the others, the Hampshire settlements shared 
a prominent bond in the person of John Pynchon. The 
influential son of Springfield's founder served on the 
organizing committees for virtually all of the subsequently
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founded river towns, beginning with Northampton in 1653, and 
he played an important role in financing and securing land 
for them. In recompense, Pynchon received land grants in 
each, giving him a continuing interest and influence which 
lasted after the period of initial settlement.17 The 
mutual relationships which existed between Springfield and 
the communities it helped to produce were evident in the 
defensive plan outlined for the Connecticut Valley by 
Massachusetts authorities.
By March 1676, the Council ordered frontier commanders 
to put "themselves in to such a Posture as may best 
accommodate their security & provision." The safest plan, 
as judged by the councillors, involved "their gathering 
together in such places & numbers as that they may be able 
to defend themselves." Springfield and Hadley were judged 
the most secure positions, and officials in Boston advised 
that ‘‘the lesser Townes must gather to the greater." "To 
remayne in such a scattered manner," warned the Council, "is 
to expose lives & estates to the merciless cruelty of the 
enemy [and] is no less than tempting Divine providence.1,18 
The plan called for Westfield residents to retire to 
Springfield, while colonists from Northampton and Hatfield 
were to gather at Hadley. From the start, opponents 
resisted the advice, and the councillors noted "somethinge 
working towards a frustration & disappointment of that good 
end aimed at."19 They feared the worst if Hampshire 
residents persisted in their "scattered manner" of
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settlement. The colony could not muster enough troops to 
defend each individual town, and the provincial government 
hoped the towns would agree to concentrate in order to ease 
the strain on available resources. Also in March 1676, the 
General Court informed Pynchon that he and his fellow
residents of Springfield "must ride it out as best you
20can." The defense of the entire frontier depended on the 
ability of key points like Springfield to stand their ground 
and to protect the smaller communities surrounding them.
The population of Springfield, reflecting the town's 
age and settled condition, remained relatively stable during 
the war and the decades which followed, especially in 
comparison with other towns in the region. The Indian 
attack of October 5, 1675, of course, sent the residents of 
the community scrambling to fortified garrison houses and 
inspired thoughts of leaving the town. Although Springfield 
survived the war without a period of abandonment, its 
population was touched directly by the conflict. Twelve 
Springfield residents, for instance, lost their lives at the 
hands of the natives in 1675 and 1676; in addition to 
citizens killed in or near the town, three Springfield 
soldiers died at Turner's Falls and two others in the 
vicinity of Westfield.21 John Keepe and his wife were 
among those "slaine by the Indians." They left three small 
children, whom the Hampshire County Probate Court bound over 
to relatives.22 In these examples, Springfield shared the 
experiences of towns throughout the colony, as residents
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were killed and families torn apart by the war; but in the 
overall picture, Springfield's inhabitants were able to 
weather the storm more smoothly than were their fellows in 
many other frontier communities.
The stability and relative security of the town were
clearly portrayed in the vital statistics of the late
seventeenth century. In each of the three major
categories— births, marriages, and deaths— the general
trends of the period were uninterrupted by the war. Except
for a slight decline in births for 1676 compared to the
surrounding years, the numbers of babies born to Springfield
citizens remained constant or increased noticeably
throughout the war period. Likewise, the war had no
apparent effect on the general pattern of marriages in the
community, despite the fact that men of marriageable age
served in the militia and lost their lives in the conflict.
Mortality figures were understandably high in 1675 and 1676,
but the twelve deaths attributed to native attacks accounted
for only about one-fourth of the total; disease must have
played a particularly virulent role in Springfield during
the period, as deaths jumped sharply again in 1683, 1684,
1689, and 1690, reaching two to three times the average 
23annual level.
One notable characteristic revealed by the town's vital 
records was the web of associations which inhabitants of 
Springfield had with other communities in the region. 
Throughout the period, Springfield residents or their close
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relatives lived, married, and died in virtually every other 
town in the Connecticut Valley. Even more notable, 
Springfield's connections with towns further south, 
especially Suffield and Enfield, increased significantly 
after the war, indicating perhaps that although Springfield 
represented the anchor of the western frontier in 
Massachusetts, a small portion of its inhabitants reacted to 
the conflict and chose safer areas.24 Still, the 
demographic trends reflected the permanence and continuity 
which characterized the reaction of the majority of 
Springfield residents to King Philip's War.
Aside from the effort to recover wartime expenses and 
to avoid the multiple rates which followed, the residents of 
Springfield seemingly experienced few long-term effects from 
King Philip's War, at least according to evidence left in 
the town proceedings. Other than taxes, the official 
documents for the period 1675 to 1680 reveal at least as 
much interest in wolves, swine, fences, and highways as in 
war-related issues. In February 1678 the town meeting 
"voted & concluded . . . that something should be done for 
the fortification of the new meeting house," but rather than 
indicating a sense of urgency, the issue of strengthening 
the town hall was overshadowed by the attention given to 
other capital projects adopted concurrently. Plans to build 
the town's first school (£14) and a new meeting house 
(£400—5s) attracted more money and more attention than did 
any effort to fortify the village center.25
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A main concern of Springfield residents after the war 
was that all landowners pay their just share of the 
increased tax burden. For instance, when the General Court 
abated the community -L150 in its 1676 rates, the loyal 
residents insisted that "they who have deserted the towne, & 
not runn the hazard with their neighbors [should] not [be] 
allowed any share in the abovesaid abatement."26 Those 
residents who weathered the storm wanted their less resolute 
brethren to pay for their lack of fortitude. Absentee 
landowners, speculators, and the like upset the cohesion of 
New England communities, but they also complicated tax 
collection procedures. In February 1677 the town adopted a 
resolution requiring new grantees to remain a minimum of 
"five yeers in the Town after the Land granted is 
measured."27 Given Springfield's record, this policy 
likely was designed less to foster communal cooperation than 
to ensure that the recipients' actions did not interfere 
with the interests of established residents. Irony 
permeated such a design, since Springfield's most 
influential citizen, John Pynchon, was undoubtedly the 
largest absentee landowner in the other towns of the region.
Population growth in Springfield led to further 
dispersal by the 1680s. In 1679 the selectmen advised the 
county court of their "intent to setle a small Town or 
village out of their Towns Lands at a place called 
freshwater brook." The court appointed a committee of 
Pynchon, George Colton, Benjamin Cooley, and Samuel
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Marshfield to oversee the move, instructing the new settlers 
"to Live nere togeather" for security "& other Good Ends." 
Within four years, however, the residents of the Freshwater 
Brook section of the town petitioned for and received 
permission to form a new township, organized as Enfield, now 
within the bounds of Connecticut.28
In 1688, as the threat of King William's War began to 
take shape on the frontier, John Pynchon complained that 
Springfield "consists much of out-farms and a few houses 
together." In a letter to Governor Edmund Andros on August 
21 he noted that "above half our people are abroad and at a 
distance from the town three or four miles each way," 
referring to the communities at Longmeadow and Skepnuck.
The next day Pynchon wrote to John Allyn of Connecticut 
reiterating the perils of the scattered settlement but 
assuring him that the town center was "in a tolerable secure 
way by fortifying." Further, town authorities saw to 
"calling in some people in out [isolated] houses that were 
alone, . . . ordering them together where there were any 
likelihood of self defense in case of a shock."29 But 
Springfield residents persisted in their scattered brand of 
settlement, coming together only when necessity pulled them.
Even during periods of peril they apparently tired of 
their communal responsibilities. By late 1694, in the 
middle of King William's War, Pynchon had to admit that the 
town was "not in any good posture." "Fortifications gone to 
decay, and for repairing or making new," he reported,
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"people a little willful, inclined to do what and how they 
please or not at all." He perceived that only an "order 
from authority" would "enforce . . . what is meet 
and . . . strengthen the hands of those here who would have 
something done but find obstructions to their 
discouragement.1,30 Pynchon's observations support a later 
appraisal that Springfield residents generally tended toward 
individualism and only cooperated with their neighbors in 
times of extreme need.31
Westfield
One of the towns in Springfield's geographic orb was 
Westfield, originally settled during the 1660s; as was 
common in the region, John Pynchon played a part in 
organizing the outpost, and he continued his influence as a 
major landholder. Despite this persisting relationship and 
their exposed position ten miles west of Springfield, 
Westfield residents resisted drawing off during King 
Philip's War and especially opposed the suggestion that they 
retire to Pynchon's garrisons. On April 5, a committee 
composed of the Reverend Edward Taylor, Isaac Phelps, Thomas 
Dewey, Josiah Dewey, and David Ashley related the desires of 
their fellow townsmen on the matter to the Connecticut 
Council. "If we must be gone from hence many of us have 
estates and friends calling us elsewhere," they wrote, "and 
thereupon most of us incline, in case we remove, to come 
downwards."32 This statement reflected the fact that of
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the original settlers, more came from Windsor, Connecticut, 
than from any other location.
Although feeling affinity to the Connecticut 
settlements, Westfield was under the administration of 
Massachusetts. Noting the hardships occasioned by the war, 
the town committee proclaimed to the General Court a desire 
to "carey on Some thing together for the good of the whol 
that so by Gods blessing and our labors wee may be in a way 
of geting food for our familyes." In the hope that the 
"Counsel See not cause [to] draw us off," Westfield 
residents pledged "to plowe and sow and cary on the 
imp[rove]ment of this land in general."33 This statement 
represented one of the clearest expressions of community 
feeling to be found anywhere on the Massachusetts frontier 
during or after King Philip's War. Westfield residents 
assured the provincial government that they could best 
weather the threat by banding together and maintaining their 
group identity.
Town authorities employed a variety of arguments to 
dissuade the Council from ordering their withdrawal. On 
April 3, 1676, they produced their most effusive entreaty.
"To remove from habitations to none, from fortifications to 
none, from a compact place to a scattered one, from a place 
of less danger in the field to one of more, from a place 
under the ordinary blessing upon our labors to one usually 
blasted," the committee members judged, "seems to us such a 
strange thing that we find not a man amongst us inclining
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thereto.”34 Westfield residents, by and large, opposed any 
plan to make them leave their homes.
Instead, they chose to strengthen their own 
fortifications and to ask the Massachusetts government for 
garrison troops. The townspeople agreed "to contract their 
fortifications so as to be but about 70 rods in length and 
20 broad." This compacted stronghold was "to be strongly 
and closely fortified" by the residents in proportion to 
their rateable estates. On May 8, 1676, the town meeting 
ordered the work "dun with al speed."35 Whether the 
advised urgency was designed to thwart a feared Indian 
attack or to convince the provincial legislature of the 
town's viability, the decision to draw within the 
fortifications rather than scatter represented a conscious 
emphasis on community cohesion and continuity.
The willingness of Westfield residents to gather into a 
close community did not end with the defeat of Metacom's 
warriors. Although the town was never abandoned, and the 
residents therefore did not have to undertake a major 
rebuilding or reordering operation, they did give proper 
attention to the patterns of compactness ordered by the 
General Court. The Hampshire County committee composed of 
Pynchon, Clark, Tilton, Allis, and Loomis ordered in 
November 1677 "that the Inhabietance [of Westfield] Doe all 
posses and setell Together," in a central location near the 
town meeting house. This directive may not have been 
universally popular; some residents had to leave tracts of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
land situated too far from the town center, and others lost 
shares out of the commons land reapportioned to those forced 
to relocate. As a result, Taylor wrote to Boston on May 15, 
1679, asking the General Court to "Confirm in Law those 
little bits of [unassigned] land unto those, who, in 
obedience unto your Authority have them in actual 1 
possession for which they have that, & only that to 
Show."36 The court responded favorably to the request, 
"particularly appoynting a tract of land for the inhabitants 
of Westfield, to build on nearer together, at or by their 
meeting house." Since the inhabitants "by a gennerall vote, 
consented to the setling thereon," the provincial officials 
authorized that those proprietors who "parted with" land in 
the transaction be repaid "two acres for [each] one [lost], 
out of the townes adjacent lands intended for home 
lotts."37 Westfield seemed intent on establishing a tight 
community during the years immediately following King 
Philip's War.
In fact, for some two years the residents of the town 
reportedly lived in virtually an enclosed village as a 
result of the enhanced fortifications and the active plans 
for compact settlement. Thirty-four families containing 
some two hundred people occupied an area roughly two miles 
in circumference. By 1679, however, fifteen landowners felt 
secure enough to return to their outlying holdings.38 In 
that year, the aforementioned "Comity for Ordering compact 
Dwelling together for beter Defence & safety," noted the
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recent defectors and approved their move with the provision 
that they take proper steps toward defense. But for the 
remainder of Westfield inhabitants, the committee ordered 
"their Removeing & setling" within the stated bounds as well 
as the completion of the required labor on the 
fortifications according to the assigned proportions.39 At 
the end of the tumultuous decade, the officially stated 
policy still adhered to the ideal design of a compact local 
society, but already the seeds of its disruption were 
beginning to sprout.
Perhaps inevitably, demographic progress spelled the
end of geographic compactness; the community could not grow
in numbers and at the same time resist expansion. Between
1679 and 1689, the population of Westfield increased fifty
percent, and the increase also reflected a significant
turnover among the residents. Of 54 heads of households
present in 1679, only 37 remained a decade later.
Thirty-three new householders appeared by 1689; 20 were
adult sons of established residents and, 13 were newcomers
to the community. To accommodate the petitioners, the town
authorized a division of the commons amounting to 617 
40acres. Significantly, the selectmen ordered the new 
grants issued in 1687 "to be taken up without 2 mile of the 
Meting house unles they have liberty otherwise to some 
perticler plase," more proximate.41 Within a decade of the 
county committee's order requiring residents to live within 
the meeting house environs, town authorities prohibited new
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landowners from crowding the town center. With population 
growth, the initially genuine emphasis on compact settlement 
could not survive for any great length of time, but 
adherence to the scheme began to break down by the late 
1670s and apparently disappeared by the end of the 1680s.
Northampton
Twenty miles upriver from Springfield was Northampton, 
the second oldest town on the Connecticut River frontier.
It was created in 1653 when John Pynchon, Elizur Holyoke, 
and Samuel Chapin, "Inhabitants of Springfield,11 petitioned 
the General Court for liberty to plant a settlement at 
Nonotuck (Northampton). The petitioners assured the court 
that a sufficient number of families in the area showed "a 
desire to remove thither"; more important, the committee 
reported, "many of them are of considerable Quality for 
Estates and fit matter for a Church."42 Although 
Springfield residents initiated the plans for a new town, 
well over half of the early settlers moved north from 
Connecticut, the largest numbers coming from Windsor and 
Hartford. Barely fifteen percent of the colonists admitted 
to Northampton during the first five years of its existence 
migrated from the Springfield area, with the remainder 
representing communities around Boston.43 Like other 
Connecticut Valley towns which followed, Northampton from 
the start felt common ties to Springfield political leaders, 
especially John Pynchon, but the initial inhabitants of the
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new town also shared bonds with widely dispersed communities 
throughout the region.
Following the October 5, 1675 attack on Springfield,
the residents of the Northampton area expected their turn to
come at any time. Rev. John Russell of neighboring Hadley
believed the vicinity was "likely to drink next . . .  of 
44this bitter cup." The anticipated assault came within a 
month; on October 28 natives burned four Northampton houses 
and a number of barns, prompting the residents to erect 
fortifications around the town center. During the fall and 
the ensuing winter, Northampton built "a Kind of 
Barricado . . .  by setting up Pallisadoes of Cleft-wood 
about eight Foot long." The planners realized a wooden wall 
would not necessarily keep the Indians from storming the 
town, but they correctly judged that it would slow them down 
enough to eliminate the element of sudden surprise. The 
palisade had another advantage. On March 14, 1676, warriors 
again attacked Northampton and succeeded in breaking through 
the barrier but were trapped inside by the garrison's 
counterattack. Their backs literally against the wall, the 
Indians "saw themselves like Wolves in a Pound," according 
to William Hubbard, and "they could not fly away at their 
Pleasure."45 Not only did the fortification allow 
Northampton to repulse this attack, it also provided a 
long-term deterrent. Metacom's warriors did not again 
attack Northampton or any other palisaded town during the 
war.
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The successful defense of March 14 gave the colonists
added vigor in their resistance to the General Court's
suggestion that they concentrate at Hadley for security.
Two weeks later, a group of Northampton's leaders led by the
Reverend Solomon Stoddard imformed the General Court, "we
dare not entertain any thoughts of deserting this
plantation," for fear of appearing ungrateful to the God who
protected them. Further, removing would "discourage other
plantations, as may prove no small prejudice unto the
Country." Northampton residents thus employed the same
arguments for holding their town as the court had used
earlier in prohibiting Springfield inhabitants from
abandoning that community. In asking for more soldiers, the
"generality of the Town" consented "at [their] own cost,
[to] bear the charge of a sufficient garrison." The
residents preferred to pay the soldiers' expenses, "rather
then want them."46 Although the government decried the
town's unwillingness "to attend our advice to draw into a
narrow compass whereby wee conceved they would have been
able to deffend themselves better," provincial authorities
approved extra garrison soldiers from Maj. Thomas Savage's
47company for Northampton on April 1, 1676. As a result of 
the town's initiative in building fortifications, refusal to 
retreat, and maintenance of extra garrison soldiers, 
Northampton, too, was able to survive the war despite its 
exposed position on the frontier.
On the eve of King Philip's War, Northampton had a
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population of approximately five-hundred people. No records 
exist to indicate how many residents left the town due to 
the hostilities; some undoubtedly did, but the majority 
chose to stay. Rather than leave the area completely, some 
landowners who lived in remote parts of the township 
petitioned for lots near or within the fortifications. Town 
authorities complied with as many of these requests as 
possible, issuing grants "wherever unapportioned land could 
be found." In all, eight Northampton landowners received 
new town lots as a result of King Philip’s War. Many of 
them apparently never returned to their dispersed holdings, 
but at least one recipient, William Smead, became so 
discouraged by the smallness of his new plot that he soon 
left the town altogether and moved to Deerfield.48 By and 
large, however, most of Northampton's residents seem to have 
been satisfied with the measures taken by their town in 
reaction to the conflict.
King Philip's War affected the population of the town 
in other ways as well. Of 31 Northampton residents engaged 
at the Falls Fight, for instance, 12 were killed.49 Town 
records revealed inordinately high numbers of deaths for 
1675 and 1676— 14 and 29 respectively— and the records noted 
that many of them were "slain by the Indians." Mortality 
figures had never reached such heights in any year before 
the war and did not again in the years after 1676 until the 
outbreak of King William's War in 1689. In spite of the 
sharp increase in Northampton deaths, however, the war seems
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See note 51.
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to have had no adverse effects on births or marriages among 
the town's residents, as both either increased steadily or 
remained fairly constant during and after the war. The 
ratio of births to marriages fell slightly during the period 
1675 through 1679 but rebounded to reach an unprecedented 
level for the entire decade of the 1680s. In fact, births 
in Northampton outnumbered deaths in every year during the 
last three decades of the seventeenth century, except 1689, 
and the population of the town more than doubled during the 
period, from 450 persons in 1670 to 937 in 1700.50 This 
demographic progress seems all the more remarkable given the 
fact that the bulk of the wartime victims presumably were 
soldiers and therefore males of marriageable age.
Northampton residents approached the postwar period 
with the caution advised by the provincial government. At a 
January 1678 meeting, "The Town being Sensible that it was 
their duty to [prepare] in a prudent way for their own 
Safety did . . . vote & Agree to make & maintain their 
fortification till a more Settled peace appear." The 
inhabitants of Northampton stipulated "that every man Should 
make & maintain that particular part of [the] fortification 
which is Already laid out to him." Where gaps of 
unapportioned land crossed the pallisade, the townsmen 
provided for its maintenance "in a general way."51 
Northampton took seriously the concerns of compact defense 
even after Metacom's defeat.
Town authorities expressed the same concerns with
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regard to postwar settlement. Although people continued to 
live, and the town continued to grant land, "without the 
present Fortification," officials overseeing settlement in 
Northampton during the 1680s emphasized a nuclear town plan. 
In February 1680 they instructed that new house lots "be 
taken up as near the Town as may be" and preferably 
adjoining land already occupied or laid out. The order also 
required the new grantees to improve their lots within one 
year and to clear the land within four years.52 Unlike 
similar orders issued in Springfield at the same time, the 
motivations behind these instructions seem to have been 
community defense and cohesion.
This did not mean that Northampton was not changing
during the period; the town experienced an impressive
population increase, as noted, between 1675 and 1700. The
composition of the population was remained fairly constant,
however, and most of the growth resulted from natural
reproduction. Migration into the town was slight after the
war. The proprietors decided to divide the commons for the
first time in 1684, reflecting the population growth, but
apparently most of the recipients were sons of established 
53townsmen. Therefore, the town possessed a great degree 
of continuity, both in population and in experience.
The "danger they were in of being Assaulted by an 
Enemy" did not end during the 1680s, of course, and the 
residents' concerns naturally intensified at the end of the 
decade, with reports of renewed hostilities on the frontier.
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On March 5, 1690, the town meeting voted to re-fortify the 
town, a project which consisted basically of restoring the 
old palisade and enlarging it in some places to accommodate 
a decade of community growth. All householders living 
within the fortification, as well as those from outside who 
chose to seek refuge there in times of danger, were to help 
build and maintain the structure.54 Although these 
instructions appeared in a period of renewed warfare, they 
still indicated ongoing recognition of the advantages of 
compact settlement. John Pynchon, on more than one 
occasion, reported that Northampton being, "pretty compact 
and together," was probably the best equipped of any of the 
Connecticut Valley towns to meet the new Indian threat.55 
Such sound preparation did not occur overnight; 
Northampton's attention to compactness and community order 
evidently benefitted the town in the years after King 
Philip's War.
Deerfield
The Northampton area represented the last bastion of 
relative safety in the upper Connecticut Valley. Deerfield, 
fifteen miles upriver, was a wilderness outpost in every 
sense of the term throughout the period. The roots of 
Deerfield, or Pocumtuck as the settlement was originally 
known, went back to Dedham and the dispute between the 
residents there with the neighboring Praying Indians at 
Natick. In response to a petition from the Dedham
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plaintiffs concerning a large tract of contested land 
between the two towns, the General Court in 1663 granted the 
claimants 8,000 acres "in any Convenient place . . . where 
it can bee found free from former Grants."56 The 
recipients then dealt through John Pynchon to purchase a 
tract from the Pocumtuck Indians, but most of the Dedham 
proprietors never moved to the remote plantation. Only 
approximately one-third of Deerfield's original settlers 
migrated from the Dedham area, while the remaining 
two-thirds came from Northampton, Hadley, or Hatfield, 
following the path of settlement progressively up the 
Connecticut River.57 Settlers began to arrive on the site 
of Deerfield by 1669, and the town was still very much in 
its formative period on the eve of King Philip's War.
In 1675, 125 persons, including approximately 25 to 30 
adult males, lived in Deerfield, and the town took the 
precaution of fortifying three houses with palisades to 
guard against Indian attacks. When the assault came on 
September 1, the residents apparently all made it safely to 
the blockhouses, but their scattered houses and barns 
suffered heavy damage. This event prompted the women and 
children of the community to seek refuge in safer 
plantations while the men of the town and the militia 
garrison remained to defend the remnants of the outpost.58 
The darkest day for Deerfield occurred on September 18, when 
14 of 16 men employed as wagon drivers by Capt. Thomas 
Lathrop perished in an Indian ambush at Muddy Brook while
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attempting to harvest the town's grain. Among the victims 
were at least 9 married men who left at least 40 fatherless 
children, and 4 more men approaching marriageable age. This 
debacle must have had a devastating effect on the remaining 
citizens of Deerfield; in one instant, over half of the 
town's adult males and over ten percent of its entire 
population perished.59 Not surprisingly, United Colonies 
officials wrote to Pynchon three days later concerning the 
"sense about quitting the Pocumtuck garrison," and the town, 
garrison and all, was abandoned. According to the Reverend 
John Russell of Hadley, Philip was free "to make his 
planting place and fort this year [1676] at Deerfield," once 
the English settlers had left the place.60
Of 24 individual proprietors or families who fled from 
Deerfield and whose places of destination are known, 18 
retired to Northampton, Hatfield, or Hadley. Three others 
proceeded farther down the valley, and 3 returned to the 
Boston area.61 These figures correspond roughly to the 
pattern of immigration to the town in the years before the 
war, further indicating that as the bulk of settlement 
progressed generally northward up the valley, so too did 
withdrawal recede along the same routes.
The fear that caused Deerfield's inhabitants to flee 
from their plantation apparently did not last long, for by 
the spring and summer of 1677 a handful of the former 
residents returned to rebuild their homes. At least four 
optimistic proprietors and one boy were on the scene by
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September 19, 1677, when a group of natives from Canada, 
which also included at least some Pocumtuck and Narragansett 
refugees, descended on the encampment and took all five into 
captivity. Three of the colonists, Sgt. John Plympton, John 
Root, and the boy Samuel Russell perished in captivity, 
while the others, Benoni Stebbins and Quinton Stockwell, 
eventually regained their freedom.62 With the advantage of 
hindsight, William Hubbard judged that the Deerfield 
captives "had unadvisedly too soon returned" to their 
exposed plantation. The frontier residents, hoping to set 
their lives back in order, "were a little too secure, and 
too ready to say the bitterness of Death was past," he 
declared, "because they had neither seen nor heard of any 
Enemy in those Parts for half a year before."63 From the 
safety of Boston, Hubbard could editorialize about these 
events, but the refugees who attempted to return to their 
settlements were simply responding to an apparent cessation 
of hostilities and a human impulse to resume their lives.
The tragic incident in September 1677 apparently did 
not daunt the inhabitants* desire to resurrect their 
community nor did it deter the provincial government from 
advising them to return quickly, albeit cautiously and 
prudently. Less than a month later, on October 22, 1677, 
the General Court ordered a garrison established at 
Deerfield and instructed the inhabitants to "repaire thither 
this winter (if the [Hampshire County] committee doe judge 
it safe)." The court authorized "the setling thereof in the
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spring, . . . in a compact way."64 Few if any of the 
residents took steps toward returning to Deerfield at that 
time, but neither did they give up their sense of belonging 
to the community. On April 30, 1678, a group submitted a 
petition to the General Court, referring to themselves as 
"the small Remnant that are Left of Deerfield's poor 
Inhabitants." Despite noting that their plantation had 
"become a wildernesse, a dwelling for owles and a pasture 
for flocks" and that the inhabitants were "separated into 
severall townes," the petitioners expressed a desire to 
"Returne and plant that place Againe . . . for the advancing 
the Cause & kingdome of Jesus; and for [our] owne safetie & 
comfort. . . ."65 Even in their dispersed exile, the 
Deerfield proprietors retained a feeling of community.
On March 30, 1680, the Hampshire County Court created a 
committee composed of Lt. William Clark, Peter Tilton,
Lt. Philip Smith, Medad Pomeroy, and John Aliys to oversee 
the reestablishment of Deerfield, and the refugee 
proprietors met in Northampton nine months later to plan 
their return to the town. The committee and the proprietors 
set one basic rule for land distribution during the 
resettlement period: any person who possessed or received a
grant of land was required to "come and settle in Deerfield 
and Inhabit there three years" before they gained "liberty 
to Allianate or sell the same."66 The proprietors realized 
that because of the exposed position of the plantation, they 
had to strive to assure a stable community structure. In
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order to have any chance for survival, the town had to be 
able to depend on its members' commitment to each other.
This residency requirement aimed at a problem the 
optimistic proprietors encountered in drawing the community 
back together. Although the return to Deerfield was 
encouraged by an ardent group of the refugees, not all 
landowners who had fled in 1675 displayed a willingness to 
risk their lives there again so soon. In the April 30, 1678 
petition, the town committee expressed concern that a goodly 
portion of the land in the village "belongs unto eight or 9 
proprietors, each and every of which are never Like to come 
to a settlement amongst us." The "Plantation will be 
spoiled if thes proprietors may not be begged, or will not 
be bought (up on very easy termes) outt of their Right," the 
petitioners lamented. They asked the General Court to help 
"Remove that Impediment that is soo great a Lett and 
hinderance to the plantation's growth and the planters' 
outward happiness." The court replied by leaving the matter 
to the townsmen and the county committee to settle among 
themselves.67 Again, the petitioners showed a genuine 
concern for cohesion within their town. Proprietors who 
refused to return to their land in Deerfield could only 
damage community morale, growth, and defense. In the spring 
of 1682, the planters finally convinced some of the 
obstinate refugees to "give up every tenth acre or 
otherwise, as they shall see cause, it being a very probable 
way to gaine more usefull inhabitants for planting & setling
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said place." The General Court urged the rest of the 
absentee proprietors to follow this "good example.1,68 The 
residents who initiated and participated in the resettlement 
of Deerfield left consistent and repeated references to the 
importance of community order and stability.
The Deerfield vital records reveal little about the 
demographic effects of the war, mostly because the town 
itself was so young in 1675, having been planted only six 
years earlier. Demographic trends had not even had a chance 
to become established before the war interrupted their 
progress. During the 1680s, however, Deerfield apparently 
experienced significant growth, the population reaching well 
over 200 by the end of the decade. Most of this increase 
resulted from the arrival of newcomers to the town after 
resettlement; of 54 male landowners present in 1688, only 8 
of them owned land in the town in 1675. Another 3 were sons 
of deceased pre-war proprietors. Of the 40 new immigrants 
whose previous residences were recorded, 24 came from the 
Northampton area, while 10 moved north from Springfield or 
Connecticut. Only 6 migrated from towns in eastern 
Massachusetts. The figures are similar for women who came 
to reside in Deerfield during the 1680s.69
This population influx reflected two facts about the 
nature of Deerfield's postwar population. First, the new 
residents for the most part made their way to the town from 
older communities farther south in the valley, where land 
had become scarce. Step by step, settlement had made its



















(None recorded before 1689).
Deerfield Deaths
1680-84: 1 1690-94: 11
1685-89: 9 1695-99: 22
(None recorded before 1681).
Source: Baldwin, comp., Vital Records of Deerfield.
See note 70.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
way almost the entire length of the Massachusetts frontier 
along the Connecticut River in approximately half a century. 
Second, in its new formative phase, Deerfield was still very 
much an open community in accepting new residents. But many 
of them either migrated from the same locality or had 
pre-existing ties to the frontier plantation, and thus 
Deerfield possessed a sound basis for community cohesion 
from the start.
Like the residents of Westfield, however, the Deerfield 
planters soon found that demographic growth precluded 
physical compactness. By the late 1680s, most of the choice 
homelots in the village center were either occupied or owned 
by absentee proprietors, and new landowners began 
establishing suburbs at Green River, two miles north of the 
town, and at Wapping, two miles south. Neither hamlet ever 
amounted to more than about twenty homelots during the 
period. With the renewal of hostilities in 1689, many of 
the outliers retired to the safety of the Deerfield 
fortification on the meeting house hill, and the suburbs 
languished.70 On February 26, 1690, the town meeting 
ordered the fortification strengthened and provided a plan 
whereby persons from outside the village center could 
receive shelter within. For "all prsons whose familyes 
canot conveniently and comfortably be [taken] into the 
houses that are already upon the meeting-hous hill," the 
townsmen authorized a special committee of Sgt. John 
Sheldon, Benoni Stebbins, and Edward Allyn to grant them
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small tracts of land at an unstated charge, wherever 
available.71 As did their neighbors in Northampton,
Deerfield residents seem to have accepted the necessity of 
enlarging their settlement due to increased population but 
still had faith in the benefits of community consciousness.
By all accounts, Massachusetts authorities considered 
Deerfield a key to frontier defense during King William's 
War, apparently in reaction to the destruction of the 
northernmost plantations fifteen years earlier. But the 
selectmen reminded the Council that since 1680 the residents 
had "Been much Exercised and at great Expenses in purchasing 
And setlinge [the] place Anew," and that with the resumption 
of hostilities, they were "Exposed to many
straits, . . . Brought very Low & in a likely way to Come to 
Extremity." Town leaders warned that without substantial1 
aid, "we must of necessity forsake [our] habitations, and 
draw off to some Neighbouring towns."72 As in 1675, the 
provincial government's resources were limited, but the 
General Court did all it could to help. In fact, noting the 
"very Considerable Sums of money [which] have been Expended 
in the defense and for [the] preservation of the out Towns 
and Frontiers," the court in 1695 passed an "Act to prevent 
the deserting of the Frontiers." The act ordered that no 
frontier town, including Deerfield, "shall be broken up, or 
voluntarily deserted," without government approval and 
prohibited individuals, especially adult males, from leaving 
their plantations prematurely.73 So despite weathering
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seven attacks during the decade and having twelve persons 
killed and five captured by the natives, the residents of 
Deerfield had to hold out.74 They had their fortification 
to fall back on, but their insistence on community cohesion 
and the bonds which predated the new threat also must have 
contributed to their resolve.
Northfield
By far the most exposed position on the Massachusetts 
frontier during the late seventeenth century was that of 
Squakeag, or Northfield, fifteen miles above Deerfield and 
fifty miles west of the interior settlements. A group of 
colonists from "Northampton & other townes" in the region 
began to petition for a grant above Deerfield in 1670, and 
two years later the General Court approved "a convenient 
quantity of land at Squakeag for a village," provided that 
"twenty able & honest persons, householders" pledged to John 
Pynchon a willingness to "setle upon the place . . . within 
eighteene months." Also in 1672, the court appointed a 
committee of Lt. William Clarke, William Holton, Lt. Samuel 
Smith, Cornet William Aliys, and Isaac Graves to lay out the 
plantation, grant town lots, and "order all the prudentiall 
affaires of the said village."75 The committee required 
the proprietors to occupy their land and build on it within 
four years or risk forfeiting their claims.
Residents of the new town had barely begun to settle in 
when King Philip's War broke out. On September 2, 1675, the
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natives attacked a group of inhabitants and garrison 
soldiers outside the town and killed eight, including 
Sgt. Samuel Wright, age 45, Ebenezer Janes, 16, and Jonathan 
Janes, 14, all of Northfield. The others who perished were 
Ebenezer Parsons and Nathaniel Curtis of Northampton, John 
Peck of Hadley, and Thomas Scott and Benjamin Dunwich, of 
undetermined origins. Two days later, when Capt. Richard 
Beers and his company attempted to rescue the remaining 
residents, natives ambushed the party. Among the twenty-one 
victims was Joseph Dickinson, from the distressed 
settlement.76 These losses and the threat of more led the 
survivors to leave Northfield as soon as possible.
On September 7, the refugees were escorted from the 
town by a strong military detachment. Although most of the 
promoters and original proprietors of Northfield resided in 
Northampton, many of them apparently did not actually move 
to the new outpost before 1675. Rather, they remained in 
more secure towns as absentee proprietors and sent sons or 
other representatives to establish their claims. When the 
young plantation was abandoned, the inhabitants naturally 
retraced their steps, many, of course, returning to 
Northampton.77 So stood the status of Northfield for 
nearly ten years.
Not until May 27, 1682, did either the General Court or 
the proprietors take any steps toward reorganizing the town. 
On that date, the court revived the committee to oversee the 
settlement of Northfield, and in 1683 the committee set the
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conditions for the resettlement. The instructions
stipulated that a minimum of forty families settle on the
tract, that the proprietors reside in the town by May 10,
1686, and that every person possessing "sixty acres of
interval land" set up "two persons on it."78 By 1685,
however, fewer than twenty families had returned to the
exposed town, and even they reportedly did not insist on
compact settlement. Despite this slow trickle, in June of
that year the proprietors of Northfield petitioned the court
to extend the town's boundaries 2-1/2 miles, claiming a
shortage of land and seeking to "encourage those that are to 
79setle there." Although the residents authorized the 
building of fortifications in the town center, they seem to 
have sought physical expansion before they had even come 
close to attaining the forty families authorized by the 
resettlement committee in 1683.
In fact, Northfield continued to have trouble filling 
its ranks. "Honored Sir," reported the committee to 
Governor Edmund Andros in 1688, "wee have had a great deal 
of care and trouble in the Resettling of this plantation. 
Many have had grants and have forfeited them again," causing 
discouragement among the residents and "fear [that] the 
place will be defeated."80 The cause of their urgency, of 
course, was the outbreak of King William's War. Natives 
struck Northfield on August 16, 1688, killing six residents 
and sending over half of the population from the plantation. 
Five days after the attack, John Pynchon wrote to the
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governor regarding the "great hazard" in Northfield. With a 
maximum of twenty-six able men available to the town, 
drawing off appeared to be a matter that many of the 
inhabitants "incline to."81 Thus the others who wished to 
avoid losing their plantation to the natives for the second 
time in fifteen years expressed their concerns to Governor 
Andros.
By all accounts, Northfield was in no position to 
defend itself. "Have pity on us!" pleaded the remaining 
residents to the General Court in June 1689. "Our place 
[is] burnt, and laid desolate," they reported, "our people 
slain, and the rest all driven away." "If you see meet to 
order us to throw up all, and leave it wholly to the 
enemies," the petitioners admitted, "Tho its hard (we feel 
it) we would submit." They preferred to persevere, however, 
and asked the court to take some action against the 
proprietors who had quit the plantation. Provincial 
authorities ordered the deserters to return "or provide 
sufficient men to bear arms and do service in their rooms"; 
by that time, though, "but nine or ten families" remained in 
the town.82 Northfield could not endure much longer.
Pynchon advised "that some speedy care must be taken to cull 
them off from Northfield or to send up some men to secure 
them there." Pynchon favored the latter, but on June 25, 
1690, the General Court authorized "all the inhabitants of 
Northfield that have any corn or other provisions, viz. 
hogs, horses, cattle, etc. [to] transport it down within
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the space of 6 or 8 days."83 The refugees once more made 
their way back down the valley to their former areas of 
residence, and no effort was made to resettle the town for 
more than two decades.
The most obvious explanation for Northfield's inability 
to withstand the successive Indian attacks was its naked 
position. But other towns, such as Westfield and Deerfield, 
suffered from similar exposure and managed to persist more 
successfully. More telling about Northfield's problems was 
the town's short history at the outbreak of both King 
Philip's War and King William's War, having been planted 
only in 1672 and resettled in 1685. The townspeople had 
never had the opportunity to nurture any lasting community 
bonds before 1675, and the reluctance of proprietors to 
return even during the mid-1680s left the town in the same 
underdeveloped condition on the eve of the next crisis. 
Neighboring Deerfield prudently emphasized community 
compactness and cohesion after King Philip's War, even when 
demographic growth necessitated expanded settlement, and the 
town evidently profited by this adherence in meeting the 
trials of the 1690s. In seventeenth-century Northfield, 
bonds which might have helped the community through troubled 
times had neither the time nor perhaps the encouragement to 
develop.
Groton
The Connecticut Valley was not the only Massachusetts
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frontier area affected by King Philip's War and its 
legacies. Towns on the northern fringe also fell victim to 
native attacks. Residents of Groton, settled in 1655, for 
instance, by August 25, 1675, felt "very much discouraged in 
their spirits." Capt. James Parker reported to Governor 
Leverett that the townspeople were "in a very great strait" 
and "in a very weak capacity to defend" themselves, lacking 
both guns and ammunition.84 The war had not yet touched 
the Middlesex County town directly, but with hostilities 
breaking out all around them, the inhabitants began to 
examine their situation with trepidation.
Such was the state of affairs, though perhaps 
intensified with the passage of time, when Parker and 
Maj. Simon Willard wrote to the General Court in February 
1676 concerning the colony's "day of Calamity & distress." 
The two town leaders related the troubled condition of 
Groton's residents, "brought into a narrow compasse" in 
anticipation of an Indian attack, their "provision neere 
consumed," and their "wives & children, some removed, others 
removing." "These things portend to us a famine, &
poverty," stated Parker and Willard, "Coming upon us with as
great fury on the one hand, as the enemy on the other." The 
townsmen "humbly, & upon [our] knees," requested the court's 
"direction & assistance in this case, as the Lord shall
direct whither wee shall goe or stay, or what way we may be
set in."85 This anxiety and indecision continued until the 
town experienced its first assault by the natives on March
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In fact, Groton suffered three attacks during the first 
two weeks of March 1676. Its population consisted of "about 
sixty F a m i l i e s a n d  the residents who had not previously 
retreated "gathered into five Garrisons," four of them 
clustered in the town center plus another "near a Mile 
Distant from the rest."86 By the end of the month, the 
Council conceded that the remaining residents could "abide 
no longer than untill carts bee sent to bring them" away, 
and the government authorized Capt. Joseph Sills' company to 
escort the retreat.87 "Things looked with a pritty sad 
face about those parts at this time," concluded William 
Hubbard. The refugees from Groton reportedly "scattered in 
different directions among their friends and kindred."
Seeking to avoid a panicked rush from the northern 
frontier, the General Court had ordered on March 28 that the 
residents of Middlesex County towns "that are forced to 
remove; and have not some advantage of settlement 
(peculiar) to the bay" should "settle at the frontire townes 
that remain for their strengthening." As the additional 
population was supposed to be an advantage to the threatened 
settlements, the order instructed "the people of the said 
townes to which [the evacuees] are appointed are to see to 
their accommodations.1,88 Although Groton had been settled 
for twenty years at the time of its abandonment, the 
residents probably still felt ties of affinity, at least, to 
communities in the Concord area, from whence many of the
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original settlers had migrated. Many of the refugees 
retired to Concord in 1676, and the town leaders apparently 
adopted that town as their temporary headquarters in exile.
On February 10, 1678, Capt. James Parker, Lt. William 
Lakin, Ens. John Lawrence, and •'Goodman" John Morse called 
"a generall town metting of the inhabitants of 
groaton . . . assembled at Concord." This improvised town 
meeting agreed and vowed "that if the providence of god 
prevent not by death or sicknes or by the enimy . . . then 
we will go up in the spring follooing and begin to Repayer 
our habitations againe." Further, the proprietors who set 
their signatures to the agreement pledged to "ingeage the 
forfiture of [their] wholle Right in groaton unto those that 
doo goe up and cary on the work."89 This document revealed 
some significant characteristics of the Groton population. 
Even in their exile, the town proprietors and their 
established municipal leaders retained a strong sense of 
community.
Admittedly, the relatively long history of the town, in 
comparison to other abandoned frontier plantations, 
represented a definite advantage to Groton's inhabitants.
They had had two decades in which to establish community 
ties and thus were undoubtedly more dependent upon each 
other than could have been the case among residents who 
settled frontier outposts only in the early 1670s. This 
interdependence was clearly exhibited in the 1678 agreement, 
whereby the residents pledged fidelity to their town and to
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their neighbors in advance of resettlement. A similar 
pledge existed among Deerfield's proprietors before their 
successful return to the plantation, but in Northfield, 
where strong community bonds had obviously not developed by 
1675, no such unity appeared between the refugee landowners. 
In both Deerfield and in Groton, community cohesion and 
accord, even under trying circumstances, seem to have 
benefitted the resettlement process, while in plantations 
lacking an evident sense of community responsibility, 
resettlement generally proceeded awkwardly and imperfectly.
The Groton population apparently survived the war 
without any traumatic devastation, though the existing vital 
records reflect some demographic interruption during the 
period. For instance, the records reveal no deaths at all 
between 1676 and 1679. This gap unquestionably represented 
the period of exile, when no town records were kept; 
persons who died away from the town and were buried 
elsewhere would not necessarily appear in either municipal 
or church records. More noticeable is the sharp decline in 
births registered for the late 1670s. After Groton's 
residents welcomed 57 infant arrivals for the five-year 
period from 1670 to 1674, the vital records reveal only 20 
births between 1675 and 1679, with 13 of those coming in 
1675 and only 7 during the remaining four years. Again, the 
fact that Groton was abandoned during this time contributed 
to shortcomings in the records, but the deficiencies could 
have been made up partially through retrospective notations











































Source: Vital Records of Groton.
See notes 91 and 92.
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of baptisms in the local church records. The number of 
births recorded rebounded slightly during the first half of 
the 1680s and regained pre-1675 levels during the second 
half of that decade.90 Still, although the unsettled 
conditions caused by the Indian attacks and removal may have 
resulted in some decline in the number of conceptions and 
births among Groton's residents, the severe discontinuity in 
the town's corresponding vital records must reflect more an 
absence of accurate registration than a breakdown in the 
reproductive process of the population.
New marriages continued during the period, though 
apparently fewer in number; town records revealed only 
three unions between 1675 and 1684, and all three occurred 
in Chelmsford. Marriages sealed in neighboring towns were 
not unheard of before the war, but they became much more 
common after the conflict. Of 16 marriages noted in the 
Groton records between 1660 and 1674, only 3 took place 
outside the town, all in Chelmsford. During the last 
quarter of the century, 14 of 18 weddings involving at least 
one Groton participant occurred elsewhere, most commonly in 
Chelmsford or Concord.91 This trend probably reflected 
bonds of affection, either direct or indirect, formed during 
the period of exile.
The refugees began returning to Groton in 1678 and 
apparently had the work of reorganizing their community well 
underway by the 1680s. Town records indicated no 
obstruction to the process before the opening hostilities of
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King William's War. On August 31, 1688, Capt. Francis 
Nicholson, the lieutenant-governor of the Dominion of New 
England, reported that the people of Groton and Lancaster 
"were very much affraid (being out towns)."92 Indeed, the 
town records reveal the same sense of anxiety from the 
residents themselves over their "present unsetled and almost 
destracted condition." In July 1689 they wrote to 
provincial authorities in Boston, "craving youer advice and 
asistanc if it may be obtained, that we may go on with ouer 
bisnes: to gat in our harvest and do other nessary worke."
The General Court apparently never considered abandoning 
Groton during the 1690s, and in fact ordered a military 
presence maintained there for "the Deffence of the 
Frontiers."93 But this time, the residents did not show 
any insistence to leave either. The 1689 petition was not a 
plea for permission to withdraw but rather a matter-of-fact 
request for instructions so that the inhabitants could "go 
on with [their] bisnes." The degree of community cohesion 
which existed among Groton's residents apparently 
contributed to their ability to reorganize and reform the 
settlement in a secure manner before the next trial during 
the 1690s.
The Interior Frontier 
In addition to the western and northern fringes, the 
Massachusetts colony also had another frontier area in the 
sparsely inhabited region between the harbor towns and the
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Connecticut Valley. This interior frontier included such 
communities as Brookfield and Worcester, both settled during 
the late 1660s, and Lancaster, established in 1643. These 
plantations shared similar circumstances during the late 
seventeenth century, but in each case, records for the 
period are scarce. Of the three, Lancaster probably had the 
most illustrative, or at least the best documented, 
experience.
The residents of Worcester and Brookfield fled their
plantations early in the war and "removed safely with what
they had left to several places, either where they had lived
before their planting or sitting down there; or where they
had Relations to receive and entertain them." The first
stop for at least some of the refugees retiring toward the
east was Boston, "where they were plentifully relieved out 
94of the Church Stock." Lancaster managed to hold out 
through the winter, benefitting from a Council order for 
Lt. Thomas Henchman to provide garrisons for the remaining 
towns of the region. Indians attacked the place in force, 
however, on February 10, 1676, causing the residents to 
petition the General Court on March 11 concerning the "sad & 
dismall havocke" inflicted upon them. The "poor destressed 
people of Lancaster" claimed an "Incapasity to subsist," 
many of them lacking "bread to last . . . [one] month."
"We are sorowful to Leave the place, but hopelesse to keep 
it . . ." pleaded the petitioners, noting a reluctance "to 
give any Incuridgmt to the enemy, or leave any thing for
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them to promot their wicked designe." Still, in the final 
analysis, Lancaster's remaining residents concluded it 
"better [to] save our Lives then lose Life & Estat 
both."95
Officials in Boston had ordered carts from Concord and 
Sudbury to carry off the Lancaster residents who were 
"disenabled from continuing there" on February 24, 1676, but 
apparently the help "nevr came for want of a small gard of 
men." The townsmen repeated their request for help in 
removing in the March 11 petition, and by the end of that 
month Lancaster was abandoned. Like their neighbors in 
Groton, the Lancaster refugees who had no "peculiar" place 
to flee "in the bay" were ordered by the General Court "to 
settle at the frontire townes that remain for their 
strengthening.1,96 The desertion of the interior 
plantations further compounded the plight of threatened 
areas on the other Massachusetts frontiers.
Lancaster's vital records are more revealing of the 
immediate postwar years than any previously discussed. Most 
strikingly, of 40 deaths recorded in 1675 and 1676, 38 
resulted from Indian attacks. Thirty-six of these victims 
were Lancaster residents. Thus the town's population 
directly and sharply felt the effects of the hostilities.
Of even more significance, in the long run, the records 
reveal to some extent where the residents fled during their 
period of exile from the abandoned town. The deaths of 16 
Lancaster residents were recorded between 1677 and 1681. Of





























1690-94: 9 (Killed by Indians: 
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1675: 8, 1676: 30)
Source: Nourse, ed., Birth, Marriage and Death Register
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Lancaster, 313-326.
See notes 98 and 99.
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that number, 15 succumbed away from Lancaster; 4 died in 
Dorchester, 4 in Charlestown, and 2 in Concord.97 By and 
large, Lancaster's death registers indicate that the 
residents retired to the towns surrounding Boston when the 
natives forced them from their frontier homes.
The town's birth records disclose the same pattern.
The number of births declined sharply during the period, 
from 54 between 1670 and 1674 to only 17 for the remainder 
of the decade and 30 between 1680 and 1684. Again, this 
decline may have resulted as much from a disruption in 
record-keeping during the years of abandonment and 
reorganization as from any disruption in the population's 
reproductive process. But the Lancaster registries noted 20 
births which occurred elsewhere within two decades of King 
Philip's War. Eight additions to two Lancaster families 
arrived in Sudbury; 6 babies among three families were born 
at Concord; and 4 children came into the world at 
Charlestown.98 These births reasserted the continuing ties 
between Lancaster in the interior and the coastal towns 
around the bay. Only thirty-five miles from the relative 
safety of Boston, Lancaster residents understandably felt an 
affinity to the more secure towns in which many of them 
originated.
Just when the refugees began to return to Lancaster or 
any of the other interior towns is difficult to determine, 
due to the sparsity of surviving documents. Some residents 
apparently made their way back to Lancaster by 1679, and
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more sought to do so. On October 7, 1679, "the Inhabitants 
of Lancaster" petitioned the Middlesex County Court for a 
committee to oversee the resettlement of the place, in 
accordance with the General Court order that no abandoned 
towns be planted anew without proper permission from county 
or provincial authorities. The proprietors expressed an 
earnest desire "to returne to Lancaster from whence wee have 
beene scattered," and the court appointed a committee of 
Capt. Thomas Prentice, Deacon John Stone, and Corp. William 
Bond to supervise the effort." By early 1682, as many as 
eighteen families had returned to the town "with a desire to 
build the plantation againe," despite the "many 
difficulties" occasioned by their "povertie." The returning 
colonists set "about building and fencing that soe they may 
provid bread for their families, and not be troublesom and 
burdensom to other townes, which of nesesitie must have been 
If we had Continued where we were" as refugees.100
Most Lancaster proprietors during the late 1670s thus 
exhibited not only a desire to live in their own town but 
also to exist independent of the charity and good works 
which supported them in exile. Apparently, however, not all 
of the landowners returned to the town promptly; as late as 
1684 the residents petitioned the General Court about 
absentee proprietors and asked that they "may be assessed in 
proportion to the value of their Estates as the Inhabitants 
are."101 The difficulties and poverty of which the 
proprietors complained in 1682 carried over further into the
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period of reorganization, and those residents who desired to 
make a commitment to their community evidently resented the 
intransigence of their fellow proprietors who refused to 
contribute to the resettlement of the town.
Worcester experienced an even more difficult period of 
adjustment. In March 1679, sixteen persons interested in 
returning to Worcester met in Concord under the direction of 
a committee which included Daniel Gookin, Thomas Prentice, 
and Daniel Henchman. They agreed that "if God spare life, 
and peace continue, to endevor, either by their [persons], 
or by their Relations, or by their purses, to Setle the Said 
plantation" by the summer of 1680. The proprietors also 
pledged "to build in a way of a towne" with such priorities 
in mind as "Security from the enimys," "the beter Convenicy 
of atending God's worship," "[the] Better Educatio[n] of 
their Children in Scooles," "the better Accomodation of 
Trades men," "Better Helps to [civility]," and "more 
convenient Helps in case of Sicknes, fyre or other 
Casualty.1,102 The optimistic Worcester refugees planned a 
close, interdependent community but one which could also 
accommodate commercial growth through the encouragement of 
"Trades men." Despite this agreement, however, 1680 came 
and went, "but there was no goeing by an[y] of them, or hope 
that they would So doe, for divers of them importu[ned to] 
goe, would not." Impatience evidently spread to Boston, for 
in October 1682 the General Court gave notice "that if 
Something was not [done] to begin the Said place it would
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bee Lost” and the charter forfeited.103 Time was running 
out for the Worcester proprietors who sought to reorganize 
their community.
The court's warning had the desired effect. On May 16,
1683, the court renewed the town charter under the
supervision of the county committee, and some of the
residents began to return. One year later, in April 1684,
the town planners ordered anyone who had taken a lot in
Worcester to settle on it within a year's time or lose their
claim. The committee also laid out rules for the
arrangement of the resettlement. Land for houselots was
resurveyed in the town center "to the end the inhabitants
may Setle in a way of defence as injoyned by law." From the
start, the organizers realized that not all of the eventual
residents could or would live in the concentrated plat.
"And those who will not Setle in the Said cittadel but [on]
therre plan[ting] or farme lotts," provided the committee
order, "shal So build as to have 2 or morre houses within
musket Sh[ot] of each other, that soe they may be in a way 
104of Defense." Worcester residents were slow in returning 
to their plantation, but once they did, they sought to order 
the resettlement in a prudent way, giving proper attention 
to the General Court's instructions concerning compact 
settlement.
As with other towns in the region, the old proprietors 
and the new settlers of Worcester had barely planted 
themselves before they were once more shaken by news of
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Indian hostilities. In July 1689, Lancaster residents spoke 
for all of their neighbors in the "out towns" of the exposed 
interior when they admitted harboring "som fears of being 
surprissed by the Indians, we being by foremer experience 
sencsible of theire mallice and crueltie."105 Lancaster 
managed to hold out, but Brookfield, whose recent 
resettlement was far from complete, and Worcester once again 
had to be abandoned during the 1690s.106 In spite of the 
emphasis Worcester's proprietors placed on compact 
settlement, community cohesion, and defense, the town could 
not pull together sufficiently to resist the native attacks.
Lancaster, the closest of the interior settlements to 
the more settled areas of the colony, probably benefitted 
from an extended security network. After an optimistic 
resettlement effort and with knowledge gained from 
experience that they had survived the Indian onslaught, 
Lancaster residents could return to their town with at least 
some small degree of confidence that the communities of the 
Concord River region were near. Worcester and Brookfield, 
conversely, were literally miles from anywhere, as close to 
the Connecticut River frontier towns as they were to the 
haven of Boston. This fact could have proven little comfort 
to the refugees who faced a return to their isolated homes. 
They had no proximate support system upon which to lean, 
only miles of open wilderness in any direction. At least 
the Connecticut Valley plantations had a familiar and 
regular elongated security network which stretched the
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length of the region; each town had another relatively 
close by down the valley to fall back on. No such comfort 
existed for the isolated interior outposts. No wonder the 
residents of Brookfield and Worcester were so reluctant to 
return and so quick to scatter again.
While towns and plantations across Massachusetts1 
frontiers shared many experiences during King Philip's War, 
the paths followed by each in the crucial postwar period of 
recovery were sufficiently varied as to make generalizations 
risky. All of the towns felt the effects of the Indian 
hostilities in 1675 and 1676, either directly in the form of 
native attacks or indirectly in the form of an overall 
regional fear of enemy depredations. Three of these 
communities— Westfield, Springfield, and 
Northampton— survived the war intact, while the other 
six— Deerfield, Northfield, Groton, Lancaster, Worcester, 
and Brookfield— suffered periods of complete abandonment 
ranging from under three years to over ten years. 
Surprisingly, no patterns directly relevant to the towns' 
specific experiences during the war carried over into the 
recovery period.
Of the three which survived, for instance, Westfield 
and Northampton benefitted from community cohesion after 
1675, while Springfield, undoubtedly the most physically 
secure of the towns, was not blessed with strong communal 
bonds either before or after the war. Conversely, of the
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abandoned plantations, Deerfield and Groton residents 
developed and expressed a vibrant sense of social 
responsibility during their respective resettlement efforts, 
and this cooperation paid off in meeting the next crisis. 
Residents of the other deserted towns either never had ample 
opportunity to develop lasting commitments with their 
neighbors or never voiced such assurances as confidently as 
did the proprietors who led the resettlement of Deerfield or 
Groton. Wartime experiences thus give no sure indication 
about postwar community development.
Of only slightly more significance in explaining 
community patterning during the years after King Philip's 
War in these towns was their age. The oldest were 
Springfield and Lancaster, settled in 1636 and 1643 
respectively; neither exhibited an impressive record of 
communal cooperation during the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century, but both managed to survive King 
William's War intact. Northampton, Groton, Westfield, 
Brookfield, Worcester, and Deerfield all were established 
between 1654 and 1669, so each had time to develop 
neighborly bonds and commitments before 1675. The most 
successful towns in community rebuilding or reorganization 
after the war came from this group; only Worcester and 
Brookfield residents failed to arrange their resettlement 
quickly enough or efficiently enough to weather the next 
war. The case which lends itself most clearly to analysis 
in the category of town age is that of Northfield. Settled
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175
only in 1672, the isolated fledgling outpost had developed 
by 1675 neither the community strength to withstand King 
Philip's War nor the community commitment necessary for a 
speedy and effective return. Therefore, Northfield's tender 
age hurt the plantation both in 1675 and in 1690.
The most successful formula for community development 
during the postwar years involved a combination of town age 
and geographic location. Longevity did not necessarily 
ensure community order. In the case of Springfield, in 
fact, the long history of the town contributed to a sense of 
individualism and noncommunalism uncharacteristic of 
frontier plantations. Other towns, which had existed for 
approximately a decade or two, seem to have been still new 
enough that some degree of interdependence remained among 
the residents, yet settled enough that they either survived 
the war or initiated a positive return effort fairly 
quickly. Such was the case in Westfield, Northampton, 
Deerfield, and Groton.
Worcester and Brookfield, of course, were the 
exceptions among this group. As such, they reflected the 
importance of the second component of geographic location. 
These two interior settlements were geographically isolated, 
whereas those of the Connecticut Valley were links in a 
chain which stretched nearly fifty miles. This chain 
provided an extended security system which in the long run 
supplemented the community stability of the individual 
members. Northfield, unfortunately, could not benefit fully
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from the support of its neighbors because it had not had the 
opportunity to formulate its own base of communal 
interdependence. Groton and Lancaster both had fairly 
direct contact with Boston via the secure and proximate 
towns of the Concord River region. Of the two, the former 
displayed a more apparent sense of postwar community 
commitment. A combination of factors thus served to 
strengthen commxmity order in certain frontier plantations 
directly affected by King Philip's War and thereby aided 
their residents in banding together during the difficult 
decades which followed. But in towns like Northfield, 
Worcester, and Brookfield, which lacked the existence of 
either a firm pre-war community structure or an extended 
support system, the problems of resettlement and 
reorganization were never really resolved satisfactorily in 
the years following King Philip's War.
Nearly all of the towns discussed had at least one 
characteristic in common during the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century. In spite of General Court admonitions 
for compact settlement and local committee instructions to 
the same effect, community leaders across the frontier had 
to face and regulate the phenomenon of expansion and 
dispersal of settlement away from their town centers. Even 
in frontier plantations such as Westfield and Deerfield, 
where the residents seem sincerely to have espoused the 
doctrine of compact settlement, newcomers and even 
established landowners or their sons began to branch off to
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detached farmsteads or, more commonly, satellite 
communities.
This concern was not new to Massachusetts authorities; 
their predecessors had attempted to enforce compactness 
throughout the colony's history. Likewise, other town 
studies have indicated the extent to which communities 
throughout the colony experienced geographic diffusion 
during the seventeenth century. For instance, Philip 
Greven, for Andover, and Kenneth Lockridge for Dedham found 
towns which originated as close, compact, communal entities. 
In both, population growth and land divisions led 
inhabitants to move away from the village center.107 So, 
similar instances in the frontier towns were by no means 
unique; only their timing lent them any degree of novelty, 
coming as they did in such an unsettled time.
Expanding and dispersing when a continuing Indian 
threat existed may have represented a gamble. But in a 
larger sense, perhaps the attraction toward expansion was a 
healthy sign in the postwar frontier communities. By 
branching off, residents who had been forced to flee into 
garrison houses or to abandon their communities altogether 
just a few years earlier reflected a confidence in their 
ability to weather the threats encountered on the frontier 
and in the belief that they could rely on the support of 
their neighbors without necessarily having to live in 
immediate physical contact with them. The idea of community 
thus remained vibrant, even while its form was changing.
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Had frontier residents chosen to remain huddled in their 
fortified houses or, worse yet, refused to return to their 
houses at all, the Massachusetts frontier would have been in 
peril.
Each town on the Massachusetts frontier underwent 
different experiences during King Philip's War and each one 
dealt with the problems of recovering from the conflict in 
its own way. The General Court provided guidelines, and 
county committees supervised resettlement efforts to 
encourage prudent procedures, but in the end it was left to 
individual towns and their residents to determine the exact 
course their communities would follow during the postwar 
decades. Resolving the problems of resettlement and 
reorganization remained one of the most difficult tasks of 
the period. The physical scars on the frontier provided 
lasting reminders of the conflict. Some communities met the 
challenge and started over or even expanded; others could 
not regenerate quickly or sufficiently enough to heal the 
wounds. Therefore, all of the Massachusetts frontier 
communities were affected, directly or indirectly, by the 
longterm legacies of King Philip's War in the region.
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CHAPTER 5 
POLITICS: STABILITY AMID ADVERSITY
In addition to the physical, economic, and demographic 
legacies left by King Philip's War, political issues also 
became prominent in the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century. From the local to the provincial level, colonists 
became increasingly sensitive to the governmental climate in 
the colony, but the political problems themselves had no 
direct relationship to the war. On all levels of 
government, Massachusetts residents looked to familiar 
leaders for guidance throughout the period. The preference 
for continuity was most apparent in town politics on the 
frontier. At the same time, townspeople became more 
assertive in their approach to political issues. This 
assertiveness resulted from the trials faced during King 
Philip's War and its aftermath. In reaction to the physical 
threats they faced, Massachusetts colonists became more wary 
of the varied forces they encountered in the world around 
them. So while citizens across the colony called on trusted 
leaders to see them through troubled times, they did so with 
a new sense of watchfulness, warning both town and 
provincial officials that public assent no longer came 
without public scrutiny. The Indian conflict did not cause 
192
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the political problems which existed during the postwar 
years, but it did influence the ways in which colonists 
responded to the perceived challenges of the period.
The "Indian war set off a chain of events that 
profoundly altered the colony's political culture," argued 
Douglas Leach. Economic troubles resulting from the war, he 
found, made colonists more politically sensitive and 
skeptical, and "transformed colonial authorities from 
trusted agents into outsiders whom villagers increasingly 
identified with interests beyond the local community." The 
financial legacies of King Philip's War "inevitably 
stimulated popular participation in government affairs," and 
"as the economy weakened, local people challenged 
traditional authority."1 Other writers have echoed Leach's 
connection between war, taxes, and popular political 
upheaval. Christine Young, for instance, claimed that 
strains between the established leaders and a rising 
generation existed in Salem by the 1670s and that the 
legacies of King Philip's War, particularly the economic 
costs, exacerbated the tensions.2 New England communities 
stressed local autonomy in their political administration as 
well as in their Congregational churches. Any forces that 
threatened local self-determination and control, whether 
Indians attacking the outposts in the wilderness or crown 
officials challenging the cherished charter, sparked 
Massachusetts residents to the defense of their accustomed 
order.3
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Echoing Leach's general statements, numerous studies of 
town politics have emphasized the importance that colonists 
placed on the value of local autonomy. In the years 
following the Indian war, the increased taxation represented 
an intrusion to many colonists and led them to reevaluate 
their relationship with both local and provincial 
authorities. Young found this to be the case in Salem, 
where resistance to tax rates authorized in Boston affected 
relationships between residents and their elected selectmen. 
Whereas before the late 1670s the selectmen had acted with a 
fairly free hand, even in financial transactions, by the 
1680s the town began to require greater public 
accountability in matters of taxation and expenditure.
Young even found a breakdown in the previous consensus over 
the selection of selectmen, as a larger number of nominees 
attracted the votes of Salem residents.4
Kenneth Lockridge and Allan Kreider discovered much the 
same situation in Dedham and Watertown. As serious 
issues— such as increased taxation— arose which directly 
affected the townsmen, the colonists became more politically 
active. During the late seventeenth century, residents of 
both towns took back powers which had gravitated to the 
selectmen earlier in the century. The authors theorized 
that the town meetings' reassertiveness resulted from either 
a new degree of self-confidence on the part of the citizens 
or a lack of confidence in the ability of their 
selectmen.5 Either way, issues of local importance which
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arose during the years following King Philip's War led 
colonists in both Dedham and Watertown to take a harder look 
at local administration.
Both communities also experienced a marked increase in 
turnover among the selectmen. Before the 1680s, most 
selectmen served for long periods of time; after that time, 
more residents received nominations and those elected 
generally served fewer and shorter terms. In fact, Dedham 
voters chose an entirely new slate of town leaders in 1689. 
Leach went so far as to say that the tendency to drop 
established "local civil and military" leaders— "village 
brokers"— was widespread across the colony.6 Some of these 
same patterns appeared in Massachusetts frontier towns which 
faced reorganization after the traumas of the Indian war, 
though the extensive repudiation of the political leadership 
suggested by Leach and evident in Dedham never materialized 
in any of the towns studied.
In Springfield, the cornerstone of the Connecticut 
Valley, demographic stability was accompanied by political 
stability, at least in the election of selectmen. The town 
elected five men to that office annually. Of nine residents 
who served at least twice between 1670 and 1674, three died 
during the mid-1670s, but the remaining six each served at 
least two more terms during the next five-year period.
Indeed, John Dumberton and Henry Chapin continued to be 
elected regularly— generally every other year, as was the 
common pattern in Springfield— into the early 1690s, while
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Benjamin Parsons, George Colton, and Samuel Marshfield 
remained politically prominent into the middle or late 
1680s.7 Neither did a large turnover occur after 1689.
Twelve men in all served two or more terms during the 1680s. 
Dumberton, Chapin, Parsons, Colton, and Marshfield were at 
or nearing the end of long political careers by that time, 
each spanning at least twenty years of regular service. Of 
the seven remaining, only one, Samuel Ball, failed to be 
reelected, while the other six, Jonathan Burt, John 
Hitchcock, Japhet Chapin, John Holyoke, John Warriner, and 
Thomas Stebbins, each served at least one more time during
the early 1690s. New names did appear on the selectman
lists of Springfield between the end of King Philip's War 
and the Revolution of 1689, but of fourteen men elected for
the first time during those years, eight bore the same
surnames as previous selectmen. Similarly, of ten new men 
chosen as selectmen during the five years after 1689, six 
had relatives who had previously held the position.8 
Persistence was definitely a characteristic of Springfield's 
leaders during the last quarter of the seventeenth century.
While Springfield residents remained fairly consistent 
in the men they chose to order the affairs of their town, 
they did not give them an entirely free hand during the 
postwar period. On July 17, 1678, the town meeting took 
notice of ''some scruple made concerning the Select mens 
Acts, because the Major part of them are not freemen 
according to order." The matter caused no political
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upheaval because Nathaniel Burt, one of the selectmen, 
resigned his seat to his brother Jonathan Burt, thus 
creating the desired majority of confirmed freemen on the 
panel.9 By demanding this simple adjustment, the town 
meeting gave notice that it was keeping an eye on the 
actions of the elected town leaders.
In a more noteworthy incident, the residents of 
Springfield tightened the reins on selectman powers in a 
manner similar to that described by Young, Lockridge, and 
Kreider. The townsmen authorized the selectmen "to take 
care from time to time for the making & Collecting of Such 
Rates" as necessary for the building of a new meetinghouse 
in January 1677. With building costs mounting and 
provincial taxation remaining high, however, eight years 
later, in 1685, the residents withdrew such discretionary 
authority from the selectmen, ordering them to "contract no 
bargain or engage any sum above Twenty pounds for the 
Inhabitants to pay by Rate, without first advising with & 
consulting the Town, & having their approbation concerning 
the same."10 Springfield residents voiced confidence in 
their selectmen during the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century by generally reelecting them at regular intervals, 
but the town meeting also followed a pattern apparently 
prevalent in the colony by reasserting its authority, 
particularly in burdensome financial matters.
Persistence was also notable among Westfield's 
selectmen after King Philip's War, though a paucity of town












1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695
Isaac Phelps X X X X X X1-4 X X X X X
Thomas Gun X
John Roote X X
John Ingersoll X
Ens. Loomis X X x i-2
George Phelps X
Josiah Dewey X X X X X X
David Ashley X X X X X
Lt. Madsley X X^
Thomas Bancroft X
Jedediah Dewey X X X^ X
Nathaniel Welar x i-z X X X
Samuel Root X X X X
John Sacket, Sr. x^ X
John Sacket, Jr. X
Source: Powell, "Edward Taylor's Westfield" No records exist for the year9 1682-1685
and 1691.
Two elections were held in 1688.
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records makes the patterns less readily apparent than in 
Springfield. Still, taking into account a complete absence 
of records between 1682 and 1685, certain names stick out 
among the fifteen men who served as selectmen during the two 
decades following King Philip's War. Of that number, nine 
were chosen at least twice in a town which elected only 
three selectmen per year. Josiah Dewey served at least six 
terms between 1677 and 1695, David Ashley five, and Jedediah 
Dewey, Nathaniel Weller, and Samuel Root four each. By far 
the most prominent Westfield selectman was Isaac Phelps, 
elected eleven times, exclusive of the period 1682 to 1685. 
Phelps never missed more than one year at a time between 
terms and in fact was reelected five years in a row from 
1688 through 1693.11 Clearly, Westfield residents did not 
repudiate their established leaders. Unfortunately, the 
sparse town records provide no further indications of the 
political climate in Westfield.
Politics in Northampton followed the same patterns.
The same men who led the town through King Philip's War 
continued to exert their influence during the postwar 
decades. At the time of the conflict, William Clark 
dominated the town's politics; his career as a selectman 
stretched from 1661 to 1684, and he served twenty terms in 
twenty-three years. Six of the other eight selectmen 
elected in 1675 and 1676 finished their careers by the end 
of the decade, but the other two, Jonathan Hunt and Medad 
Pomeroy, became two of the most persistent town leaders for
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the next fifteen years. In addition, all four of the 
subsequent selectmen who first appeared during the late 
1670s went on to serve the town repeatedly. John King and 
Jonathan Hawley particularly gained the favor of Northampton 
voters, but Aaron Cooke and Judadiah Wright also served at 
least three terms each.12 Ten new men became selectmen 
during the 1680s. Six of them served only one or two terms 
each, but the other four, Ebenezer Strong, Joseph Parsons, 
Samuel Wright, and Preserved Clapp, were fixtures in the 
town leadership well into the 1690s. Strong, Parsons,
Wright, and Clapp, together with Hunt, Pomeroy, King, and 
Hawley, dominated elections between the mid-1680s and the 
mid-1690s. These eight men held thirty-six of the fifty 
seats during that period, and in the ten years, 1685 to 
1694, they occupied three or more of the five annual 
selectman positions eight times; in two straight years all 
of the seats were distributed among the entrenched 
leaders.13 No political backlash occurred against the 
traditional leadership in Northampton after either King 
Philip's War or the Revolution of 1689.
As in the other towns studied, the Northampton town
meeting made an effort to control the power of the
selectmen, but it had done so before the war as well.
Ostensibly to relieve their leaders of the obligations and
burdens incurred in holding the office repeatedly, the
residents in 1674 prohibited their selectmen from serving 
14consecutive terms. Whatever the intent of this order, it











TABLE 5.3: NORTHAMPTON SELECTMEN
1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695
William Clark X X X X X
Deacon (William Holton X X
John Lyman X
Henrv Woodward X
John Stebblns X X X
David Wilton X
Thomas Root. Sr. X
John Hunt X X X X X X X
Medad Pomeroy X X X X X X X X X X X X X
John Kina X X X X X X X X X X X
Aaron Cooke X X X
Joseph Hawley X X X X X X X X
JU dadiah Wright X X X X X
Thomas Strong X.
Thomas Judd X
Ebenezer Strong X X X X X X
Joseph Parsons X X X X X X X X X
Samuel Wright X X X X X
James Wright X
John Bridgman X
Samuel Bartlet X X
Preserved Clapp x X X X
John Clark X
Deacon Phelps X
T. Lvman X X
John Parsons X








clearly did not loosen the hold of the chosen few on the 
prominent positions. Each of the powerful selectmen 
regularly served terms consecutively or even in strings of 
three years at a time, and the voters of Northampton who 
consistently returned their leaders to office apparently saw 
no need to restrain their terms of service.15 Political 
cohesion and continuity reigned in Northampton during the 
decades after the Indian war and during the colony's most 
politically disruptive period of the seventeenth century.
The towns which were abandoned during the war naturally 
had their political processes interrupted. Deerfield, for 
instance, was so young in 1675 that no significant degree of 
continuity could have developed before the inhabitants fled 
down the Connecticut Valley. Furthermore, even while 
residents and newcomers began to return to the town during 
the 1680s, a court-appointed committee composed of men from 
throughout Hampshire County controlled most administrative 
matters in Deerfield. Not until 1687 did Deerfield 
residents elect a board of local selectmen, who were 
assigned to "continue in office until others be Chosen and 
they discharged,11 and not until 1689 did the town begin to 
hold regular annual elections.16 Six selectmen— William 
Smead, Joshua Pomeroy, John Sheldon, Benoni Stebbins,
Benjamin Hastings, and Thomas French— served that first 
extended term, but none of them was reelected in 1689, when 
Thomas Wells, John Catlin, Jonathan Wells, Samuel Northam, 
and Joseph Barnard took over. Although six of these ten











TABLE 5.4: DEERFIELD SELECTMEN
1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693* 1693* 1694
William Smead X
Joshua Pumry X
John Sheldon X X X
Benoni Stebbins X X X
Beniamin Hastings X
Thomas French X X X X X
Thomas Wells X X
John Catlin X X
Jonathan Wells X X X X
Samuel Northam X
Joseph Barnard X X
John Allvn X







Simon Beamon X X
John Porter X
Source: Melvoin, ed., Deerfield Town Book
*In March 1693 the town changed from a pattern of December 
elections to March elections, thus the occurrence of two 
separate elections for the year 1693.
The 1687 selectmen served until the next election in 1689.
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original selectmen served at least one more term during the 
early 1690s, the position was not characterized by the 
persistence evident in other Connecticut Valley towns. In 
fact, in 1692 an entirely new group came into office.17 
Deerfield at the time was still building its political 
foundations.
A problem inherent in the politics of any town similar 
in size and age to Deerfield was the number of necessary 
elected municipal offices relative to the number of eligible 
adult male residents. In Deerfield, for instance, the 
inhabitants annually elected about twenty officeholders out 
of some sixty adult men living in the town during the late 
seventeenth century. The town meeting in June 1689 claimed 
that elections of selectmen could not be carried out 
regularly "without greatly burthening some particularr 
persons." To ease the burdens incumbent on their town 
leaders, the residents agreed to "bind themselves to stand 
by them in said office and to obey all such acts and orders 
as said Selectmen shall doe and put forth for the good and 
benefit of the town provided such acts and orders shal not 
be repugnant to the Laws of this Jurisdiction."18 
Deerfield townspeople pledged to do their utmost to preserve 
political harmony in the town so as to make their 
selectmen's tasks as light as possible. The frontier 
residents there were too concerned with establishing their 
own political order to be influenced by the political 
atmosphere of the province at the time. The degree of
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continuity present in town elections elsewhere did not 
appear in Deerfield because no basis for cohesion existed 
yet, not because the residents of the outpost were 
dissatisfied with their leaders. Far from exhibiting 
dissatisfaction, Deerfield's inhabitants entered into 
sincere agreements, during both resettlement and the initial 
stages of redevelopment, to make the administrative 
functions of the community run as smoothly as possible.
The only other town included in this study which had 
either adequate records or a tenure of existence long enough 
to provide any relevant information about a political system 
is Groton. Groton's administrative functions, like 
Deerfield's, were interrupted by a period of abandonment, 
but unlike the Connecticut Valley outpost, Groton residents 
had over a full decade of previous political experience to 
build on when they returned in 1678. An established and 
vital leadership structure developed between 1662 and 1675; 
when the town was resettled, and even while they were 
scattered, the inhabitants looked to these same leaders for 
guidance.
Although Groton residents generally elected between
five and seven selectmen per year, during the period from
1662 to 1676, a total of only sixteen men held the office.
Half of them— John Morse, James Knop, William Longley, John
Page, William Lakin, John Fiske, William Martin, and James
Parker— served five or more terms apiece; Parker won a seat
19in thirteen of the fifteen years. Most of these men
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resumed positions of sustained leadership during the 1680s. 
Parker, Lakin, Morse, and John Lawrence played important 
roles in keeping the residents united when they fled Groton 
and in organizing the return to the town in 1678. Of the 
eight men who predominated during the 1660s and early 1670s, 
all except Martin and Fiske went on to serve repeatedly 
after the town was resettled, with Parker holding the office 
eight times between 1679 and 1689, William Lakin seven 
times, Page six, and Knop five.20
These established leaders were joined by ten new
selectmen during the 1680s, but persistence continued to be
a trait among the members of the governing board. Jonas
Prescott and Jonathan Morse, who made their first appearance
in 1680, served seven and five years, respectively, while
Josiah Parker, elected in 1682, held office six times during
the remainder of the decade. The same patterns of
leadership continued into the 1690s, as both persistent
selectmen from the pre-war period and newcomers from the
1680s continued to serve the town. Such familiar names as
James Parker, William Lakin, James Knop, Jonas Prescott, and
Josiah Parker all appeared on Groton selectmen boards in the 
21early 1690s. The length of the careers of some of these 
selectmen and the regularity with which they won reelection 
suggest no dissatisfaction among Groton's residents with 
their established leaders, even during the troubled times of 
the late seventeenth century.
Harmony did not always reign supreme in Groton,
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however, and the town meeting took an extreme measure to
ensure that the selectmen served the best interests of the
residents. In December 1680 the meeting created a committee
"to view and to give Instructions to the sellect men to act
in town affaires." The initial committee included James
Parker, Richard Blood, William Lakin, John Lakin, and John
Page; all the them except Page had just completed terms in
office. Some tension arose in the town over the building of
a new meeting house, so the residents instructed the
committee members to help the selectmen "doe what they can
to healle the differences." By the end of the month the
disagreements apparently were settled because the contesting
factions agreed to "forgive each other wheirin we have been
Instrumintall of greiving each other in word or deed" and
"to promote and increase lov and doe nothing to break the 
22peace now mad[e]."
Still, the Groton town meeting continued the practice 
of appointing advisory committees composed of former 
selectmen to ensure that the current leaders "doe mak and
maintain [peace] and love [one] with another in the
23town." Groton voters showed their trust m  the 
established local leaders by reelecting them regularly, but 
the townspeople also reacted to potentially divisive issues 
by creating a panel to consult with the selectmen prior to 
major decisions. This appointive committee structure really 
did not take power away from the elected officials because 
its members were drawn from the same group which regularly
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served as selectmen. But the presence of these auxiliary 
advisors probably made Groton residents feel more certain 
that weighty issues would receive greater consideration from 
the men in authority.
In spite of the efforts of town meetings across the 
colony to reassert their power over their selectmen, 
residents remained constant in the local leaders they chose. 
With various issues, especially financial matters, magnified 
in the aftermath of King Philip's War, townspeople naturally 
wanted to have more control over, or at least knowledge of, 
decisions which directly affected them. All the while, 
however, they repeatedly put their trust in the same men to 
order town affairs. In the uneasy years which followed the 
conflict, Massachusetts colonists generally looked to 
familiar leadership, and they did so on the provincial level 
as well as on the town level.
In addition to the legacies left by King Philip's War, 
another crisis arose during the 1680s, as the crown 
initiated proceedings to revoke the Massachusetts charter.
The two conflicts, coming as they did, one on the heels of 
the other, laid the foundation for political upheaval in the 
colony. People were understandably agitated by events of 
the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The resulting 
tensions became most apparent in the political sphere in 
Boston, where the constitutional showdown threatened to 
wound the Massachusetts Bay colony gravely.
The internal troubles of the postwar years cannot be
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separated from the charter controversy, which became a major
concern to Massachusetts residents by the late 1670s. Royal
plans to revoke the charter, which had been removed from
England to the colony in 1630, began early in the
Restoration period at which time the colonial leaders
expressed the belief that "the pattent (under God) [was] the
first and maine foundation of our civil politye here." The
General Court in 1661 maintained that the charter provided
"full power and authoritie, both legislative and execcutive"
for the government of the colony, "without appeale,
excepting lawe or lawes repugnant to the lawes of England."
As long as they stayed within the laws of the realm,
Massachusetts legislators proclaimed "any imposition
prejudiciall to the country . . . to be an infringement of 
24our right." From an early date, Massachusetts residents 
considered the rights laid out in the charter to be supreme 
in the colony.
Complaints sounded from various offices in the imperial 
system about the colony's presumption, and most of the 
objections revolved ultimately around the subject of trade. 
Governor Lord Vaughan of Jamaica, for example, suggested to 
the Committee for Trade and Plantations in September 1675 
that perhaps the time was ripe for the king to take action 
against Massachusetts' refusal to obey trade restrictions, 
"the Indians being in rebellion . . . and not like to be 
reduced" in the near future. The committee concurred. "The 
present laws of the Massachusetts are so different from the
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laws of England, and the government so arbitrary," noted the
lords, "that it occasions murmuring among all sorts of
people." They further charged that the provincial leaders
hoarded power and that the people had no real voice in the 
25annual elections. The colony's most ardent and perhaps 
most dangerous enemy was Edward Randolph, an agent for the 
crown who came to Boston in the mid-1670s to report on the 
merits of the allegations. One month after Metacom's death, 
Randolph reported to the king that Governor Leverett 
considered crown and parliamentary directives meaningless if 
they contradicted the colony's interests and accused him of 
stating "that all matters in difference are to be concluded 
by their final1 determination, without appeal to your 
Majestie."26 So the charter controversy began, as 
Massachusetts' enemies took the opportunity provided by the 
confusion surrounding King Philip's War to compile evidence 
against the colony.
The General Court recognized the danger, and as soon as 
the Indian threat was extinguished, the Massachusetts 
government turned to counter the royal challenge, not with 
force as against the natives but rather with an act of 
courtesy. In October 1677, the court sent King Charles a 
gift of ten barrels of cranberries, two hogsheads of 
"speciall good sampe," and three thousand codfish. Leverett 
petitioned the king to accept the native commodities of the 
region as a sign of Massachusetts's good faith and earnest 
desire "to repell those false clamours which have been layd
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before your majesty against us by some that have not binn
well affected to us, nor to your majesties service with us."
He assured the crown that the colony remained "at all times
religiously observant of our duty to God, and [loyal] to 
27your majesty, our king." The wording of Leverett's 
assurance may have contained some underlying significance; 
orthodox Puritans placed their loyalty to God above their 
loyalty to the king and viewed the charter in almost 
religious terms, as the sanction for their errand into the 
wilderness. With a battle over their charter brewing, 
Leverett and the members of the General Court attempted to 
mollify the king's suspicions while subtly affirming the 
order of their priorities.
One year after sending the gifts to England, the 
General Court took an even more conciliatory tone in 
addressing the king. Massachusetts authorities expressed a 
hope that the crown would "receve no impressions from any 
that, for their own evill ends, shall endeavor (by false & 
mistaken reports) to represent us as affecting & aspiring to 
a greatnes independent [of] your majestie's soveraignty over 
us, or incompatable with the duty of good & loyall subjects 
to a most gratious king, in whose prosperity wee most 
heartily rejoyce, & for which wee dayly pray."28 Clearly 
on the retreat, at least in the image they hoped to present 
in England, the court also wrote to its agents in London 
approving a "declaration of our readiness to amend any thing 
which, through ignorance or neglect in any kinde, wee have
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transgressed the rules given us by his majesty in our 
charter, and to begg his pardon for the same." Apparently 
this propitiatory approach proved successful, at least for a 
time, for by early 1682 the General Court reported to its 
agents Joseph Dudley and John Richards that the king had 
"gratiously intimated . . . that he hath no intention to 
violate or infringe our charter." Therefore, Dudley and 
Richards were to cooperate with the Privy Council, thereby 
assuring "the continuance of his majesty's grace and favour 
toward us, who have alwayes endeavoured to approove 
ourselves his majesty's most loyall subjects, & promoters of 
his Crowne & dignitie."29
While the provincial government worked to mend fences 
with royal authorities, however, well-known and outspoken 
colonists continued to make inflammatory statements. "By 
our Pattent," wrote the Reverend Samuel Nowell in 1683, for 
instance, "we have full and absolute power to rule and 
governe, pardon and punish, etc."30 With the likes of 
Edward Randolph lurking around Boston, reports of such 
sentiments certainly found their way across the Atlantic and 
hurt the colony's attempts to save the charter from royal 
abrogation.
In June 1683 the Lords of Trade received from Randolph 
a list of seventeen "Articles against the Government of 
Boston." The list contained a wide variety of indictments, 
from the matter of the colony setting up its own "Publick 
mint" to "imprison[ing] his Majesties Officers for doing
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their Dutyes." Among the offenses cited was a complaint 
against the license supposedly afforded to the 
Congregational churches by the charter. "They impose upon 
the Consciencyes of his Majesties Subjects in matters of 
Religion," Randolph accused, "by their Lawes Ecclesiasticall 
being repugnant to the Lawes of England."31 On July 20,
1683, the lords issued a writ of quo warranto against the 
Massachusetts charter, noting "some crimes and misdemeanors" 
committed by the elected officials in the colony. However, 
if the colony made "a full submission and entire resignation 
to our pleasure," the lords offered to preserve the charter 
and only "regulate [it] in such manner as shall be for our 
service and the good of that our colony, without any other 
alterations then such as wee shall find necessary for the 
better support of our government there."32 Massachusetts 
officials were faced with the choice of submitting to the 
crown's proceedings and hoping for the best or of fighting 
the challenge and risking the complete loss of the charter.
A debate ensued among the leaders of the colony in 
Boston in January 1684. The most forceful voices in the 
debate were those of the orthodox leaders, particularly 
Increase Mather, who likened the struggle over the charter 
to the battle against the Indians; both the hostile natives 
and the royal challengers represented forces of evil 
threatening the holy mission in New England. Thus, just as 
the effort to withstand the Indian attacks came to represent 
a reflection of the Puritans' spiritual worthiness, the
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colonial clergy portrayed resistance to the suit against the 
charter as another test of their religious fortitude. The 
two challenges were twin prongs in the campaign between good 
and evil. In reference to the advice of the Lords of Trade 
that Massachusetts surrender its charter voluntarily for 
alteration, Mather warned the freemen of the colony that 
"wee shall sin against God if wee vote an affirmative to 
it." Just as numerous lay and religious leaders exhorted 
their followers to place their complete faith in the 
Almighty during King Philip's War, Mather advised his fellow 
colonists in 1684 to "keep ourselves still in the hands of 
God, and Trust ourselves with his providence."33
While refusing to relinquish their charter, colonial 
officials continued to maintain their innocence against 
accusations of political and administrative improprieties. 
"Not being conscious to ourselves that wee have wittingly 
donn anything to the just offence of your majesty thro our 
weakness and ignorance," the General Court wrote to the king 
in October 1684, "we beleive £ readily acknowledge wee may 
have committed some unwilling errors or mistakes." To show 
remorse, the members of the court pledged, "wee prostrate 
ourselves at your majesty's feet, humbly begging and 
imploring your majesties free pardon & forgiveness, with the 
continuance of our charter & priviledges therein conteyned.1 
In a subsequent letter they asked royal authorities to 
disregard "the many ill representations & informations that 
lye against us" and to believe that "we are true lovers of
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34your majesties person and of the English government.
Such deferential and conciliatory missives fell on deaf 
ears; on October 23, 1684, the crown officially revoked the 
Massachusetts charter.
The battle over the charter was not merely fought 
between contending forces separated by the Atlantic Ocean. 
Even within Massachusetts influential colonists differed in 
their approach to the problem, and political factionalism 
became a hallmark of the postwar period. In fact, the most 
conservative group, consisting of orthodox Puritans who 
adhered to the old, established order in politics as well as 
religion, became known simply as "the faction." Men such as 
Increase Mather, Leverett, and Thomas Danforth led the 
opposition to any alteration in the charter. The colony 
also contained a group of "moderates," also generally well 
known and pious, who believed that they represented a more 
realistic position than that of the intransigent faction. 
Simon Bradstreet, Peter Bulkeley, and William Stoughton, 
among others, saw the futility in complete opposition to the 
crown and preferred to compromise in order to gain as 
advantageous a settlement as possible, both for themselves 
and for the colony. Finally, a small but powerful group of 
"prerogative men" stood ready to carry the crown's cause 
against the conservative elements in the colony. This 
group, consisting largely of royal appointees and other 
recent immigrants, was led by Edmund Randolph and Joseph 
Dudley.35 These three parties vied to influence the crown
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during the proceedings over the charter's fate and during 
the subsequent establishment of the Dominion of New England.
Randolph and his royalist party blamed the orthodox 
clergy for all of the opposition to the crown. He claimed 
that the elected government of the colony was composed of 
"inconsiderable mechanics packed by the prevailing party of 
factious ministry," whom he found "generally inclined to 
sedition, being proud, ignorant, and imperious." Governor 
Edward Cranfield of New Hampshire echoed Randolph's opinion 
of the Massachusetts clergy and described Harvard College as 
a breeding ground for "pernicious and rebellious 
principles." "From this source all the towns . . . are 
supplied with factious and seditious preachers," Cranfield 
reported, "who stir up the people to dislike of the King, of 
his Government and of the Church of England."36 The clergy 
seemed to be most influential in the lower house of the 
assembly, among the deputies; in December 1683, a group of 
magistrates wrote to Sir Leoline Jenkins in England that the 
"major part of the [upper house] have for weeks contended 
and voted to submit to the King's pleasure rather than 
contest with him in a court of law" but could "by no means 
prevail with the Deputies." The signers of the letter 
included such moderates as Bulkeley, Bradstreet, Nathaniel 
Saltonstall, Bartholomew Gedney, James Russell, Stoughton, 
and William Brown. Randolph related the same state of 
affairs to the king. A majority of the magistrates, "men of 
the best estates, were for an entire submission." Those of
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the upper house who opposed alteration of the charter he 
described as men "of inconsiderable fortunes but factious 
spirits;" likewise, he characterized the deputies as 
"mostly an inferior sort of planters."37
According to Randolph, at least, the economic as well 
as religious positions of political leaders influenced the 
way they aligned themselves on the charter issue. Perhaps 
this observation had some merit. Magistrates, more than 
deputies, tended to be socially and financially prominent in 
the colony, reflecting their more distinguished political 
position, and therefore they had more to gain from a smooth 
transition from the old charter government to royal 
administration. Moderates saw the triumph of the crown's 
will as inevitable. They wanted to minimize the trauma to 
the colonial system and to their position within it.
Deputies, on the other hand, relied more closely on the 
local nature of their prominence and were more directly 
responsible to the neighbors who chose them. Their actions 
therefore were more likely to reflect popular sentiments.
By the mid-1680s, this factionalism and the ultimate 
fate of the charter gave the voters a new perspective on 
some of the magistrates they had regularly elected in 
previous years. In the spring of 1684, Randolph reported 
that the citizenry was dissatisfied with the views expressed 
by some of the more prominent moderates, and indeed, in the 
May elections that year, Dudley, Brown, and Gedney lost 
their seats in the upper house. Bulkeley and Stoughton, in
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reaction and as a show of sympathy for their fellow 
magistrates, resigned their positions and "refused to 
serve."38 These election results represented by far the 
largest turnover in the upper house during the decades 
immediately preceding or following King Philip's War and 
distinctly reflected the political dissatisfaction stemming 
from the charter controversy.
If the behavior of the moderate magistrates
dissatisfied Massachusetts voters, the establishment of the
Dominion of New England under Sir Edmund Andros caused them
unparalleled consternation. While division existed within
the colony over the charter question, the residents were
more unified, at least eventually, in their opposition to
the newly imposed government. When Andros arrived in 1686,
he delivered his royal commission requiring "all officers &
ministers civill and Millitary and all other inhabitants of
our said Territory and Dominion to be obedient Aiding and
Assisting unto" him.39 The wording and intent of the
commission offended New Englanders, especially those of the
"faction." "It would require a long summer's-day to relate
the miseries which were come, and coming in upon poor
New-England, by reason of the arbitrary government then
40imposed on" the colony, wrote Cotton Mather. Indeed, the 
lists of complaints against the Andros regime were many and 
protracted, but they all revolved around a set of basic 
offenses.
Among his administrative abuses, members of both the
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"faction" and the moderate group complained that the
governor neglected the advice of his councillors who knew
the country and relied instead upon "the advice only of a
few others, the principal of them Strangers to the Countrey,
without Estates or Interest therein." Furthermore, many of
these close advisors were "persons of known and declared
Prejudice against [the colony], and that had plainly laid
their chiefest Designs and Hopes to make unreasonable
profit" from their involvement in the Dominion. To prevent
the citizenry from voicing opposition to this arbitrary
method of administering the government, Andros limited the
number of town meetings to one per year. In addition, under
the Andros regime, "the publick Ministry of the Gospel, and
all Schools of Learning, were discountenanced unto the 
41Utmost." The colonists had already lost their cherished 
charter and then the new royal governor came in and attacked 
two of their most honored institutions, popular government, 
including the town meeting, and the influential clergy. 
Probably the most serious scenes of opposition arose, 
however, when the Dominion government began to threaten 
their estates.
Andros and his favorites, at least in the opinion of 
many colonists, "for the enriching themselves on the ruins 
of New England, did invade the property as well as liberty" 
of the inhabitants. With the charter legally revoked, the 
governor declared Massachusetts land patents defective,
"under the pretence of [the property] belonging to king
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James," regardless of what the landowners considered "honest 
and just and true titles to [their] land."42 The granting 
of land under the old charter probably was inconsistent with 
royal policy, but New Englanders reacted strongly to fears 
that they would have their land taken from them or that they 
would have to pay exhorbitant processing fees and quitrents 
to keep it. Samuel Sewall expressed the disquietude of the 
people over threats to their landholdings in a 1688 letter 
to Increase Mather, who was in London at the time. "The 
generality of People are very averse from complying with any 
thing that may alter the Tenure of their lands," he stated, 
reflecting that Massachusetts colonists were not prepared to 
give up their property to the regime which had already 
robbed them of their political institutions.43
The attack on land titles combined with increased 
taxation under Andros to raise the popular voice against the 
Dominion. High taxes resulting from King Philip’s War still 
burdened the colony when Andros arrived, so his seemingly 
arbitrary levies, demanded without consulting an assembly, 
further alarmed the colonists. The governor ordered new 
taxes based on rates of one penny per pound of estate value 
plus twenty pence per poll, in addition to stricter import 
and excise duties. The manner in which these taxes were 
levied, "without the consent of the people either by 
themselves or by an assembly," led many towns and their 
selectmen to resist collecting the authorized rates.
One such town was Ipswich, in Essex County. Although
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not alone in its refusal, Ipswich was singled out by the 
Andros regime as an example to the others. The proceedings, 
however, did more to raise hard feelings against the 
governor than to compel compliance to his orders. When the 
Ipswich selectmen argued that taxes levied without the 
approval of an elected assembly violated English law, John 
West, one of Andros's imported councillors, scornfully 
answered that the colonists "must not think the Lawes of 
England follow [them] to the Ends of the Earth." As 
disobedient subjects who refused the instructions of a royal 
governor, "you have no more priviledges Left you than not to 
be sould for slaves," West informed the defendents in a 
pre-trial hearing.
The selectmen, John Wise, John Appleton, John Andrews,
Robert Kinsman, William Goodhow, and Thomas French, were
then tried by a panel of judges composed of Joseph Dudley,
William Stoughton, Edward Randolph, John Usher, and George
Farewell. Chief judge Dudley, in a ploy "that pleased
himself . . . more than the people," harangued the jury on
their duty to convict the defendents. "I am glad (says he)
ther be so many worthie Gentlemen of the Jury so Capable to
do the King service, and we Expect a good verdict from you,
seeing the matter hath been so sufficiently proved against 
4 4the CriminalIs." The jury fulfilled its charge,
convicting the defendents, fining them, barring them from 
holding office, and requiring them to post bond for their 
good behavior.
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While opposition to the revocation of the charter and 
the Dominion government was often expressed in religious 
terms, attacks on the colonists' property and purses were 
the real issues which spurred hard feelings against 
Andros.45 Citizens and selectmen had resisted the multiple 
tax rates which resulted from King Philip's War, but they 
had always based their actions on financial hardship and 
inability— real or contrived— to meet the unprecedented 
demands. These protests generally took place in hopes of 
winning abatements from the General Court until conditions 
improved. Financial difficulties still prevented full 
compliance with tax levies during the late 1680s, at least 
in the view of many town selectmen across the colony, but 
Andros provided further basis for opposition by employing 
means which the colonists considered illegal.46 The manner 
in which his councillors flaunted their power in the faces 
of the Ipswich defendents could only have the effect of 
exacerbating a people already disgruntled over issues of 
taxation.
Massachusetts residents also doubted the governor's 
intentions for the good of New England, especially in his 
dealings with the enemies of the colonies and of the errand. 
Fear that Andros might deal with the natives of the region, 
even to the point of encouraging them to attack the colonies 
anew, gave the colonists another reason to believe that the 
political difficulties which afflicted them during the 1680s 
were just a continuation of their time of trials which began
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with King Philip's War. In fact, suspicion that Andros
favored the Indians over the colonists dated back at least
to the closing stages of the war, when he was the governor
of New York; in fact, Massachusetts suspicions of Andros
and his manipulation of the Indian situation were accurate.
On August 15, 1676, John Pynchon warned Governor Leverett
that most of the surviving natives from the Massachusetts
frontier had "drawn off toward Albany, where they are
harbored under Andros, his government." "We shall be in
danger to be continually disturbed," warned Pynchon, as long
47as Andros chose to "harbor our enemies." Thus, distrust 
of the governor's Indian policies preceded him to Boston.
When serious hostilities broke out in Maine in 1688, 
many colonists complained that Andros "delayed and neglected 
all that was necessary for the publick defence." In doing 
so, he reportedly "manifested a most furious displeasure 
against those of the council, and all others" who showed 
concern "for the security of the inhabitants." The force he 
finally sent to the Maine frontier proved ineffective;
"there were more of the poor people [colonists] killed than 
they had enemies there alive," Cotton Mather wrote later, 
and yet the governor's forces, led by royal officers, could 
not track down the hostile natives. Quite understandably, 
"this added not a little to the dissatisfaction of the 
people."48 Not only did Andros seem to sympathize with the 
natives, but accusations also surfaced, after the fact, that 
the governor even fraternized with the enemy. At least one
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colonist testified that on one occasion Andros got drunk
with four Indian women in Maine, allegedly enemies, and gave 
49them powder and shot.
Drinking with Indians was bad enough, but Massachusetts 
colonists came to suspect that Andros had formulated "a Plot 
to bring in the Indians upon us." Keeping in mind the 
upheaval caused by King Philip's War, certain Massachusetts 
leaders found "it was easy unto us to conceive, How 
serviceable another Indian War might have been to the 
Designs" of those working for the Dominion. According to 
the various indictments, Andros "hired . . . Indians to kill 
the English," released enemy Indians captured in the 
colonies, and negotiated with French Canadians and Mohawks 
"to take the Country in possession for the King of 
France."50 Although some of these accusations, including 
reports of his revelry with Indian maidens, may have 
represented exaggerations or even fabrications used to 
support the successful revolution in retrospect, they 
nonetheless exhibited how deeply Massachusetts residents 
distrusted Andros's Indian dealings and thus how the 
colonists connected his political regime to the native 
threat they thought they had defeated a decade earlier. 
Although Metacom had been killed in 1676, some colonists saw 
in Andros his political successor in the work against the 
New England mission living in Boston in 1686.
Just as New Englanders eliminated the Indian opposition 
of the 1670s, they saw both a duty and a necessity in
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removing the threat posed by Sir Edmund Andros and his 
regime. By the spring of 1689, revolution brewed in the 
region, especially as reports of the Glorious Revolution 
spread through the colonies, in spite of the governor's 
efforts to suppress the news.51 Neither Andros nor anyone 
else could stop the momentum once it began. In fact, by 
April 18, five moderate members of the governor's Council 
were moved to the point of taking part in the revolt, as 
some "principal gentlemen in Boston," described by Cotton 
Mather as "Considerate Persons," took charge of the mob 
agitating for Andros' overthrow. These veterans of 
Massachusetts politics saw trouble approaching, and they 
decided to head off violence and bloodshed by taking charge 
"with a Declaration accordingly prepared."52 As moderates 
they reacted to a potentially chaotic political situation in 
1689 with the same pragmatism they exhibited during the 
charter crisis earlier in the decade. In both instances, 
the moderates saw changes coming and wanted to guide affairs 
toward the smoothest solution possible.
Fifteen men signed the declaration demanding Andros's 
surrender of the government. The presence of such moderate 
leaders as Wait Winthrop, William Stoughton, Samuel 
Shrimpton, Bartholemew Gedney, and William Brown gave a 
solid foundation to a group which also included such New 
England traditionalists as Simon Bradstreet and Thomas 
Danforth. Their declaration of grievances contained a 
warning to Andros that although they were "surprized with
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the Peoples sudden taking of Arms . . . whereof we were 
wholly ignorant," the popular leaders expected him to 
cooperate in order to prevent bloodshed. As justification, 
they cited the "Illegal . . . Malicious and Unreasonable" 
nature of the colony's treatment by royal officials from the 
time the crown vacated the Massachusetts charter. In 
addition to reciting and describing in detail the list of 
specific grievances held against the regime, the declaration 
expressed a strong resentment about "Strangers" and "Haters 
of the People" being given a virtual license to exploit the 
colonists. "Accordingly," the signers declared, "we have 
been treated with multiplied Contradictions to Magna Charta, 
the Rights of which we laid claim unto."53 Therefore, they 
felt justified in abolishing the illegitimate and arbitrary 
regime.
Furthermore, New Englanders could point to King
William's invasion as justification for their actions. The
news from England finally spurred the colonists to action,
according to one apologist, and they naturally associated
Andros with King James, "who had invaded both the liberty
54and property of English protestants." To the extreme 
members of the "faction" and even to many moderates who 
originally cooperated with the governor, the Dominion of New 
England had come to represent an annoying extension of King 
James's unpopular rule. Edward Randolph blamed the 
political upheaval of the times on "a violent and bloudy 
zeal stir'd up in the Rabble acted and managed by the
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preachers," but members of the governor's own council also 
played leading roles in the revolts and in the 
twenty-six-member Council of Safety established on April 20 
to administer the government of Massachusetts until 
instructions for a settlement arrived from England.55
A great deal of political tension existed on the 
provincial level during the 1680s, and the fulcrum of the 
dissent was an effort to remove an overbearing royal 
presence in Boston. Although factionalism existed within 
the colony, especially over the fate of the charter, the 
real enemy resided across the Atlantic. Still, the 
disquietude was connected to other internal concerns because 
many colonists, especially orthodox Puritans, viewed the 
Dominion as a continuation of attacks unleashed by the 
forces of evil against the New England mission. First in 
the series, of course, was the tumult of King Philip's War. 
The Indian conflict was connected to the Revolution of 1689 
in that both occurrences alerted New Englanders to outside 
threats, but not in the sense that the tension which 
resulted from the war necessarily led New Englanders to 
challenge their traditional political order. In fact, the 
colonists showed a preference to maintain or return to 
familiar patterns of leadership throughout the period, on 
the provincial level as well as in local politics.
Although colonists in distant frontier communities for 
the most part played no direct role in the Boston revolt of 
April 18, 1689, they largely gave their assent to the action
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in retrospect. On May 2, the Council of Safety requested 
that the towns in the colony give "farther consultation and 
Advice" on the current political situation, and the replies 
came back overwhelmingly in favor not only of Andros' 
repudiation but also of resuming the former charter 
government. Fifty-four towns sent representatives to Boston 
by May 22 to signify their approval of the rebellion; forty 
of them carried instructions to call for the return of the 
governor and assistants elected in May 1686, according to 
the old charter rights. Such optimistic declarations came 
from all over the colony, and the frontier towns were no 
exception. The town meetings of Springfield, Westfield, 
Deerfield, and Lancaster all echoed the sentiments of 
Northampton's residents that the government officials of 
1686 "should be Continued in or Reassume their former Power 
for the year ensuying unlesse orders Come from England to 
the Contrary."56
The Council of Safety reacted cautiously to the 
recommendations; the councillors apparently had no 
opposition to turning the reins of government over to the 
deputies of 1686, and many of them served on both bodies, 
but they also recognized the potential danger in arbitrarily 
declaring the charter revived. Even though James II no 
longer sat on the throne, the councillors prudently 
acknowledged that the charter had been legally revoked, at 
least in the eyes of royal authorities. To assuage their 
own citizens without offending the crown, the Council in May
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1689 agreed to reinstate the officials "chosen and Sworn 
in . . . according to our Charter Rights . . . Hoping that 
all People will rest Satisfied till we have Confirmation 
from the Crown of England which we daily hope for."57 
Simon Bradstreet, the elected governor of 1686 and the 
president of the new provisional government of 1689, wrote 
to King William for the whole Massachusetts legislature, 
assuring him that the actions taken were only temporary and 
employed as expedients because of familiarity, "until 
further directions should arrive from England."58 Most 
colonists probably wished that no further directions would 
appear and that the crown would leave them alone to enjoy 
their preferred mode of administration.
Just as colonists exhibited a marked preference for the 
familiar in the leaders they chose on the town level and in 
the charter government/ Massachusetts voters also largely 
elected trusted men to the provincial offices after 1689. 
This trend was somewhat difficult to distinguish on the 
deputy level, since many towns, both before and after the 
revolution, sent representatives irregularly, if at all.
New and relatively new frontier towns especially often could 
not afford the expense of sending deputies to the General 
Court sessions which met at various times throughout the 
year, and many colonists had personal concerns at home which 
made service in Boston burdensome. While larger, 
established towns like Springfield and Northampton could 
generally support a deputy each year, other towns like
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Groton, Westfield, and Lancaster did so only 
59sporadically. Outposts so recently established as 
Deerfield or Northfield were not represented in the Chamber 
of Deputies.
The same patterns continued during the last decade of 
the seventeenth century. Frontier outposts still elected 
representatives irregularly, if at all; between 1689 and 
1699, for instance, Deerfield sent members to the General 
Court only three times and Lancaster did so only five times. 
In towns which did choose deputies annually, traditional 
leaders surfaced in the provincial elections. During the 
decade between King Philip's War and the establishment of 
the Dominion of New England, Springfield voters most 
consistently elected Elizur Holyoke, Samuel Marshfield, and 
Joseph Pynchon. Marshfield and Holyoke had long careers as 
town selectmen. In addition, Holyoke was a brother-in-law 
of the powerful John Pynchon, while Joseph was the major's 
son. During the decade after the revolution, Springfield 
representatives included Henry Chapin, whose career as a 
selectman began in 1670, John Holyoke, Elizur's son, John 
Hitchcock, another long-time selectman, and John Pynchon 
III.60 The Springfield deputy elections represented an 
example of the colonists' preference for familiar leaders on 
the provincial level.
The provisional government created in 1689 continued 
until 1692 when the new royal governor, Sir William Phips, 
arrived in Boston with his commission. The old charter was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
233
dead, and Massachusetts colonists finally had to admit it. 
"It was not in the King's Power to Reverse the Judgment 
against the Old Charter," admitted Increase Mather; 
"nevertheless, his Majesty had Power to Re-incorporate his 
Subjects, thereby granting them a New Charter, which should 
contain all the Old, with New and more Ample Priviledges." 
Actually, the new charter placed certain restrictions on the 
colony. The crown approved Massachusetts's representative 
legislature, for instance, but with a governor appointed in 
London instead of elected in Boston. In addition, the 
franchise became based entirely on property requirements 
rather than upon church membership, and after 1692, final 
approval of colonial laws clearly rested with crown 
officials. Massachusetts residents could no longer claim to 
possess their own Magna Charta. Even Increase Mather 
realistically came to agree with certain Privy Councillors 
who advised "that it was not only Lawfull, but, all 
Circumstances considered, a Duty to submit to what was now 
offered."61 Although this charter did not provide all that 
some colonists had hoped, they were pleased to have 
confirmation of their removal of the arbitrary Dominion 
government.
Twenty-eight men served on the first appointed colonial 
council named under the new charter; thereafter councillors 
stood for election every year. Between 1692 and 1695, a 
total of forty-five men held the office, and even though the 
reconstructed body contained members from the former
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Plymouth Colony, Maine, and the northeastern coast, sixteen 
of that number had served as Assistants in the Bay Colony 
before 1686. Furthermore, thirteen of them won reelection 
repeatedly after 1692, serving an average of nearly fifteen 
years apiece. Samuel Sewall, an Assistant from 1684 to 
1686, went on to hold a seat on the Council for thirty-four 
years. Other former magistrates, including John Hawthorne, 
Elisha Hutchinson, Isaac Addington, and William Browne, 
served terms of twenty years or more.62 Increase Mather 
expressed confidence in the councillors of the 1690s, 
proclaiming ‘'every man of them is a Friend to New England, 
and to the Churches and Interest of Christ therein." 
Regardless of the merits of his appraisal, Increase's son 
Cotton accurately commended Massachusetts voters because 
"they wisely made few Alterations in their Annual Elections; 
and they thereby shew'd their Satisfaction in the wise and 
good Conduct of those whom they had Elected."63 Other 
councillors, who had served under Andros, were not as 
fortunate. Actually, ten of the council members who sat 
during the early 1690s also sat during the Dominion period, 
but four of them came from Plymouth. Of the six from the 
Bay Colony, five redeemed themselves by participating in the 
revolutionary group which demanded Andros' surrender in 
1689. John Pynchon, who served under Andros and did not 
take part in the revolt, went on to hold a council seat 
during the 1690s, but his case was atypical. Most of his 
colleagues who did not come out publicly against the
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Dominion regime did not again hold a provincial public 
office.64 Thus, even on the highest elective level after 
1689, Massachusetts colonists showed a preference for 
familiar, trusted leaders.
The political upheaval of the late seventeenth century 
in Massachusetts was connected to the upheaval of King 
Philip's War in that both represented efforts to eliminate 
outside threats to the colony's accustomed and cherished 
mode of existence. The Indians supposedly attempted to 
destroy the Puritan errand into the wilderness while the 
Dominion of New England served as the means of abolishing 
the charter upon which the mission was based. Therefore, 
the colonists faced a constant struggle between 1675 and 
1689 to restore order as they knew it.65 But the 
accumulated chaos of the postwar years did not make 
Massachusetts residents repudiate their established 
political leaders; instead, in the effort to deal with the 
legacies of the period, colonists turned to selectmen, 
deputies, and councillors they knew they could trust.
If any repudiation of established leadership occurred 
during the postwar years, it did so in the militia. 
Indiscipline within the colonial military appeared during 
the war, as Massachusetts officials expressed concern over 
their inability to recruit sufficient numbers of troopers. 
Even during the war, many colonists denied the necessity of 
serving in the militia and their duty of contributing to the 
military goals of the colony. Fighting Indians became
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unpopular in some areas even before Metacom's defeat; when 
the necessity of defense continued after 1676, unpopularity 
in some cases turned into open insubordination.
As early as September 1675, Secretary Edward Rawson 
reported "much dampened . . . spirits for the war. Some men 
escape away from the press," he wrote, "and others hide away 
after they are impressed." Such aversion to military 
service lowered morale in the ranks, as "plaine Contempt" 
resulted in "the Publicke Service and safety [being] 
neglected in such a perilous day."66 The end of the war 
against King Philip did not bring an end to the threat to 
the colonial frontier, and it certainly did not end the 
efforts of colonists to evade military service. While 
hostile natives remained on the eastern frontier in Maine 
throughout the late 1670s and 1680s, many Massachusetts men 
showed their displeasure at having to defend what they 
considered a distant and desolate region by devising new 
ways of dodging conscription. In 1679, for instance, to 
combat the practice of potential soldiers who constantly 
travelled back and forth between two or more towns to avoid 
militia calls, the General Court prohibited men from moving 
without first obtaining registration certificates from the 
corresponding local officers.67 Colonial authorities thus 
had to engage in a virtual cat-and-mouse game to commandeer 
troopers for the frontier defenses after King Philip's War.
Discontent within the ranks deepened during the 1680s, 
especially under the Andros regime. Militiamen in Maine
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complained of unfamiliar British regular army officers 
forced upon them by the governor, and rumors ran rampant 
through the ranks that Andros would "Sacrifice 'em" to their 
combined native and French enemies. As soon as the 
opportunity arose, in April 1689, the soldiers "seized their 
officers and sent them home prisoners." Dissatisfaction 
centered on Lt. John Jordan, one of Andros' imported 
officers, who admitted to striking several militiamen for 
their indiscipline and disrespect toward him and other 
appointees. Although Jordan claimed that the "charges of 
cruelty [against him] are malicious lies," his soldiers 
seized him, further complaining that he "intended to go to 
New France."68
After the rebellion in Boston toppled the Andros 
regime, the troopers already in Maine generally abandoned 
their posts, and the provisional government could not 
recruit other soldiers to replace them. "Some questioned 
their pay, some the authority for the press," a contemporary 
reported, "and few or none went." Even after the removal of 
Jordan and the other regular army officers, problems with 
discipline continued in the region. In October 1689, John 
Swayne complained that the soldiers on duty in Maine were "a 
company of prayerless people" who constantly absented 
themselves and regularly disregarded orders. He asked that 
the General Court take "a Speedy & Severe course . . . with 
Such persons."69 Severe punishment, however, was not the 
solution to the long-term problem. Discontent in the
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militia erupted most notably on the Maine frontier in 1689, 
but throughout the colony the system suffered from the 
dissatisfaction which began during King Philip’s War.
During the war, the colonial government attempted to 
establish firm control over the militia. In October 1675, 
the General Court issued a set of "Lawes and ordinances of 
war . . . for the better regulating their forces, and
keeping theire souldiers to theire duty." These 
instructions prohibited such abuses as negligence of duty, 
disobedience to superior officers, or unexcused absence on 
pain of corporal punishment or even death.70 Civil and 
military officials attempted to stem the problems which 
existed in the ranks through the threat or use of strict 
discipline, but religious leaders also exhorted militiamen 
to recognize their obligations.
Rev. Samuel Nowell, for example, reminded citizens that 
military training was "a commendable practice, yea of Duty 
of Great Consequence." He pointed out that only through 
"Frequent Trainings" and the establishment of "military 
Discipline" could soldiers "be ready and expert for 
War, . . .  a Duty," according to Nowell, "which God 
expecteth" of His followers. Furthermore, he indicted those 
who took their responsibilities lightly; "they are greatly 
to blame that do neglect it, or slight over it, [or] do not 
make conscience of it."71 Nowell, and other clergymen, 
reminded eligible men that they had not only a legal 
obligation to answer the calls of their militia committees,
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but that they also had a moral calling to carry on the 
crusade against the physical forces of evil in the world.
The orthodox clergy continued its perceived function of 
guiding and directing the citizenry into proper channels of 
unified, responsible, communal activity, and preachers like 
Nowell and the Mathers expected the colonists to fall into 
line.
One problem which plagued colonial militia companies 
was that the soldiers, in the words of John Pynchon, "much 
desire & Insist upon it, to have Commission officers of 
their owne, . . . such as they know."72 Just as in the 
area of taxation, Massachusetts colonists turned against any 
hint of outside authority which appeared to threaten local 
autonomy in militia affairs. Although only the General 
Court could actually appoint commissioned officers, 
provincial law permitted active militiamen and militia 
committees to choose nominees for the positions, and the 
soldiers guarded this privilege closely. Traditionally, 
colonial officials dared not reject the soldiers' 
nominations.73 But in the decades after King Philip's War 
a high degree of turnover occurred in the local officers 
corps, for various reasons, and many of the elections of the 
period attracted unusual attention.
Admittedly, much of the turnover resulted from natural 
attrition. Across the colony, in towns from the coast to 
the Connecticut Valley, local militia officers asked to be 
relieved of their positions after the war. In Springfield,
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for instance, Ens. Benjamin Cooley petitioned the General
Court, in May 1679, for permission "to lay downe his place,
being aged & deafe." Likewise, about the same time,
Lt. Samuel Smith of Hadley complained of "being very aged &
weake, & not . . .  so well able to dischardge [his] military 
74trust as heeretofore." The Court granted these and
similar requests.
Many incidents of local tension and dissension,
however, interrupted the flow of militia affairs during the
period. Hingham militiamen, for example, elected Lt. John
Smith their captain and Ens. Jeremiah Coall their lieutenant
on October 11, 1682, but the selection of an ensign caused
contention among the voters. The older members of the
company supported Sgt. Thomas Andrews, who had a good record
of service, while the younger men voted for James Hawk, who
"never was in any office, but a privatt souldier." Hawk won
a small majority, but Andrews’s supporters petitioned the
General Court to overturn this election. Finally, on March
17, 1683, Thomas Lincoln was chosen ensign, apparently as a 
75compromise. A similar incident occurred m  Topsfield. 
Sometime during the late 1670s, Ens. John Gould lost his 
commission due to "some uncomfortable misunderstandings 
amongst" members of the company, but in March 1679 his 
comrades reported that the troubles had been solved and 
asked the General Court to reinstate him "to his former 
Commission or an higher." The court agreed. By 1686 Gould, 
by then a lieutenant, again fell into trouble, leading "a
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Riotous Muster" against service to the Dudley regime. He 
was arrested, fined £50, and released on bond for good 
behavior.76 In Enfield, "the next place to Springfield," 
the soldiers elected a lieutenant for their company in 1689, 
although the small size of the band did not entitle them to 
a full complement of commissioned officers. When Maj. John 
Pynchon challenged the election, the ringleaders, or "at 
least one that was the mouth," answered that "they had 
chosen commissioned officers and them they would obey." 
Pynchon, the commander of the Hampshire County regiment, 
asked the government in Boston to support him in putting 
down this insurgency.77 All three of these incidents, and 
others like them, indicated the existence of dissension and 
disdain for authority within the militia ranks after King 
Philip's War. Many of the soldiers involved were openly 
defiant of the status quo, and the older, established 
leaders naturally became alarmed at this development.
The most serious upheaval occurred in the town of 
Northampton, one of the most secure towns in the Connecticut 
Valley. In 1689, when the provincial government attempted 
to turn the clock back by reinstating or reaffirming 
officeholders of 1686 across the colony, certain members of 
the Northampton militia company turned against their former 
elected officers in favor of a new generation of leaders.
"At Northampton Sergeant [John] King cavilled about my 
Power," Pynchon complained to the governor and Council, and 
the disruption quickly reached mutinous proportions. King,
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with his allies, Medad Pomeroy and Preserved Clapp, 
attempted to convince their comrades to reject the board 
which consisted of Capt. Aaron Cooke, Lt. Joseph Hawley, and 
Ens. Timothy Baker, and in general, the dissidents "bid 
defiance to the old Commission[ed] officers." The two 
ringleaders displayed "such a height of Pride," said 
Pynchon, "that nothing would or could be done by or from my 
orders & direction."78 The major reported that "on many 
accounts" militia affairs were "in no good posture," because 
King's insubordination in Northampton had spread to other 
towns in the region; the upheaval "disquieted some others 
that were quiet before" and filled the plotters with 
confidence that "they have now liberty to do what they 
please."79 At least the General Court sided with Pynchon 
in the controversy and responded by confirming the officers 
of 1686.
Still, King kept up the effort in the hope that 
eventually "he might be Captaine" of the company. Pynchon 
feared that the ambitious troublemaker might gain enough 
popular support to carry the day, "having so many 
Relations . . . who have holpen it on & are the Faction in 
that Busyness." Captain Cooke sought to influence the 
General Court to take strong action against the 
conspirators, describing King and his followers as enemies 
of authority, lawbreakers, and known heavy drinkers.80 
Such descriptions were probably exaggerated but not entirely 
wide of the truth. In the eyes of the traditional leaders,
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at least, the trouble in Northampton resulted from lack of 
respect on the part of unqualified newcomers who wanted to 
propel themselves into positions of undeserved power.
King's supporters, however, obviously felt justified in 
seizing leadership positions from the representatives of an 
older generation.
The "Disorders & Irregularetys" which plagued the 
Northampton company continued into 1690, when Cooke died, 
opening the way for King and his associates. Pynchon wrote 
to Lieutenant Hawley, the ranking officer, on December 5, 
1690, recommending that he encourage the soldiers to lay 
"aside al headyness, prjudice, commotion . . .  & misguided 
affection" in the upcoming election. The major implored the 
men "to act Judiciously with respect to the Publicke good & 
advantage," and to "make noe alteration but what may be safe 
& beneficial to the Company & Publicke." Throughout the 
whole affair, he advised Hawley to "Consider & not overlooke 
the way & mode of Military discipline.1,81
Three days later the lieutenant wrote to the General 
Court complaining about the outcome of the election. Clapp 
won the contest for captain, but Hawley expressed doubt that 
"a Competent Number" of voters participated in the election. 
Further, he claimed that the newly elected officers 
continued their contrary practices which interrupted the 
progress of militia affairs in the town. Given the 
difficulties he faced as one of the holdovers from 1686, 
Hawley petitioned the court to relieve him of his
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commission, assuring the legislators that his request 
resulted "not from a Backward spririt to serve . . . the 
Country," but rather from the animosity he experienced from 
within the company. He concluded his letter by calling on 
the provincial government to intervene so "that [our] poor 
Divided town may once again be setled." The General Court 
responded by confirming Clapp's election, accepting Hawley's 
resignation, and approving the choice of King as 
lieutenant.82 Officials in Boston thus took the course 
which appeared to offer the least resistance in restoring 
peace and order to Northampton, but the whole incident 
reflected Pynchon's observation by the 1690s that "the 
People [had become] a litle wilful, inclined to do what and 
how they pleased or not at all."83
Ironically, the ringleaders of the militia unrest in 
Northampton did not represent a new generation of men trying 
to break into positions of influence in the town; they had 
already attained public prominence by 1689. John King and 
Medad Pomeroy both served the town as selectmen on a regular 
basis during the years immediately following King Philip's 
War. Likewise, Preserved Clapp began his career as a 
selectman during the mid-1680s.84 These three men, who 
played such prominent roles in the disruption of the town's 
militia company, did not need to speak out in order to gain 
the attention of their fellow townspeople. Why, then, did 
they practice such stratagems to subvert the established 
officers of the company? Personality factors must have
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played some part in the controversy; Cooke's repudiation of 
the conspirators' characters betrayed personal animosity.
In addition, however, advancement through the militia 
represented another way for ambitious men like King to 
cement their own power. They were not only turning against 
established officers but also trying to assure for 
themselves places in the town's leadership structure.
The disruption which occurred in the militia system was 
difficult to reconcile with the trend toward continuity in 
both local and provincial politics. The turnover in many 
militia companies had no parallel on the selectman boards of 
the period. Controversy in the selection of officers, 
however, was not a new phenomenon after King Philip's War.
As long as the institution existed, local companies 
periodically experienced disruptive elections.85 Perhaps 
as a result of the war the colonial military passed through 
a state of increased flux and transition, but no one 
involved in the turmoil challenged the traditional political 
structure. Instead, more men sought to elbow their way into 
it.
Massachusetts colonists came to feel that the end of 
King Philip's War did not represent the end of their trials 
at the hands of the forces of evil. The relief they felt at 
the defeat of the Indians was shortlived, as a crisis of 
leadership ensued within the colony during the 1680s. The 
charter controversy of that decade created a chaotic and 
disruptive period in colonial politics, but in their
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resolution of the situation, New Englanders turned to 
trusted and established leaders for stability. In 
individual towns, however, where royal officials did not 
directly control day-to-day administrative matters, 
colonists for the most part never turned away from their 
familiar officials. Even on the frontier, where Indian 
attacks had caused the greatest disruption, selectmen 
elections revealed a marked degree of continuity. Colonists 
clearly sought a return to the old order in the face of new 
opposition, whether from native assaults or royal policies.
If King Philip's War left any political legacy in the 
Massachusetts Bay colony, it did so in making colonists wary 
of perceived threats to their integrity and existence.
First the natives and then the crown represented challenges 
to the orderly, accustomed progress of the colony. In 
reaction, colonists during the later decades of the 
seventeenth century became more watchful, even within their 
own ranks, for forces acting against their own best 
interests, and this vigilance made them more assertive in 
questioning authority. Their initiative was apparent not 
only in the opposition to the Dominion of New England but 
also in individual community affairs. Although there was no 
notable disruption in local politics— townspeople continued 
to elect established selectmen— colonists throughout the 
region began to reassert more power for themselves and their 
town meetings, while imposing restraints on the assumed 
powers of their elected officials. The accumulated
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challenges of the period, beginning with King Philip's War, 
led New Englanders to become less passive in accepting their 
world at face value and more willing to question political 
affairs as well as other, less tangible, aspects of life.
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Massachusetts residents readily recognized the 
economic, demographic, and political legacies of King 
Philip's War. Less tangible but of greater magnitude in the 
long run were the intellectual and attitudinal changes which 
resulted from the conflict and continuing tensions. The 
accumulated challenges they faced contributed to a sense of 
uneasiness and even fear which led many colonists to 
question the dogmas and practices of the New England way. 
While New Englanders shared an apprehension about the 
possibility of renewed native and even French hostilities on 
the frontier, orthodox Puritans, especially the clergy, 
pointed to a greater danger within the Massachusetts 
communities. In an effort to save the errand into the 
wilderness from destroying itself, Puritan ministers led a 
crusade against the many manifestations of indiscipline and 
ungodliness running rampant in the region during the late 
seventeenth century. Men like Cotton Mather and Samuel 
Nowell exhorted their congregations to resist the forces of 
evil infiltrating Massachusetts towns and families, but the 
excesses continued. King Philip's War fostered an unsettled
period in New England history, and the far-reaching
258
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intellectual repercussions were much more difficult to 
accommodate than were the physical legacies.
This sense of disturbing change and unwelcome flux was 
not unique to the New England experience nor was the 
phenomenon, in its more generic forms, related inherently to 
the Puritan character of the region's English inhabitants. 
Societies throughout history have faced social change and 
upheaval in the aftermath of warfare. In many ways, the 
colonists exhibited typical reactions and behavioral 
patterns in response to the war-time tensions imposed upon 
them. For instance, Puritan New Englanders cited God's 
displeasure combined with the malice of the supernatural 
forces of evil as the orthodox explanation for King Philip's 
War. They therefore portrayed the war itself as a necessary 
struggle to rectify the situation and to reassert their own 
spiritual worth, both to themselves and to God. Obviously, 
Puritan theology contributed to this interpretation of the 
conflict, but sociologists have noted such rationalization 
as a common human characteristic.1 Human beings naturally 
seek to explain misfortune or turmoil by blaming outside 
forces. The colonists did just that in their evaluation of 
native hostilities in 1676. Metacom and his followers 
became associated with all of New England's problems. As 
agents of the forces of evil in the world, the natives 
became symbols of everything the Puritan mission stood 
against. Thus the enemy represented the target at which New 
Englanders could direct their fears, desires, guilt, and
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aggressions.2
War, therefore, served a valuable purpose to 
Massachusetts communities, just as it has to countless 
societies in the past. By focusing opposition against a 
perceived threat, most notably a military enemy, leaders 
have sought to solidify their own group unity. In facing an 
easily distinguishable foe, people tend to pull together and 
consolidate their efforts, thus augmenting their defensive 
measures and further defining their collective identity.3 
Civil and religious leaders constantly reminded 
Massachusetts residents that the natives represented alien, 
evil forces, and thus fostered a virtual fortress mentality 
which portrayed a dichotomy between New England and all of 
its enemies. In the moment of extremity, the threat of 
Indian attack led a iuajoi'ity of New Eiiglanders to cooperate 
with each other in opposition to the common enemy.
The clergy attempted to use the war to combat sin and 
backsliding within their congregations. By explaining the 
native attacks as signs of God's displeasure with His chosen 
people and by correlating each English victory with 
indications of the colonists' penitence, ministers sought to 
regenerate a sense of spiritual vigor among their fellow 
sinners. From John Pynchon in Springfield and Mary 
Rowlandson in Lancaster to Increase Mather in Boston, 
prominent figures across the colony proclaimed that 
salvation and victory over the Indians could come only 
through sincere repentance. Devout Puritans recognized the
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war as an opportunity and even a mandate to reinvigorate the 
religious errand into the wilderness.4
While creating the possibility of increased unity as an 
immediate reaction, wars have often resulted in internal 
disorder and social change. On the most superficial level, 
war creates an atmosphere in which normally forbidden 
activities— such as killing— are permitted, thus opening the 
way for challenges to other, more subtle, social 
conventions. The high tension levels which lead to initial 
group solidarity against the outside threat are also capable 
of nurturing discord within. Therefore, the two forces work 
in opposition. Although authorities attempt to use wartime 
tensions to augment conformity, the inherent instability 
leads some members to question accustomed practices and even 
to adopt apparently deviant behavior. As a result, once 
peace returns, periods of warfare often result in longer 
campaigns against perceived degeneracy and backlashes 
against any social change, positive or negative.5 
Certainly New England witnessed this struggle between a 
conservative reaction and the agents of change.
King Philip's War, of course, was not the only crisis 
which New Englanders faced during the late seventeenth 
century, nor was it the direct cause of all of the problems 
and tensions which plagued the colonies at the time. The 
war left lingering legacies, but the economic and 
demographic costs of the conflict were compounded by new 
political and spiritual challenges which appeared
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concurrently. Although the roots of some of these troubles 
cannot be attributed specifically to the struggle against 
Metacom, King Philip's War did represent a focal point to 
the colonists who lived through the troubled period. In a 
quarter-century characterized by a sense of continuing 
crisis, the war that ended in 1676 was the one crisis to 
which the colonists repeatedly referred. New England was 
under attack throughout the period, and with the new 
challenges imposed on top of the legacies of King Philip's 
War, the colonists really never had an opportunity to 
recover from the conflict. By the time King William's War 
broke out in 1689, Massachusetts residents were already 
anxious and uncertain, and King Philip's War was the signal 
event which set the tone for the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century.
According to Douglas Leach, victory over Metacom 
brought "a great sense of relief and joy," tempered by a 
realization of the destruction caused by the conflict.
Still, he found the postwar years "characterized not by 
harmony, but by internal strains."6 The war presented New 
Englanders with images of everything they came to America to 
avoid or amend, both in the forms of their unregenerate 
native enemies and their own sinfulness. Thus, when native 
threats on the frontier continued and, more significantly, 
when worldliness and indiscipline appeared to increase in 
the years after King Philip's War, conservative Puritans 
reacted with exhortations for further repentance. The
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struggle against the opponents of the errand did not end 
with the defeat of the Massachusetts tribes. Rather, the 
legacies of the conflict induced an intellectual shift among 
many colonists, as they became more sensitive to the various 
forces working against them in the region. An intellectual 
battle persisted, and the campaign of attitudes was applied 
to New England's native enemies as well as to its domestic 
doctrinal challengers.
In fact, although the natives' physical assaults were 
very real, in the long run the Indians made their deepest 
marks on the New England psyche. They were always more than 
just military or cultural enemies; the region's native 
inhabitants represented everything alien to English 
civilization and to Puritan spirituality. The colonists' 
prejudices appeared in the images they painted of their 
counterparts. William Hubbard disliked the way native 
tribes supported each other against the English, "all 
hanging together, like Serpent's Eggs," the serpent, of 
course, being the symbol of the devil and the tempter of 
Eve. Likewise, Deacon Philip Walker poetically portrayed 
Indians as "Incarnat divels sent from the infernall Lake,
[who] Like helish monsters make our harts to ake."7 Such 
literary characterizations abounded in late 
seventeenth-century New England, and by and large they 
reflected the attitudes of the vast majority of colonists. 
During King Philip's War the colonists projected all of the 
ills affecting them on the natives, and many Englishmen
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adopted an immutable intellectual enmity against Indians in 
general, including, to some extent, the Praying Indians. As 
long as any hostile bands "remain unconquered," lamented 
Increase Mather, "we cannot enjoy such perfect peace as in 
the years which are past."8 Massachusetts residents 
naturally feared renewed hostilities, but more 
significantly, the persistence of any unconverted native 
groups in their midst prevented the colonists from enjoying 
true peace of mind.
Of course, the threat or actual continuation of 
belligerent activities contributed to this mental agitation. 
Even with Metacom dead, the colonists still saw apparently 
unfriendly natives lurking at their frontiers, and so 
naturally their elevated sense of fear and animosity 
continued unabated. In the words of Thomas Hobbes, "as the ' 
nature of foul weather lies not in the shower or two of 
rain, but in an inclination of many days together, so the 
nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the 
known disposition during all the time that there is no 
assurance to the contrary."9 Even with Metacom gone and 
his warriors scattered, New Englanders had no assurance 
against further assaults from the natives, much less from 
the demonic forces they supposedly represented. Leach 
mistakenly called the attack on Deerfield and Hatfield in 
September 1677 "a final afterclap of King Philip's War" and 
claimed that the colonists themselves saw it as "an isolated 
episode" which did not significantly hamper the resettlement
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of the frontier.10 Although frontier inhabitants returned 
to their outlying towns shortly thereafter, they did so in 
most cases with caution, and the general atmosphere in the 
colony reflected nowhere near the level of confidence 
asserted by Leach. As late as May 1679, for instance,
Edward Taylor in Westfield still referred to the Hatfield 
incident in relating the anxiety felt by frontier 
residents.11 Such lingering fears reflected more a 
long-term "inclination" than "an isolated episode."
Understandably, New Englanders reacted to this tension 
with increasingly belligerent rhetoric. In his Magnalia 
Christi Americana (1702), Cotton Mather argued that as the 
natives continued their hostile behavior, "the most 
scrupulous persons in the world must own, that it must be 
the most unexceptionable piece of justice in the world for 
to extinguish them."12 All over the colony during the 
1680s, Massachusetts authorities, both local and provincial, 
took measures to protect the inhabitants from proximate 
natives, thus attesting to the long-term effects of King 
Philip's War on New Englanders' perceptions of their own 
security and the potential threats which still lurked in 
their midst. In 1681, the General Court reminded 
Massachusetts citizens that selling guns, powder, or 
ammunition to any Indian was illegal. Reacting to the 
difficulty of distinguishing friendly natives from enemies, 
the court in early 1690 issued the order confining "all the 
Indians . . .  in amity with us" to their assigned towns.
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Likewise, John Pynchon received authorization to "dispose" 
all the native residents of Hampshire County in appropriate 
places "with such limitations & directions as may be least 
disquiet to the English."13 Actually, in the aftermath of 
King Philip's War, the presence of any Indians near the 
colonists proved disquieting.
So deep was the effect on New England attitudes that 
some colonists entirely abandoned the cherished values of 
civilized behavior which they had previously held up in 
contrast to the natives' supposed barbarity. During King 
Philip's War, for instance, a Massachusetts writer decried 
native women for their "delight in Cruelties" inflicted upon 
captives and for abandoning "the two proper Virtues of 
Womanhood, Pity and Modesty." Over the next two decades, 
with the continuation of anxiety over persistent Indian 
threats and finally renewed warfare, animosity progressed to 
such heights that colonists openly applauded acts of 
violence and cruelty inflicted upon Indians. The most 
poignant example occurred in April 1697, when Hannah Dustin 
of Haverhill, who had earlier lost a child in the 
hostilities, murdered and mutilated ten of her captors while 
they slept, including two women and six Indian children. 
Rather than any sort of censure for her actions, Dustin 
received a reward of £50 from the Assembly and a great deal 
of public acclaim.14 The experience not only of King 
Philip's War but more importantly of the persistent 
uneasiness which followed, caused New Englanders to react in
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ways which seemed completely alien to the principles for 
which they had fought the natives in the first place. By 
applauding Dustin's actions, the colonists were becoming 
more like the image of the savage Indians they hoped to 
destroy than they would ever admit. At the very least, 
approval of such behavior revealed a clear decline in 
popular optimism about the errand into the wilderness.
In its attempt to eliminate the existence of any 
hostile threat, the colonial government attempted to 
manipulate relations between contesting native groups, a 
practice not entirely without precedent in New England, of 
course. Even during the war, various English officials, 
including Governor Andros, had attempted to control native 
activities to their own advantage. The New England colonies 
hoped to gain an alliance with the powerful Mohawks by 
encouraging them to attack the renegades from the 
Massachusetts frontier, who were also the Mohawk's 
longstanding enemies. On October 5, 1677, John Pynchon, 
acting on instructions from the Council, wrote to Captain 
Sylvester Salisbury at Fort Albany advising him to employ 
"Maqua" warriors to track down the Indians who had attacked 
Deerfield and other Connecticut Valley towns the previous 
month. "Let them know it will be a great demonstration of 
their fidelity and friendship to us," he told Salisbury,
"and it is a very likely opportunity for them to kill and 
catch Indians whom they so much hunt after."
Some New Englanders were openly uneasy at the plan,
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questioning the legality and morality of employing "Heathen" 
warriors, "but the General Court and the most considerate of 
the Country," according to Hubbard, "apprehended it lawful 
to make use of any Advantage Providence put into their 
Hands, whereby to weaken or abate the Force and Power of 
their Enemies."15 Any weapons or allies which hastened the 
demise of the native menace and thus helped to solve the 
instability threatening New England security were seen as 
justifiable.
The Mohawk alliance did not achieve the desired 
results. From the start, Massachusetts officials accused 
their native mercenaries of preying on English cattle and 
friendly, converted Indians, especially around the town of 
Natick. Connecticut Valley residents were particularly 
disturbed by the free movement afforded the Iroquois 
warriors, the colonists "not being able to distinguish 
between . . . ennemy Indians & Macquas." Finally, in March 
1679 the Commissioners of the United Colonies decided to 
inform the Mohawks that "wee have no present need for them 
to pursue any Indians in these parts or at the 
Eastward."16 The colonists apparently believed that they 
could ignite or extinguish hostilities between native groups 
at a moment's notice or solely according to their own 
desires; they failed to realize that the Indians of the 
region were anything more than instruments of God's 
providence or tools for their use.
Throughout the 1680s, the colonies, primarily through
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John Pynchon, attempted to enforce peace between the Mohawks 
and the native groups effectively under English control, as 
well as to bar the fierce warriors from undertaking 
campaigns against the eastern Indians still in enmity with 
the colonies. The authorities realized what a dangerous 
weapon their allies could be. By 1689, however, Pynchon was 
again suggesting to the Council in Boston that the colony 
encourage "the Maguas and Senecas . . .  to effect some 
destruction on the Eastern Indians."17 In again 
considering a dangerous policy which clearly had not worked 
the previous decade, New Englanders seemed slow to learn 
their lessons. After King Philip's War, however, they were 
prepared to use any means at their disposal to eliminate the 
native threat which continued to occupy their minds and 
estates.
In addition to the presence of known hostile tribes and 
invited warriors, Massachusetts residents from time to time 
also became further unsettled by the appearance of wandering 
groups of unidentified Indians on the frontier. For 
example, in late 1691 approximately 150 native men, women, 
and children on a hunting expedition from the Albany area 
settled, without warning, about a mile from Deerfield. 
Residents of that town as well as neighboring communities on 
the Connecticut River frontier immediately agreed that 
although the newcomers appeared peaceful, their mere 
presence represented a potential threat. The local militia 
committees in the region stepped up defensive preparations
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to give the natives notice, in Pynchon's words, that "we are 
in a warlike Posture."18
Most town officials apparently favored sending the band 
back to Albany immediately, but the General Court issued a 
proclamation through Pynchon granting the refugee natives 
temporary, conditional permission to remain in the area for 
the winter of 1692. Although the major chastised them for 
not seeking advance leave to set up camp within 
Massachusetts's jurisdiction, he promised the natives that 
the colonists would "for the present overlook their seeming 
intruding upon us" and would let them stay until spring if 
they behaved themselves, abstained from liquor, and abided 
by certain restrictions on their movement.19 The natives 
agreed to the requirements and left the area without 
incident in May 1692. The importance of the incident rested 
in the colonists' initial response to a potentially new 
threat, particularly exemplified by Pynchon's advice that 
colonial forces maintain "a warlike Posture." Even though 
they let the strange band remain in 1692, the colonists 
exhibited an acute sense of tension and mental agitation at 
the appearance of the natives. One effect of King Philip's 
War and related challenges was that, psychologically, 
Massachusetts residents never really lost their "warlike 
Posture"; in their lingering uneasiness they seemed 
mentally ready to fight at the appearance of any perceived 
challenge, whether Indians, crown officials, or evil forces 
within their communities.
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During the late 1680s and into the 1690s, alarm after 
alarm sounded from the Massachusetts frontier, and English 
reactions turned toward eliminating any natives whose 
behavior could not be controlled. In October 1691 Nathaniel 
Saltonstall advised that a military force be dispatched to 
pursue the Indians on the Maine frontier, "and so not to 
give it over while an Indian can be heard of in the 
Country." Similarly, Capt. Samuel Partridge of Deerfield 
suggested in 1696 that "the pretended friendly Indians" who, 
"proving enemies, being worse than open enemies," should be 
rounded up and transported into slavery or exiled on 
isolated islands near the colony. The General Court 
apparently agreed, for the previous year it declared "all 
Indians who shall be found within 5 miles of the Connecticut 
River on the easterly side or within 20 miles on the 
westerly side thereof, shall be deemed and accounted enemies 
and treated as such."20 This mentality of regarding all 
Indians as enemies until proven innocent— and in some cases 
even after— persisted long after King Philip's War, as the 
siege of New England continued.
By the last decade of the century, King William's War 
added a new dimension to the threats facing the English 
colonies, as the French in Canada became factors in the 
hostilities on the Massachusetts frontier. The new enemies 
furnished the same sources of tension as did the Indians;
New Englanders feared French opposition not only because of 
military attacks but also because of far-reaching
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ideological differences. To orthodox Puritans, Catholic 
Frenchmen represented as serious a threat as did heathen 
Indians; the union of the two in a campaign against New 
England therefore presented a paramount danger. Cotton 
Mather, for one, took every opportunity to point out the 
evils of Massachusetts's "Declared Enemies, . . . those 
Pagan and Popish Neighbors." He characterized the alliance 
as an unholy marriage between the "Half Indianized French, 
and the Half Frenchified Indians."21
Mather was not alone in this antipathy toward French 
Catholics. John Gyles was taken captive in Maine in 1689 
and delivered to a Jesuit priest. When the Jesuit gave him 
a biscuit to eat, the boy instead disposed of it "fearing he 
had put something into it to make me love him." He 
certainly took his mother's words to heart. "Oh my dear 
child," she told him during their captivity, "if it were 
God's will, I had rather follow you to your grave, or never 
see you more in this world, than you should be sold to a 
Jesuit; for a Jesuit will ruin you, body and soul!"22 
Englishmen attributed supernatural evil powers to Catholic 
priests, just as they did to Indian shamans, and therefore 
viewed both as spiritual enemies bent on subverting the 
Protestant mission in America. In retrospect, these types 
of fears appear outlandish; to seventeenth-century 
Puritans, they represented sharp prongs in the devil's 
attack on New England.
The colonists had plenty of evidence to support their
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fear of French military malice. In the summer of 1688 a
band of "North Indians" terrorized the Connecticut Valley,
killing five friendly natives near Springfield and six
settlers at Northfield. Later testimony by other Indians in
the region revealed that the hostile group came "by ordre of
the Governor of Canida" with instructions to kill Englishmen
and Christianized Indians and to "bring noe prisoners, but
their Scalps."23 Massachusetts residents also found reason
to tie another of their archenemies into the plot;
following his overthrow in 1689, accusers levelled charges
at Governor Andros that he had plotted with both Indians and
Canadians to turn the New England colonies over to 
24France.
Not surprisingly, New Englanders cited Canada, along 
with "Frenchified pagans" dispatched from there, as a major 
source of their "Miseries." "There was the main strength of 
the French; there the Indians were mostly supplied with 
ammunition; thence issued parties of men, who, uniting with 
the salvages, barbarously murdered many innocent New 
Englanders, . . . "  wrote Cotton Mather. Therefore, the 
general conclusion among colonists concerned with the safety 
of the colony was that "'Canada must be reduced.1" Pynchon 
reflected the same sentiment when he warned, "we shal never 
be quiet as long as we have those II Neighbors the French at 
Canida & at the Eastward."25 Again, the quiet which the 
colonists desired but found so elusive during the postwar 
years was as much a respite from the mental agitation of the
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period as it was a relief from military attack. Peace meant 
nothing without peace of mind.
New England's enemies did not manifest themselves only 
in the alien forms of Indian warriors or French soldiers.
In addition to these foes, Cotton Mather cited "the fatal 
Enemies of this people, that shall go to Debauch and infect 
the Rising Generation among us, and corrupt them with evil 
manners; and learn them to Drink and Drab, and Game, and 
profane the Sabbath, and Sin against the Hope of their 
Fathers."26 After King Philip's War, pious Puritans became 
increasingly sensitive to signs of degeneracy with their 
communities and interpreted the apparent growth of 
sinfulness as an indication of the devil's attack on the 
very heart of the New England mission.
Reflections of worldliness in personal behavior were a 
major concern of Massachusetts authorities after 1675. 
Warnings against excesses in apparel— the most widespread 
and commonplace "evil" present in the colony— were not new 
after the war; concern over such symbols of personal pride 
existed from the earliest days of the colony's history. 
Judging by the attention spent on the problem during the 
postwar years, however, worldliness— or at least sensitivity 
to it— reached epidemic proportions.
In 1675 the General Court created the position of 
tithingman to maintain a watch in Massachusetts communities 
against such abuses as extravagant dress, abuse of liquor, 
gambling, idleness, and sabbath-breaking. The court later
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elaborated on the order to include inspections over "the
manners of all disorderly persons," residents suspected of
"debauchery, irreligion, prophaness, & atheisme," parents
neglecting their duties of proper "family government," and
any "idlenes, profligat, uncivill, or rude practices of any
sort." The Hampshire County Court took these instructions
to heart, directing the tithingmen in the towns under its
jurisdiction "faithfully to act in their Inspecting of their
Neighbors, so as that Sin & Disorder may be prevented &
27suppressed." Communal watchfulness was an established 
tradition in Massachusetts, of course, justified by the 
belief that the good of the whole took priority over the 
rights of the individual. The creation of tithingmen added 
one more weapon to the effort by civil authorities to 
enforce Puritan morals on all Massachusetts residents.
Throughout the 1670s, both before and after King 
Philip's War, county court dockets across the colony were 
burdened with numerous cases of excessive worldliness. The 
Hampshire court proclaimed such behavior as "not Becomeing a 
Wilderness State" and alien to "the Proffession of 
Christianity & Religion." Whether or not the problem of 
"wearing silk Extravegently Contrary to Law" and generally 
dressing "in a fflanteing [flaunting] manner" increased 
significantly as a result of the war, local authorities took 
a sterner stance against the continuing abuses, "Considering 
of how unseemly a nature such things are in this Day of 
Calamity, Wasting & Desolation." Men and women alike were
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charged with taking excessive pride in their personal 
appearance, but other instances indicating an apparent 
decline in public morality also flooded the court books. 
Hampshire County magistrates dealt with more cases involving 
"Heineous swearing, . . . lacivious & Wanton Carriages" in 
public, fornication, and illegitimacy.28 None of these 
crimes were new during the 1670s, but the stern reaction to 
them by public officials reflected the continuing anxiety 
over the future of Massachusetts.
In March 1685, in response to the number of "evills as 
are found amongst us," the Massachusetts General Court 
required "selectmen, grand jury men, constables, & 
tithingmen of all townes within this jurisdiction . . .  to 
doe their utmost to be faithfull in the discharge of their 
respective duties as to Saboath breaking, typling, & 
drincking, & towne dwellers mispending their time in publick 
houses of entertainment."29 The sense of urgency expressed 
by the legislators reflected the fervent messages delivered 
from pulpits throughout the colony. Both Increase and 
Cotton Mather spoke out against breaches of the Seventh 
Commandment, loosely defined as "Light Behaviour" 
occasioning "Provacations to Uncleanness," which were 
allegedly rampant among the colonists. The elder Mather 
warned his followers to abandon their "Revelling" and 
"Rioting" in favor of a more appropriate "Gravity and 
Sobriety." Such behavior, he stated, "at a Time when God 
calls to mourn, is most certainly a provocation." In fact,
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he declared many of the "profane practices" to be "utterly 
unlawful," and not to "be tollerated in such a place as 
New-England, without great Sin."30
Countless ministers responded to the signs of 
degeneracy with exhortations to their flocks. Samuel Nowell 
predicted shortly after Metacom’s death that "we shall not 
live quiet long, or at least we have no Reason to promise 
ourselves that we shall," because the "sins of New-England 
increase, iniquity doth abound, and the Love of many doth 
wax cold." He preached that the repentance necessary to 
completely defeat the Indians had not been forthcoming and 
that, in fact, it seemed to be declining. Nowell set the 
scenario which he found all too common in the colony, 
reflecting the evils of progress and worldly complacency. 
Regrettably, "every Farmers Son, when he goes to 
Market-Town, must have money in his purse; and when he 
meets with his Companions," the cleric warned, "they goe to 
the Tavern or Ale-house, and seldome away before Drunk, or 
well-tipled." "This makes Youth effeminate and wanton," 
maintained Nowell, and "doth make men not so bold; The 
Righteous are bold as a Lion." With sin undermining the 
future generations of Massachusetts and thus jeopardizing 
the future of the errand, he "encourage[d] Rulers,
Governours and Parents to train & bring up their Children in 
such manner that they may endure Hardness."31 Discipline 
and discipline alone represented the path to true repentance 
and ultimately to a cleansing of New England's collective
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conscience.
Cotton Mather was also outspoken on the issue, not only 
of the continuing "Spiritual Plagues" which afflicted the 
colony but the consequences thereof. "The World, The World, 
it is truly a most Bewitching thing;" he warned, "and the 
Love of it, will be a Root of all Evil to us. . . . "  No New 
Englander had any excuse for missing the gravity of his 
admonition, he maintained, but unfortunatley many colonists 
had not learned any spiritual lessons from the experiences 
of King Philips's War. Mather found that the passage of 
time only made many men and women in the colony all too "apt 
to forget the fears and sorrows which have been upon us." 
Neglecting reformation in the years after the conflict 
represented "the ready way to great Calamity.1,32 Such 
pointed exhortations reflected a feeling that Massachusetts' 
worst enemies were not the Indians or the French but rather 
the cold hearts of the colonists themselves. Human enemies, 
even if they acted as agents of the devil, could be defeated 
militarily; purging New Englanders' own souls of Satan's 
influence represented to fire-and-brimstone ministers like 
Mather a much more serious and difficult struggle.
Increase Mather shared his son's antipathy toward "The 
World," and he pinpointed the colonists' long-standing 
appetite for real estate as a sign of the growth of 
worldliness in New England. The record of expansion and 
community development from the earliest days of the colony 
attested to the desire for the acquisition of land. By
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1676, however, Increase Mather considered that this singular 
attraction had reached unhealthy levels. "Land! land!" he 
harangued, "hath been the Idol of many in New England."33 
He and other clergymen feared that the victory over the 
natives might prove counterproductive in a way; the 
potential removal of the Indians as an effective barrier on 
the frontier could have encouraged colonists to disperse 
from central locations of provincial or even local 
authority. Of course, as events transpired, unfriendly 
Indians did not disappear from the frontiers of 
Massachusetts, nor did hordes of colonists rush headlong to 
scattered farmsteads out of the reach of civil or religious 
authorities. Still, concerned clergymen saw a need to stem 
the spread of worldly behavior, of which the attraction to 
real estate was a blatant example.
Other clerics employed gentler means to influence their
followers. Versifying minister Benjamin Tompson harkened
back to better days in New England, "When honest sisters met
to pray not prate/About their own and not their neighbor's
state." Reacting to the problem of extravagant dress, he
reminded the colonists that "Deep-skirted doublets,
puritanic capes/Which now would render men like upright
apes/Was cornelier wear our wiser fathers thought/Than the
34cast fashions from all Europe brought." Tompson appealed 
to a sense of nostalgia and a longing for quieter, more 
secure times, when New Englanders behaved in a more uniform 
manner and had more confidence in their errand into the
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wilderness.
Even lay persons publicly urged their fellow colonists 
to learn from their recent experiences and to seek 
repentance. Mary Rowlandson warned that worldly goods and 
amusements were only "a bait the devil lays to make men lose 
their precious time." She took the opportunity of her 
period of enforced exile among the natives for reflection 
and self-evaluation. She found that "my conscience did not 
accuse me of unrighteousness toward one or other: yet I saw
how in my walk with God I had been a careless creature." 
Rowlandson's sins were obviously sins of omission and 
unwitting neglect, a point driven home particularly when 
during the first Sunday of her captivity she "remembered how 
careless I had been of God's holy time, how many Sabbaths I 
had lost or misspent, and how evilly I had walked in God's 
s i g h t . H e r  complacent adherence to the requirements of 
the Puritan religion became most apparent to her when the 
Indians tore her away from the practice completely; she 
therefore wrote her narrative as a warning to other 
colonists who were tearing themselves away from a spiritual 
connection with the church by their inward apathy and 
outward behavior.
Whether the exhortations took the form of fiery 
sermons, nostalgic verse, or earnest narratives, the message 
was the same. New England was still under attack; the 
forces of evil already represented by Indians, French 
militia, and crown officials now infiltrated Massachusetts
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destruction of the New England mission. The war itself 
represented both a warning and a punishment from God, 
revealing His displeasure with New England's sins. Rather 
than defeating their enemies and repenting in order to avoid 
retribution, the colonists faced new enemies in human form 
while sin— the root of the problem— seemingly proliferated 
in the communities of the Massachusetts Bay colony after the 
war. King Philip's War provided the initial shock; the 
continuing attacks and the manifestations of worldliness 
around theii led the orthodox clergy and other pious 
colonists to question just what the future held for 
them.36 In their reflections on New England's experiences 
and in their calls for reform, clergy as well as laymen 
expresed decline in morale, approaching in some instances 
despair.
The jeremiad was a dominant literary genre of 
seventeenth-century New England. By definition, jeremiads 
were sermons presented on official occasions, such as 
election days or fast days. The clergy who delivered these 
homilies concentrated on contemporary evils and 
transgressions which prevented the colonists from fulfilling 
their mission. Although the genre was not new in 1675 nor 
unique to colonial New England, King Philip's War and the 
uneasy decades which followed presented clergymen with ample 
ammunition for their sermons. The jeremiads traditionally 
played on a theme of crisis to spur the colonists toward
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reformation and rededication to the holy cause.37 The 
experiences of the last quarter of the seventeenth century 
inspired ample concern over New England's impending doom and 
attention to the need for regeneration.
Increase Mather blamed the inconstancy of younger
colonists for the troubles, claiming that God had no reason
to punish New England with "so dreadfull a judgment, untill
the Body of the first Generation was removed, and another
Generation risen up which hath not so pursued, as ought to
have been, the blessed design of their Fathers, in following
the Lord into this Wilderness, whilst it was a land not
sown."38 Whoever was at fault, "the humbling, trying [and]
distressing providences" were a collective test, stated John
Higginson, to determine "whether, according to our
profession and [God's] expectation, we would keep his
commandments, or not." More and more the answer seemed to
be "no" during the period, leading the Reverend Solomon
Stoddard later to deliver a somber prophecy. In their
sinfulness, "men are wont to make many pretences and
excuses, and by them they mitigate the terror of their
consciences," he preached, "but this does not prevent the
displeasure of God: and if God be angry with his people, it
39will before it be long, break out upon them." Stoddard's 
1703 admonition succinctly summarized the messages of the 
jeremiads during the uneasy decades of the late seventeenth 
century. Mather delivered a blast in 1690, warning his 
fellow colonists that if they persisted in their sinfulness
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and "if a Reformation be not Endeavoured, the Righteous God 
will Punish us yet seven Times for our Iniquities."40 As 
the epidemic of iniquity spread, chances of its cure seemed 
to be slipping away. The jeremiads continued, but the 
preachers wondered if anyone was listening.
Since the major theme among pious Puritans during the 
last quarter of the seventeenth century revolved around the 
unceasing battle between the forces of good and evil in New 
England, the appearance of witchcraft represented a focal 
cause for alarm. Accusations and trials of supposed witches 
predated King Philip's War, but the intellectual intolerance 
which accompanied the tense postwar period increased 
suspicion. New Englanders, feeling besieged by their 
enemies and wary of any deviant behavior in their midst, 
were more than ready to find and punish Satan's bedfellows, 
even within settled communities. By doing so, fearful 
colonists could take heart in at least continuing the 
battle, if not entirely eradicating the forces of the devil 
which threatened them.41 The witchcraft proceedings became 
just another defensive action in the ongoing battle against 
Indians, French Canadians, royal officials, and backsliding 
colonists; English witches represented an additional branch 
of the same familiar enemy.
In his Magnalia, Cotton Mather surmised that due to New 
England's falling from its position as "a country devoted 
unto the worship and service of the Lord JESUS CHRIST above 
the rest of the world," God unleashed upon the degenerate
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colonists a series of unparalleled punishments. Trying to
make sense out of the sharp judgments, he reasoned that when
God's people refused to repent in the past, He had
"suffer[ed] Devils sometimes" to visit the sinners with
perplexing and grave punishments. Earlier, the Lord had
"permitt[ed] Satan and his Instruments [the Indians] to
molest His children . . .  in their Estates;" as New
England's sins persisted, He allowed the devil to assault
"their Persons and their Posterity too." "Devils and
Witches" infiltrated "not only the wigwams of Indians, where
the pagan powaws often raise their masters, in the shapes of
bears and snakes and fires," he warned, "but also in the
42homes of white English men and women." The clergy cited 
biblical precedents of God employing the forces of Satan to 
achieve His ends. John Hale reminded his readers that when 
the Egyptians angered God with their worldly sins, in many 
ways the same worldly sins prevalent in New England, He 
expressed His displeasure "by sending Evil Angels among 
them."43 The only means of salvation open to the 
colonists, therefore, was to expel existing "Evil Angels" 
from their presence and to eliminate the sins which invited 
them.
Understandably, New Englanders associated witchcraft 
with Indians, their most common, most persistent, and 
perhaps most frightening opponent. The colonists certainly 
feared their native enemies, and Europeans traditionally 
characterized Indians as devil worshippers anyway. Increase
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Mather reminded the colonists, as if it were necessary to do
so, that "it is known from their own Confessions that
amongst the Indians . . . oftentimes at their Dances the
44Devil appears in bodily shape." No doubt existed that
Satan and the natives worked hand-in-hand in plotting the 
destruction of the New England mission. This perception was 
not new in 1676; in 1652 Thomas Mayhew, Jr. wrote to John 
Eliot, stating, "The Devil also with his Angels had his 
Kingdom among them."45 The popular association between 
Indians and witches, however, was enhanced in the years 
following King Philip's War.
Many deponents in witchcraft proceedings who claimed to 
have experienced contact with the devil noted the 
connection. Mercy Short, herself a former captive whose 
whole family perished in an Indian attack, in 1692 described 
a specter which she claimed appeared to her as "a Short and 
a Black Man; . . .  he was not of a Negro," she said, "but of 
a Tawney, or an Indian colour." Cotton Mather found that 
this characteristic "tawny colour," exhibiting an 
unmistakable resemblance to the natives, recurred frequently 
in depositions.46
The association between witchcraft and the current 
enemies afflicting New England did not stop with the 
Indians. "One who was Executed at Salem for Witchcraft had 
confessed That at their Cheef Witch-meetings, there had been 
present some French Canadians," according to Mather, along 
with "some Indian Sagamores, to concert the methods of
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ruining New England."47 Such testimony revealed how deeply 
the experiences of the recent decades had affected the 
psyche of the colonists. King Philip's War kindled popular 
suspicion of the natives on a vast and unprecedented scale, 
and the tensions which followed confirmed the perception, in 
Englishmen's minds, that the Indians were in league with the 
devil. Colonists came to believe and fear that their 
military enemies were indeed pawns of the devil in plotting 
the "ruining" of New England, and conceiving that Indians 
and Canadians could transmit evil to supposedly pious 
Englishmen became a part of the colonial mentality at the 
time.
Few Massachusetts residents seemed to question that the 
accumulated troubles heaped on the colony were the designs 
of the devil to destroy the errand into the wilderness or 
that the natives played an integral role in the campaign. 
When in August 1676 a violent storm struck the colony,
"doing much Hurt to very many" and spoiling much property, 
many colonists undoubtedly believed a boast shortly 
thereafter by some Indians "that they had caused it by their 
Pawwaw, (i.e. worshipping the Devil)." As a further boast, 
the natives predicted "that as many Englishmen shall die, as 
the Trees have by this Wind been blown down in the 
Woods."48
In another incident, this time in 1692, colonists 
around Gloucester were plagued by strange and elusive 
figures who resembled Indians and Frenchmen lurking about
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the area, and by strange occurrences such as the 
inexplicable misfiring of their guns. Rev. John Emerson 
wrote that he trusted that "all Rational Persons" would 
realize "that Glocester was not Alarumed . . .  by real 
French and Indians, but that the Devil and his Agents were 
the cause of all the Molestation, which at this Time befel 
the Town." With every confidence that Satan had it within 
his power and his design to set ambushes for New England 
"with Daemons, in the Shape of Armed Indians and Frenchmen," 
even "the most Considerate Gentlemen in that 
Neighbourhood . . . Believe[d] this whole matter to have 
been a Prodigious piece of the Strange Descent from the 
Invisible World, then made upon other parts of the Country" 
as well.49 The Indians received a double indictment in the 
whole affair. John Hale concluded that "the Devil could not 
assume the shape of an innocent person in doing mischief 
unto mankind."50 Therefore, the natives were not only 
guilty of hostile activities, but by their very nature 
invited the forces of evil to assist them.
The clergy of the colony undertook a program to stem 
the spread of sin during the late seventeenth century. On 
May 28, 1679 some of the elders suggested a synod, "for the 
revisall of the platforme of discipline agreed upon by the 
schismes, haeresies, prophaness, & the establishment of the 
churches in one faith & order of the gospell." The avowed 
purpose of the conclave was "to enquire into the causes of 
Gods displeasure against New England and scripture
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following September, and while they enumerated a lengthy 
list of specific affronts, the most serious sin affecting 
New England at the time appeared to be an overall decline in 
godliness and religious zeal. This flaw was a coverall 
which naturally opened the way for particular wrongs such as 
drinking, swearing, and excessive dress.52 Identifying the 
colonists' sins, of course, was the easy part; finding 
effective "expedients for Reformation" was the more pressing 
and difficult task.
The decline in godliness appeared most clearly in an
apparently growing failure "to sanctifie the Sabbath day,"
especially among the youth. In Springfield, as in other
communities across the colony, the selectmen heard
complaints of "great disorder in our assembly by many young
persons stealing out of the meeting house before the
blessing be pronounced." Cotton Mather warned "that more
care should be taken respecting the Rising Generation, then
formerly hath been, that they might be brought under the 
53discipline of Christ." Clearly, he looked to the future 
of the mission with a sense of trepidation as long as the 
"Rising Generation" was allowed to become complacent or even 
scornful of religious discipline. This potentially 
dangerous decline in spiritual zeal represented a major part 
of what the General Court cited as "a wofull breach of the 
fifth commandment," composed of a widespread "contempt of 
authority, civil, ecclesiasticall, and domesticall." The
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court declared "that [particular] sin is highly provoking to 
the Lord" and ordered "all persons under this government to 
reforme so great an evil" before its progress became 
irreversible.54 A decline in self discipline and in proper 
respect for the symbols of authority at all levels meant 
inevitable social disorder.
Already in the years immediately after King Philip's 
War, when they were more sensitive than ever to such abuses, 
Massachusetts leaders saw disturbing manifestations of 
public disrespect. The Hampshire County Court dealt with 
many cases of "high Contempt of authority." The justices 
called Plaxy Holton to answer for "her ungodlie speeches 
agst the Reverend Mr. Solomon Stoddard." In September 1676, 
John Lee of Westfield was presented for "willfully 
resist[ing] the Constable" with "many Reviling & Curssing 
speaches & Language;" likewise, Samuel Smith of Northampton 
faced charges for his "most Heineous, wecked, Revileing 
speeches" against town authorities. The most serious case
involved "an unlawfull and Rioteous Assembly" at Hadley in
February 1676, during which several persons "Resisted the 
Constable . . .  in the Execution of his office," thereby 
"Stirring up and anemateing Sedition, Breakeing the Peace, 
Contemning and affronteing Authority. . . . "  The offenders 
were whipped or fined and forced to post bond for their 
future good behavior. The court judged such disorder "not 
becomeing of the gospell Especially at such a time of sore
Affliction & Callamity by Reason of the warr with the
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Indians." Even more disturbing, the presiding justices
55noted "how much such Evils grow amongst us." They 
believed that the problem was getting worse during the 
postwar period.
The problem rested, however, not only in degenerate 
colonists who slighted authories but also in civil officials 
and clergymen who failed to demand or earn their followers' 
respect. The younger Mather warned against ministers who 
neglected to encourage or enforce religious piety and 
conformity, teachers who did not insist on proper 
discipline, and heads of households who ignored their duty 
to educate their charges in proper respect for 
ecclesiastical and civil authority. He entreated ministers 
to take the lead in the crusade for reform and "to witness 
against the more Spiritual Sins," which he collectively 
described as "the Roots of Bitterness in the midst of 
us."56
Complacency and lack of spiritual vigilance led to 
worldly behavior, which stood as the outward sign of New 
England's growing degeneracy. Increase Mather cited sins 
resulting from religious indiscipline as things "pleasing to 
the Devil, but highly provoking to the Holy God." He noted 
that the spread of such behavior "hinder[ed] Religious 
Exercises" and led the revellers to put "impudent 
contempt . . . upon the Gospel." "The Devil thereby 
catcheth away the good seed of the Word," he warned, "and 
the former Religious Exercise is rendered ineffectual."57
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The prevalence of excesses of the flesh, therefore, 
represented both signs of the declining spiritual zeal and 
causes of further degeneracy to late seventeenth-century 
Puritan clergymen.
During King Philip's War, colonial authorities 
prescribed special days of public humiliation, as well as 
days of thanksgiving, when the situation merited them, to 
bring about the desired reformation. Even after the war and 
Metacom's defeat, officials continued to order fast days to 
exorcise evil. On such occasions, the General Court 
proclaimed "all servile labour prohibited on that day, and 
the Churches ministers and people enjoined to keep it 
solemnly and seriously." The purpose of these days of 
humiliation was to encourage colonists to "humble themselves 
before the Lord and seek his face," in hopes that "he will 
still please to dwell in the midst of, and not forsake us." 
Officials of the United Colonies often coordinated these 
holy days in an effort to present an image of unity and 
universality in the reformation effort. Of special concern 
was that the ritual and the graces gained might result in 
"the powring out of his Spirit upon the rising generation," 
and thereby encourage a renewal of spiritual vigor among the 
future heirs of New England leadership.58
The mere ritual, however, was only an outward sign and 
a beginning of the true process of reformation. "Praying 
without Reforming," Cotton Mather warned, "will not do." 
Figuratively, the colonists had to "Ly mourning and weeping
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and wailing in Sackcloth and Ashes, before the Lord," in 
order to humble themselves sufficiently to lay their worldly 
pride aside and open their hearts to the proper methods of 
correction.59 At the base of the process, Mather advised 
"a due execution of wholsome Laws which are founded upon the 
Word of God" and a "Solemn Renewal of [the] Covenant with 
God in Jesus Christ." Puritan congregational identity was 
embodied in individual church covenants, whereby members 
both distinguished themselves as a select group and pledged 
their dedication to the spiritual mission. Therefore, 
although individuals had to make restitution in their own 
hearts, the renewal had to take place on a communal level, 
with whole communities and congregations reaffirming their 
covenants with the Lord.
There was no need to point fingers at the towns which 
had suffered most from New England's accumulated enemies.
No one, in the Puritan view, was innocent and "none . 
so good but we may be better, we may (and should) grow in 
Grace and make progress in the work of Mortification."60 
Deacon Philip Walker reminded his readers that everyone was 
guilty of sin and advised that to root out the ungodliness 
the colonists should "serch owr selves Each man his Secrit 
hart, And Search the temple in Each privat partt."61 
Reformation had to begin inside each colonist and spread to 
encompass the whole in order to bring about a complete cure 
of the evils threatening New England during the last quarter 
of the seventeenth century.
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The general message of the clergy in their jeremiads 
was that New England was declining in spiritual worth and 
that self-discipline was the necessary formula for turning 
the tide. In reaction to the belief that colonists were 
increasingly giving in to temptation, Increase Mather 
demanded that "They ought to swim against the stream, and to 
keep themselves pure from the sins of the Times." He 
further commanded the churches of the colony to oversee 
individual repentance and "to exercise the Discipline of 
Christ towards such of their Members as shall offend in this 
matter."62 Mather and others called their brethren to be 
steadfast in the effort.
Samuel Nowell admonished the colonists to brace 
themselves and remain ever-ready to defend themselves 
against their attackers, both human and supernatural. "Put 
on your spiritual Armour," he advised; "look to that 
Breast-plate of Righteousness." Nowell, an outspoken 
proponent of military discipline and preparedness, quite 
clearly drew the link between the struggles faced by the 
colonists in the wilderness of the frontier and that within 
their own souls. He likened the physical rigor necessary 
for a soldier in the ranks to the spiritual vigor required 
of New England’s Puritans. He noted an "agreement between 
the Spiritual and temporal Warfare" and claimed that every 
attribute "belonging to a Souldier, is made use of to 
resemble some Grace or Duty of a Christian." Nowell 
complained of "a strange piece of dotage befallen this
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crazy-headed age, that men should not use the sword."63 Of 
course the colonists had to fight, he maintained, both 
physically and spiritually, to defeat their challengers. 
Anything less than a total commitment to the struggle 
represented to the orthodox clergy a sign of resignation and 
apathy in the face of the mission's impending doom.
In advocating total commitment against New England's 
enemies, Massachusetts leaders emphasized the necessity of 
solidarity, which had to which extend from the family to the 
province. Those who turned their backs on their duty to 
foster unity and conformity were, according to Cotton 
Mather, no better than heathens. "How many that although 
they are Christians in name," he asked, "are no better than 
Heathens in heart, and in Conversation?" He claimed that 
"whole Plantations . . . have lived from year to year, 
without any publick Invocation of the Name of God, and 
without his Word. And in most places," Mather lamented, 
"Instituted Worship (whereby Christians are distinguished 
from Heathens) hath been too much neglected." Hubbard 
observed in "many of these scattering Plantations in our 
Borders, that many were contented to live without, yea, 
desirous to shake off all Yoake of Government, both sacred 
and civil, and so transforming themselves as much as well 
they could into the Manners of the Indians they lived 
amongst."64
These conditions represented certain paths to doom, 
according to the clergy, and the danger could only be
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alleviated through a return to strict discipline, within 
both families and congregations. New England's natural 
enemies, the Indians, were pictured as living without 
restraint, in the wilderness, without the towns and other 
communal organizations which colonial authorities portrayed 
as the outward signs of civilization and Christian order.
Any trend towards breaking the ties of these valuable 
agencies signalled to pious colonists a reversal of what the 
founders of the mission came to America to accomplish. "The 
men of a Private Spirit are loosers," Mather stated, and 
insisted that "Private Spirit tenders men Obnoxious to the 
terrible Displeasure of an Holy and an Angry God." He cited 
a scriptural example in which disunity appeared among "some 
of the Provinces of Israel." "The man of God" warned the 
Israelites, "Behold, yee have Sinned against the Lord; and 
be sure your Sin will find you out."65
Numerous writers pointed to the example of one 
Mr. Wakely who was killed in 1675 at Casco Bay, in Maine. 
Mather claimed that Wakely "would sometimes say with tears, 
that he believed God was angry with him, because although he 
came into New-England for the Gospels sake, yet he had left 
another place in this Country, where there was a Church of 
Christ, which he once was in Communion with, and had lived 
many years in a Plantation where was no Church, nor 
Instituted Worship." Nathaniel Saltonstall cited another 
"Man of a singular and sordid Humour; of Great Knowledge in 
the Scripture, but of no particular professed Sect or
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Perswasion," who perished at Providence in March 1676. This 
man reportedly denied the necessity of communal cooperation, 
instead maintaining "a strange Confidence, or rather 
Conceit, that whilst he held his Bible in his Hand, he 
looked upon himself as secure from all kinde of Violence." 
The natives evidently proved him wrong; they "ripped him 
open," according to Saltonstall, "and put his Bible in his 
Belly."66 These extreme examples were obviously employed 
by Massachusetts authorities as lessons against solitary 
existence and removal from the webs of community and 
congregation. Isolation could only bring trouble.
Saltonstall's message was particularly poignant. Even 
supreme faith proved worthless in the absence of a communal 
existence. New Englanders had to band together and nurture 
a firm commitment to fight their enemies as one body if they 
were to have any hopes of winning the ultimate victory.
An important component of the necessary solidarity was 
the removal of dissenters, such as Anglicans, Baptists, and 
Quakers, from Massachusetts communities. The controversy 
over the elevation of the Anglican church in Boston under 
Andros reflected the Puritan opposition to the English 
institution. Even more troublesome were Quakers, since the 
1650s a perennial thorn in the side of pious New Englanders. 
Mather considered the presence of Quakers a punishment from 
God, "smiting them with Spiritual Plagues for their 
Unfruitfulness and Unthankfulness." Still, he thanked the 
Lord that the number of Friends in the region was no
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greater, "for if they should multiply, not only would 
Christianity be utterly Extinguished, but Humanity it self 
Exterminated.1,67 The elimination of dissenters from the 
colony, therefore, was a task of unquestionable importance 
to the orthodox clergy in the effort to present a unified 
front against New England's enemies.
Dissenters came in different forms, however, and not 
all challengers of the orthodox conformity appeared so 
blatantly evil as did the members of strange sects. Even 
within Massachusetts congregations, challenges to church 
unity became serious matters of discussion during the last 
quarter of the seventeenth century, and the most serious and 
long-lasting controversy occurred in the Connecticut Valley. 
Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Northampton caused a stir among the 
orthodox hierarchy during the 1670s when he began openly 
relaxing the traditional requirements for full church 
membership.
In July 1677, he listed 222 persons as church members, 
of whom at least 40 probably could not fulfill the 
requirements of the Half-Way Covenant. After 1677, the 
Northampton minister stopped making distinctions between 
"half-way" members and those admitted to full communion. In 
his "five Harvests" (1679, 1683, 1696, 1712, and 1718), 
Stoddard shocked many fellow clergymen by espousing the 
belief that individual conversion experiences were not a 
necessary prerequisite for acceptance to full communion.68 
The frontier minister did not come up with his theory
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suddenly or without serious thought; he reportedly even 
publicized his developing views to members of his 
congregation, causing some controversy within the 
Northampton body. In any case, Stoddard felt by the end of 
the decade that the matter deserved discussion at the 
Reforming Synod of 1679, where his comparatively liberal 
beliefs naturally met with stiff opposition.69
The controversy revolved around Stoddard's insistence 
that communion should be opened to "All Such as do make a 
Solemn Profession of Faith, & Repentance, & are of Godly 
Conversation, having Knowledge to Examine themselves, & 
discern the Lords Body." Persons of faith and moral 
behavior deserved full membership, he stated, "without any 
examination concerning a work of grace upon their souls."
The Northampton minister claimed that the church elders 
imposed an artificial and erroneous dichotomy by making 
communion only a sign of regeneration rather than a means to 
that end. "The Lords Supper is appointed by Jesus Christ," 
said Stoddard, "for the begetting of Grace as Well as for 
the Strengthening of Grace."70 He felt that excluding 
pious Christians from full church membership represented a 
frustration and an impediment to the spread of God's word 
across the frontier.
More conservative clergymen like Edward Taylor,
Increase Mather, and Cotton Mather could not bring 
themselves to support Stoddard's innovations. Each of these 
eminent ministers argued that especially in a time of
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confusion and spiritual decline, the churches had to
maintain strict standards and thus guard against
complacency. Stoddard and his opponents both sought the
same ends— the rejuvenation of religious vigor in New
England— but they obviously differed on the best means. In
a 1677 election sermon, Increase Mather warned against
teachers in the region "that have espoused loose, large
Principles here, designing to bring all persons to the Lords
Supper, who have an Historical Faith, and are not scandalous
in life, although they never had Experience of a work of 
71Regeneration on their Souls."
Taylor, the minister of the Westfield congregation, 
addressed Stoddard both publicly and privately on the 
matter. In 1688 he wrote to Northampton that he felt 
justified in "medling," "considering as well our 
familiarity, as proximity." He chastised Stoddard for 
taking it upon himself to institute such a radical extension 
of the already controversial Half-Way Covenant. To support 
his stand, Taylor cited the Bible: "Christ saith, let him
that hath an Eare to heare hear. But he saith not, let him 
that hath a mouth, to eatt, etc., eat & drink here." Taylor 
denied Stoddard's assertion that communion was a valid means 
to regeneracy, claiming that the "Word" but not "the Lords 
Supper" was "ordained for the Conversion of Sinners." He 
warned Stoddard that relaxing the requirements represented 
"the ready way to trample underfoot all Church Discipline, & 
to fill the Churches with all sorts of Sinners & to destroy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
300
the Purity of Churches, & so lock Church Holiness out of 
Doores."72 Aside from the theological arguments, Taylor 
pointed out that the innovation threatened the unity of the 
colony's churches in the critical period. He knew that the 
controversy would not remain confined to the Northampton 
congregation but would affect churches throughout the 
colony, especially on the frontier.
Sensing that frontier congregations occupied a special 
place in the errand into the wilderness, Taylor worried that 
as a result of Stoddard's actions "a reflection unavoidably 
is Cast upon our Churches." He feared the controversy would 
cause discord in neighboring congregations and encourage 
"malevolent persons" to take advantage of the unsettled 
situation. Just as the frontier had to hold firm against 
Indian attacks, frontier congregations had to maintain a 
united front against spiritual decay. Relaxing standards 
for church membership would pollute the existing 
congregations, he argued, rather than renew and propagate 
fervor, as Stoddard hoped. "And how grievous this may 
prove," despaired Taylor, "who knows?" Still, he was 
confident, as of the turn of the century anyway, that public 
opinion ran "100 or 1000 against One" in opposition to the 
reform.73
Taylor's warning that the matter would tear at the 
unity of Stoddard's congregation and adversely affect other 
communities in the long run seemed to be accurate during the 
late seventeenth century. As for the immediate effects in
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Northampton, however, dissension existed among the 
churchmembers even before the progressive minister's 
arrival. The question of restrictive versus expanded 
standards for full membership surfaced during the 1660s, and 
as the discussion continued, Northampton became a center of 
reform against traditional clerical authority, in favor of 
lay initiative. Residents of the town were no strangers to 
controversy when Stoddard began to announce his beliefs 
during the 1670s, though it took nearly two decades for the 
church to officially adopt his reforms. By the 1690s, with 
the maturation of a new generation, the Northampton 
congregation finally resolved the question by voting to 
accept Stoddard's definition of church membership.74 
Stoddard's brand of presbyterianism— a term applied to those 
moderate views which advocated the loosened 
standards— definitely caught on more in the frontier region 
than it did in the more established eastern areas of the 
colony. Congregations up and down the Connecticut Valley 
opted for "Mr. Stoddard's Way" during the period, the 
notable exception being Westfield, where the church under 
Taylor's leadership maintained the traditional requirements 
well into the eighteenth century.75
Much has been made of the fact that the liberalized 
views first appeared and took root on the frontier; perhaps 
in some cases, too much has been made of it. Still, a 
parallel must be drawn between the social and demographic 
nature of frontier communities and the desire for more lay
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control over church matters, including membership decisions. 
Life on the Connecticut River, particularly during the 
unsettled period of the late seventeenth century, required 
an assertiveness on the part of the residents in defending 
themselves and ordering their community affairs. This 
outlook naturally would have carried over into 
congregational matters as well. In addition, the growing 
sense of worldliness, combined with the evident decline in 
spiritual vigor among members of the second generation, 
understandably produced an attitudinal change concerning 
criteria for church participation. Whether this 
transformation represented degeneracy or merely evolution, 
conditions in such frontier areas as the Connecticut Valley 
fostered demand for reform during the postwar decades.
In this and other ways, Massachusetts colonists were 
affected by the experience of King Philip's War and its 
legacies, as settlement continued to spread out onto the 
frontier. While orthodox ministers continued to preach the 
spiritual causes and lessons attributed to New England's 
misfortunes at the time, a definite trend toward secular 
interest and worldliness grew among the residents of the 
region. They were not all necessarily the degenerate 
backsliders of whom ministers complained, but King Philip's 
War did make colonists more aware of the assorted forces 
working against them and more willing to take action to 
protect their interests. Of course, this assertiveness 
disturbed the orthodox clergy who clung to the traditional
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norms of communal and congregational discipline, but even 
while delivering jeremiads against internal evils which 
threatened the mission, they continued to hold hope for 
ultimate salvation, through "the undeserved favours of God" 
whose "mercy endureth for ever."76
Numerous New England writers cited scriptural 
precedents to draw some positive encouragement from God's 
"fatherly chastisements," during the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century. Quoting Psalm 118, Mary Rowlandson 
pondered how "the Lord hast chastened me sore, yet he hath 
not given me over to death." Increase Mather even found 
reason to rejoice in God's punishment of the colonists. "As 
many as I love," he found the Lord proclaiming in the Book 
of Revelation, "I rebuke and chasten."77 As long as they 
continued to feel the effects of providential correction, 
therefore, New Englanders could be confident of God's love. 
Humans could never attain perfection, so divine rebukes were 
good signs to Puritans who looked to the future, as long as 
their fellow colonists reacted to the trials with the proper 
spirit of humility and repentence.
John Higginson encouraged the effort by quoting the 
Book of Chronicles, wherein the Lord promised, "If my 
people, who are called by my name, shall humble themselves, 
and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways, 
then will I hear their prayers, forgive their sins, and heal 
their land; and mine eyes, and mine heart, shall be upon 
them perpetually for good!" Mather concurred; "when a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
304
Sinful People Humble themselves before the Almighty God, it
is an Hopeful And an Happy Sympton, that He will not utterly
Destroy such a People."78 On the other hand, he cited the
example of Sodom, where the people disregarded the Lord's
warnings and refused to reform, and therefore "God sent a
fire upon the town that made it an eternal desolation." The
Almighty did not want to destroy New England because, as
Mather pointed out, "The Great God is greatly Glorify'd by 
79the prosperity of His People." Still, sincere 
reformation was necessary in order to regain redemption and 
a return to favor.
In spite of the monumental task of spreading 
reformation throughout the colony, Higginson had faith that 
"there are as yet many signs of his gracious presence with 
us," most significantly "in and with the hearts and souls of 
a considerable number of his people in New-England." Samuel 
Nowell, speaking in his usual militaristic tone, expressed 
confidence that the colonists had "Spirit and Courage 
enough" to meet the challenges and described them as "a 
People bred up in this Country, that have the heart of 
Lions." The major concern, of course, revolved around the 
fortitude of the younger generation, an age-old theme.
While pointing out that "the body of the second Generation 
be wofully degenerate," Cotton Mather admitted,
"nevertheless there are some of them (and through Grace 
many) that are eminently faithfull to the Lord Jesus and his 
interest, being of the same Principles & Spirit, that their
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blessed Fathers were of before them.”80 Hope was not lost. 
Despite all the trials and hardships, not the least of which 
was the slow progress toward true repentance, a glimmer of 
optimism remained that the Lord still had work for the 
colonists to accomplish in New England and that enough of 
them would remain worthy to warrant His favor.
Realistically, even the clerical jeremiahs had to hold out 
some promise of success; anything less would have 
represented an acknowledgment of failure.
The postwar period was part of a learning process for 
Puritan New Englanders. They had to learn many 
lessons— some good, some bad; some willingly, others 
reluctantly— about themselves and both the physical and 
supernatural world around them. Like it or not, even 
devout, orthodox Puritans had to realize that the nature of 
their mission had to change, inevitably, in response to 
forces affecting New England from within as well as from 
outside. An important lesson appeared in the optimistic 
outlook for God's continued favor; the errand could 
persist, even if in an altered form. King Philip's War and 
the troubled years that followed accentuated the changes 
occurring in the region, and of course, this illumination 
startled and disturbed conservatives. Still, they predicted 
that enough of the original spirit, if not all of the 
original conventions, remained by the end of the century to 
keep the errand into the wilderness alive, if only the 
colonists would learn their lessons from the trials of the
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period. According to Thomas Wheeler, the most significant 
and long-lasting message which emerged for New Englanders 
was the need "to trust and Rely upon [God] in the sorest 
straits, and . . .  to wait patiently for Deliverance in the 
greatest danger that may befall them." They must never 
forget the mercy and goodness of their Creator. The "Lord 
hath made his wonderful works to be remembered," wrote 
Wheeler, "and he would have his People to tell them to their 
Children, that they might also declare them to their 
Children."81 If New Englanders could extract this simple 
lesson from their deliverances of the period, then hope 
remained for the future.
In a symbolic conclusion to his narrative of King 
Philip's War, Benjamin Church unwittingly summed up the 
intellectual legacies of the post-war period. One of the 
last bands of Indians captured by Church's company 
supposedly included an old native man named "Conscience." 
"Conscience said the Captain (smiling)," when he heard the 
captive's name, "then the War is over, for that was what 
they were searching for, it being much wanting. . . . »82 
Church, not known for his strict piety, may have intended 
the allegory as a slap at the more insistent orthodox 
leaders, but he was more insightful than he intended. 
Throughout the last quarter of the seventeenth century, 
Massachusetts colonists were undergoing an examination of 
conscience. Not all of them, of course, intended the 
process as a cleansing or renewing endeavor in the spiritual
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sense, as clergymen like the Mathers insisted. In a more 
general way, New Englanders at the time were taking a new 
look at themselves and how they fit into the world around 
them. King Philip's War did not cause all of the changes 
underway in the colonies during the period, but it made the 
colonists more sensitive to them and thus influenced the 
ways in which the settlers of the New England frontier 
viewed the changing situation. They lived through a 
traumatic period. The search for conscience did not end in 
1676, as Church suggested. Rather, the whole postwar period 
involved a process of trying to define or redefine the 
collective conscience of the New England mission to cope 
with present trials and to carry the experiment into the 
future.
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Society Along the Connecticut River, 1636-1725 (Hanover: 
University Press of New England, 1976), 84-85, 114, 131-132.
75. Ibid., 60, 122-126, 145; Melvoin, "New England 
Outpost," 346-348; Accompanying the move towards a 
Presbyterian orientation in the Valley was a feeling of 
anti-clericalism, a sentiment which the authoritative 
Stoddard definitely did not encourage. See, Lucas, Valley 
of Discord, 65, 131-132; According to Perry Miller, 
Presbyterianism became popular on the frontier because 
there, all men, of whatever status, worked and fought 
side-by-side, making the imposed stratification of official 
church membership less important. In addition, Stoddard 
"became a power because he spoke for the Valley, in a 
forthright, plain style such as a neurotic Cotton Mather 
could never emulate." Miller, New England Mind, 229-230,
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76. Mather, Magnalia, I, 91-93.
77. Higginson, "Attestation,11 in Mather, Magnalia, I, 
14; Rowlandson, "Captivity and Restauration," 336; Mather, 
Magnalia, Ed., Murdock, 5; Rowlandson echoed Mather's 
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CONCLUSION
In 1676, Increase Mather saw "good reason to hope that 
this Day of Trouble is near to an end." Samuel Nowell 
agreed two years later, stating, "Our own greatest tryals 
seem to me to be behind."1 Such optimistic predictions 
followed closely Metacom's death and the defeat of his 
scattered bands. At the time, neither these clergymen nor 
any other New Englanders could have foreseen that the recent 
adversity would extend any farther than the immediate 
aftermath of the conflict. But, the challenges to the 
errand into the wilderness did not die with the native 
warriors; rather, the legacies of King Philip's War 
lingered throughout the ensuing decades, and new attacks 
appeared on several fronts. King Philip's War was not the 
sole or direct cause of all of New England's accumulated 
trials during the last quarter of the seventeenth century,
It was, however, the first in a series of crises, and it was 
the event to which contemporary Massachusetts colonists 
continually referred. Some of the direct legacies of the 
war persisted throughout the period, but more significantly, 
the struggle against Metacom initiated an era of general 
tension. As a result, New England underwent a number of 
changes during the decades following King Philip's War.
319
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
320
Ethnically, the period witnessed the virtual
elimination from the area of colonial settlement of any
Indian bands not under the direct control of the provincial
government. Nearly all of the tribes residing on the
Massachusetts frontiers, including the Nipmucks of the
interior, joined with Metacom's Wampanoags in open enmity
against the colonies, and the English undertook to erase any
hostile elements from the region. In the end, the depletion
of the native population attested to the success of the 
2colonists' campaigns. Even the Praying Indians who lived 
within the province's jurisdiction suffered the effects of 
the conflict. During the war they experienced distrust, 
confinement, and violence from their white neighbors; after 
1676, the Praying Indians still faced prejudice and physical 
restrictions. Even the Apostle, John Eliot, expressed 
concern by 1690 that "There is a cloud, a dark cloud upon 
the work of the gospel among the poor Indians."3 Although 
the missionary effort did go on, King Philip's War and the 
continuing anxiety adversely affected the atmosphere of 
cultural relations in the colonies.
Economically, New Englanders paid for King Philip's War 
throughout the period, and in fact, the lingering deficits 
still existed when King William's War erupted in 1689. 
Actually, the solution to the problem proved as disruptive 
as the expenditures themselves. The Massachusetts 
government had to resort to unprecedented levels of taxation 
to replenish the treasury, but towns as well as individuals
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did their best to avoid the multiple rates. Some colonists 
attempted to gain formal abatements or deferments from 
Boston, while others simply refused to pay their levies. 
Therefore, recovering from the deficits of King Philip's War 
represented an ongoing source of contention, on both the 
local and the provincial level.
Demographically, the scars of King Philip's War did not 
soon disappear from the Massachusetts frontier. Over 600 
soldiers plus countless noncombatants lost their lives in 
the conflict.4 Even more disruptive, in the long run, were 
the effects of the war on the frontier settlements. The 
more exposed plantations, such as Deerfield, Northfield, 
Groton, and Lancaster experienced periods of complete 
abandonment, while other frontier communities such as 
Springfield, Westfield, and Northampton suffered from direct 
native attacks and persistent fears thereof. In any case, a 
major emphasis throughout Massachusetts after the war 
involved government orders and clergymen's admonitions for 
compact settlement. The effort was an ongoing struggle, and 
with continued threats on the frontiers, the search for 
stable, permanent community order was never accomplished in 
some places before the outbreak of King William's War. The 
physical wounds of King Philip's War did not heal quickly 
because of the lingering uneasiness, and when the new 
conflict erupted in 1689, some of the damaged areas 
collapsed again. Although not completely stymied by the 
initial conflict, the face of the Massachusetts frontier was
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definitely altered by the experiences of King Philip's War.
Political concerns further compounded the recovery 
effort in New England. On the provincial level, the crown 
revoked the cherished Massachusetts charter in 1684 and in 
its place instituted the Dominion of New England. The 
colonists viewed this development not only as an 
infringement upon their civil privileges but also as a 
spiritual challenge, just as serious as the Indian war, 
since the charter represented the basis of the errand into 
the wilderness. Massachusetts residents overcame this trial 
with the Glorious Revolution of 1689, and throughout the 
period, the colonists expressed a preference for familiar 
trusted leaders. They displayed this same preference on the 
local level, but the upheaval which occurred in Boston never 
appeared in the scattered towns because residents 
consistently reelected thier established selectmen without 
interruption. This vote of confidence, however, was 
accompanied by a new spirit of assertive’* ss by townspeople 
all over the colony, as countless towns enacted restrictions 
on the traditional powers of their local leaders. Only in 
isolated militia affairs did notable local disruptions 
occur. If the trials of the period, beginning with King 
Philip's War, reminded colonists of their preference for the 
old order, the accumulated challenges also taught them to 
become more active in protecting their own interests.
The collective New England mind naturally underwent 
changes in response to the unprecedented level of upheaval
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in the colonies during the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century. The colonists faced new challenges, both 
physically and intellectually, and coping with the tensions 
left its mark on the colonial psyche. As noted, New 
Englanders became ever watchful of potential, in any form, 
and throughout the period they maintained 11 a warlike 
Posture," ready to respond to the slightest threat.5 
Ministers and laymen alike warned their brethren to stay 
prepared against the forces of evil that attacked the 
mission. The Reverend Samuel Nowell, in particular, advised 
the colonists to "Put on your spiritual Armour" and "look to 
that Breast-plate of Righteousness.1,6 The jeremiads of the 
period blasted the apparent spiritual decline in the 
colonies and warned of impending doom if the colonists 
failed to dedicate themselves to reformation. But the 
sermons also included the optimistic messages that God still 
had work for the Englishmen to do in America and that enough 
worthy colonists remained to merit His continued 
approbation. New England had changed in the half-century 
since John Winthrop and his followers inaugurated the 
errand, and even the jeremiahs had to recognize that fact.
But the experiences of the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century had provided the lesson that the mission could 
survive through periods of turmoil and adversity. The 
colonies had survived King Philip's War; they could 
persevere through any challenge, according to the orthodox 
clergy, if only the residents would place their ultimate
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faith in God.
King Philip's War proved to be the focal point of a 
period of trial for the New England colonies. The conflict 
was the first crisis in a quarter-century of almost constant 
tension. Even after Metacom's defeat, the lingering 
legacies and the appearance of new challenges kept the 
colonists from truly recovering any sense of physical or 
mental tranquility before the next wave of warfare broke out 
in 1689. But the troubled times also provided valuable 
lessons for the future of the errand into the wilderness.
The colonists learned that despite facing overwhelming 
obstacles— including the destruction of frontier towns, the 
loss of their charter, huge economic deficits, and the 
alarming spread of worldliness— the New England colonies 
would survive. Further, the crucial decades represented a 
period of maturation and helped to redefine the mission.
The colonists were confronted with both worldly and 
spiritual problems on an unprecedented scale, and the 
experiences had to be incorporated into the New England way. 
The errand was originally founded on idealistic visions;
King Philip's War and the related legacies forced New 
Englanders to adapt and respond with greater flexibility and 
practicality to assure the future of the mission.
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION
1. Mather, "Brief History,"142; Nowell, "Abraham in 
Arms," 286.
2. See, Cook, "Interracial Warfare and Population 
Decline," 1-24; Cook, "Disease and the Extinction of the 
New England Indians," 485-508.
3. Cited in, Mather, Magnalia. I, 577.
4. Jennings, Invasion of America, 324; Leach, 
Flintlock and Tomahawk, 243-244; Melvoin, "New England 
Outpost," 159.
5. John Pynchon to the Governor and Council, January 
18, 1691/2. Bridenbaugh, ed., Pynchon Papers, 242; MA, 
37:214.
6. Nowell, "Abraham in Arms," 278, 285, 293.
325
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. Primary Sources
The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province 
of the Massachusetts Bay. 21 vols. Boston: Wright 
and Potter, 1869-1922.
Baldwin, Thomas E., comp. Vital Records of Deerfield,
Massachusetts to the Year 1850. Boston: Wright and
Potter, 1920.
Bridenbaugh, Carl, ed. The Pynchon Papers, Letters of
John Pynchon, 1654-1700. Boston: Colonial Society
of Massachusetts, 1982.
Burt, Henry M., ed. The First Century of the History of
Springfield; The Official Records from 1636 to 1736.
2 vols. Springfield: Henry M. Burt, 1898.
"Case of John Gould, Charged with Treason, (May 1686)."
Massachusetts Historical Society Collections. 27 
(1858).
C[hurch], T[homas]. "Entertaining Passages Relating to
Philip's War which began in the Year 1675." in Slotkin 
and Folsom, eds. So Dreadfull a Judgment. See, 
Slotkin and Folsom, (secondary listing).
Drake, Samuel G., ed. New From New-England. 1676. Reprint. 
Boston: Coolidge and Wiley, 1850.
Easton, John. "A Relacion of the Indyan Warre, 1675." in 
Lincoln, ed. Narratives of the Indian Wars. See, 
Lincoln, (secondary listing).
Eliot, John. "An Account of Indian Churches in New England 
(1673)." Massachusetts Historical Society Collections 
10 (1809).
________ . "A Brief Narrative of the Progress of the Gospel
Among the Indians in New England, in the Year 1670." 
in Charles W. Eliot, ed. American Historical 
Documents, 1000-1904. New York: P. F. Collier
and Son, Corp., 1938.
326
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
327
Force, Peter. Tracts and Other Papers Relating Principally 
to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress of the 
Colonies xn North America From the Discovery of the 
Country to the Year 1776. 4 vols. 1847. Reprint.
Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1963.
Further Letters on King Philip's War. Providence:
Society of Colonial Wars, 1923.
Gookin, Daniel. "Historical Collections of the Indians in
New England (1674)." Massachusetts Historical Society 
Collections. 1 (1792).
________ . An Historical Account of the Doings and
Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England 
in the Years 1675, 1676, 1677. 1836. Reprint.
New York: Arno Press, 1972.
Green, Samuel A., ed. The Early Records of Groton, 
Massachusetts, 1662-1707- Groton: Privately
Printed, 1880.
________ . The Town Records of Groton, Massachusetts, 1662-
1678. Cambridge: University ?re&, 1879.
Gyles, John. "Memoirs of Odd Adventures, Strange
Deliverances, etc., in the Captivity of John Gyles, 
Esq." in Drake, ed, Indian Captivities. See, Drake, 
(secondary listing).
Hale, John. "A Modest Inquiry into the Nature of Witchcraft 
(1702)." in Burr, ed. Narratives of the Witchcraft 
Cases. See, Burr, (secondary listing).
Hall, Michael G., Lawrence H. Leder, and Michael G. Kammen, 
eds. The Glorious Revolution in America: Documents
on the Colonial Crisis of 1689., Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1964.
Hampshire County Massachusetts Court Records, 1677-1728. 
Deerfield. Henry Flynt Library. Microfilm.
Hampshire County Massachusetts Probate Court Records, 1660- 
1690. Mormon Genealogical Library. Microfilm.
Hubbard, William. The History of the Indian Wars in New
England from the First Settlement to the Termination 
of the War with King Philip, in 1677, from the 
Original Work by the Rev.~ William Hubbard (1677) . 
Edited by Samuel G. Drake. 2 vols. 1865. Reprint. 
New York: Burt Franklin, 1971.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
328
H[utchinson], R[ichard]. "The Wars in New-England Visibly 
Ended, 1677." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives of the 
Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary listing).
Hutchinson, Thomas. The History of the Colony and Province 
of Massachusetts Bay. Lawrence S. Mays, ed.
Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1936.
"Indian Children put to Service, 1676," New England
Historical and Genealogical Register. 8 (1854).
Massachusetts Archives. State of Massachuetts. Office of 
the Secretary of State.
Massachusetts Court Records. State of Massachusetts. Office 
of the Secretary of State.
Mather, Cotton. Bonifacius: An Essay Upon the Good.
Edited by David Levin. 1710. Reprint. Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1966.
________ . "Brand Pluck'd Out of the Burning." in Burr, ed.
Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases. See, Burr, 
(secondary listing).
________ . "A Cloud of Witnesses." in Marks, ed. Mathers
on Dancing. See, Marks, (secondary listing).
________ . "Decennium Luctuosum." in Lincoln, ed.
Narratives of the Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, 
(secondary listing).
________ . Humiliations Follow'd With Deliverances. 1697.
Reprint. Vol. 1 of Narratives of Indian Captivities. 
Wilcomb Washburn, ed. Ill vols. New York: Garland
Publishing Co., 1977.
________ . Magnalia Christi Americana. 2 vols. Hartford:
Silas Andrus and Son, 1855.
________ . "Memorable Providences Relating to Witchcrafts and
Possessions." in Burr, ed. Narratives of the 
Witchcraft Cases. See, Burr, (secondary listing).
________ . The Present State of New England. Boston:
Samuel Green, 1690.
________ . "The Wonders of the Invisible World." in Burr, ed.
Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases. See, Burr, 
(secondary listing).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
329
Mather, Increase. "An Arrow Against Profane and Promiscuous 
Dancing Drawn out of the Quiver of the Scriptures 
(1685)." in Marks, ed. Mathers on Dancing. See, 
Marks, (secondary listing).
________ . "The Autobiography of Increase Mather." Edited
by M. G. Hall. Proceedings of the American 
Antiquarian Society. 71 (1961).
________ . "A Brief Account Concerning Several Agents of New
England." in Charles M. Andrews, ed. Narratives of 
the Insurrections, 1675-1690. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1915.
________ . "A Brief History of the War with the Indians in
New England." in Slotking and Folsom, eds. So 
Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and Folsom, 
(secondary listing).
________ . "Diary of Increase Mather, 1675-1676."
Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings. 2nd 
ser. 13 (1899/1900).
________ . "An Earnest Exhortation to the Inhabitants of
New England." in Slotkin and Folsom, eds. So 
Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and Folsom, 
(secondary listing).
Melvoin, Richard I., ed. Deerfield Town Book, 1670-1729. 
Deerfield: Unpublished transcript from original
records, 1981-1983.
Moody, Robert E., ed. The Saltonstall Papers, 1607-1815. 
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1972.
Northampton Births, Deaths and Marriages, 1654-1853. 
Northampton: Forbes Library Microfilm, #16.
Northampton Town Records. Northampton: Forbes Library
Microfilm, #56.
Nourse, Henry S., ed. The Birth, Marriage, and Death
Register, Church Records and Epitaphs of Lancaster 
Massachusetts, 1643-1850. Lancaster: w. J.
Coulter, 1890.
The Early Records of Lancaster, Massachusetts, 
1643-1725. Lancaster: W. J. Coulter, 1884.
Nowell, Samuel. "Abraham in Arms." in Slotkin and Folsom, 
eds. So Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and 
Folsom, (secondary listing).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
330
Powell, Walter L. "Edward Taylor's Westfield: An Edition
of the Westfield 'Town Records.'" PhD Dissertation: 
Kent State University. (Includes Miscellaneous 
Records, 1675-1694; Westfield Town Records, 1696- 
1765; Grants of Land at Worronoco, 1658-1725; 
Westfield Land Records.)
Pulsifer, David, ed. Records of the Colony of New 
Plymouth. vols. Boston: William White,
1859.
Rawson, Grindel. "Account of an Indian Visitation (1698)." 
Massachusetts Historical Society Collections. 10 
(1809).
Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of
Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692. 3 vols. Boston:
County of Suffolk, 1901.
Records of Salem Witchcraft, Copied from the Original 
Documents. 2 vols. 1864-1865. Reprint. New 
York: Da Capa Press, 1969.
Rice, Franklin P., ed. Records of the Proprietors of
Worcester, Massachusetts. Worcester: Worcester
Society of Antiquity, 1881.
Rowlandson, Mary. "Narrative of the Captivity and
Restauration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson." in Slotkin 
and Folsom, eds, So Dreadfull a Judgment. See, 
Slotkin and Folsom, (secondary listing).
Sainsbury, W. N., ed. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 
Series. 40 vols. 1860-1939. Reprint. Vaduz:
Kraus Reprint Ltd., 1964.
S[altonstall], N[athaniel]. "A Continuation of the State 
of New-England, 1676." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives 
of the Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary 
listing).
________ . "A New and Further Narrative of the State of New-
England, 1676." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives of the 
Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary listing).
________ . "The Present State of New-England with Respect to
the Indian War, 1675." in Lincoln, ed. Narratives 
of the Indian Wars. See, Lincoln, (secondary 
listing).
[Sewall, Samuel]. "Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729." 2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
331
vols. Massachusetts Historical Society Collections. 
45-46 (1878-1879).
Sheldon, George, ed. "Three Letters Written by Gov.
Leverett in 1675— Newly Brought to Light," New 
England Historical and Genealogical Register.
48 (1894).
Shurtleff, Nathaniel B., ed. Records of the Governor and 
Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England.
5 vols. Boston: William White, 1854.
Smith, Joseph H., ed. Colonial Justice in Western
Massachusetts (1639-1702); The Pynchon Court 
Record. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1961.
Stockwell, Quinton. "The Captivity of Quinton Stockwell." 
in Drake, ed. Indian Captivities. See, Drake, 
(secondary listing).
Tompson, Benjamin. "New England Crisis, or a Brief
Narrative of New England's Lamentable Estate at 
Present." in Slotkin and Folsom, eds. So 
Dreadfull a Judgment. See, Slotkin and Folsom, 
(secondary listing).
"A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences that
have Hapned in the Warre between the English and the 
Indians in New-England (1676)." in King Philip's 
War Narratives. Ann Arbor: University Micro­
films, Inc., 1966.
Vital Records of Groton, Massachusetts to . . . 1849.
2 vols. Salem: Essex Institute, 1926.
Warren, Thomas B. Births, Marriages and Deaths in 
Springfield, 1639-1843. MSS. 1897. Mormon 
Genealogical Library. Microfilm.
Wheeler, Thomas. "A Thankefull Remembrance of God's Mercy 
to Several Persons at Quabaug or Brookfield." in 
Slotkin and Folsom, ed. So Dreadfull a Judgment.
See, Slotkin and Folsom, (secondary listing).
Whitmore, William H., ed. The Colonial Laws of 
Massachusetts, 1672-1686. Boston: 1887.
________ . The Massachusetts Civil List for the Colonial
and Provincial Periods, 1630-1774. 1870. Reprint.
Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1969.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
332
"Winthrop Papers.11 Massachusetts Historical Society 
Collections. 41 (1871).
II. Secondary Sources
Allen, David Grayson. In English Ways. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
Axtell, James. The European and the Indian: Essays in
the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1981.
________ . The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures
in Colonial North America. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985.
________ . "The Scholastic Philosophy of the Wilderness."
William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser. 29 (1972): 
335-366.
________ . "The Vengeful Women of Marblehead: Robert
Roules's Deposition of 1677." William and Mary 
Quarterly. 3rd ser. 31 (1974):647-652.
________ . "The White Indians of Colonial America."
William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser. 32 (1975): 
55-88.
Andrews, Charles M., ed. Narratives of the Insurrections. 
1675-1690. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1915.
Barnes, Viola F. The Dominion of New England; A Study in 
British Colonial Policy. New York: Frederick
Ungar Publishing Co., 1960.
Bercovitch, Sacvan. The American Jeremiad. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.
Biglow, William. History of the Town of Natick,
Massachusetts. Boston: Marsh, Capen & Lyon, 1830.
Bodge, George M. Soldiers in King Philip's War. 
Leominster: Privately Printed, 1896.
Booth, Sally Smith. The Witches of Early America. New 
York: Hastings House Publishers, 1975.
Bowen, Richard L. Early Rehoboth: Documented Historical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
333
Studies of Families and Events in This Plymouth 
Colony Townshship. Rehoboth: Privately Printed,
1945.
________ . Massachusetts Records, A Handbook for
Genealogists, Historians, Lawyers and Other 
Researchers. Rehoboth: Privately Printed, 1957.
Boyer, Paul and Stephen Nissenbaum. Salem Possessed:
The Social Origins of Witchcraft. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1974.
Bramson, Leon and George Goethals, eds. War: Studies
from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology. New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964.
Brayton, Abbott A. and Stephana Landwehr. The Politics of 
War and Peace: A Survey of Thought. Washington:
University Press of America, Inc., 1981.
Breen, Timothy H. "The Character of the Good Ruler: A
Study of Puritan Political Ideas in New England, 
1630-1730." PhD Dissertation: Yale University, 1968.
________ . "Persistent Localism: English Social Change and
the Shaping of New England Institutions." William 
and Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser. 32 (1975):3-28.
________ . Puritans and Adventurers: Change and Persistence
in Early America. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980.
Burr, George L., ed. Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases, 
1648-1706. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1914.
Carroll, Peter N. Puritanism and the Wilderness: The
Intellectual Significance of the New England Frontier, 
1629-1700. New York: Columbia University Press,
1969.
Celebration of the Two Hundredth Anniversary of the
Settlement of Hadley, Massachusetts. Northampton: 
Bridgman and Childs, 1859.
Coblentz, Stanton A. From Arrow to Atom Bomb. New York:
A. S. Barnes and Co., 1967.
Cook, Frederic W. Historical Data Relating to Counties,
Cities and Towns in Massachusetts. Boston:
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1948.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
334
Cook, Sherburne F. "Interracial Warfare and Population 
Decline Among the New England Indians."
Ethnohistory. 20 (1973):l-24.
________ . "The Significance of Disease in the Extinction
of the New England Indians." Human Biology. 45 
(1973):485-508.
Crandall, Ruth. Tax and Valuation Lists of Massachusetts 
Towns Before 1776, Finding List for the Microfilm 
Edition. Cambridge: Charles Warren Center for
Studies in American History, 1971.
Davis, Thomas M. and Virginia L. Davis. Edward Taylor
versus Solomon Stoddard: The Nature of the Lord1s
Supper. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981.
Demos, John. Entertaining Satan: Witchcraft and the
Culture of Early New England. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982.
Drake, Samuel G., ed. Indian Captivities or Life in the 
Wigwam. Auburn: Derby and Miller, 1852.
Dunn, Richard S. Puritans and Yankees: The Winthrop
Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962.
Ellis, George W. and John E. Morris. King Philip's War.
New York: Grafton Press, 1906.
Flagg, Charles A. A Guide to Massachusetts Local History. 
Salem: Salem Press, 1907.
Grant, Frank, ed. The History of the Celebration of the 
250th. Anniversary of the Incorporation of the Town 
of Westfield, Massachusetts. Concord: Rumford
Press, 1919.
Green, Samuel A. Two Chapters in the Early History of 
Groton, Massachusetts. Boston: David Clapp and
Son, 1882.
________ . An Historical Sketch of Groton, Massachusetts,
1655-1890. Groton: Privately Printed, 1894.
________ . Groton in the Witchcraft Times. Groton:
Privately Printed, 1883.
Greven, Philip J., Jr. Four Generations: Population,
Land and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
335
Hall, Michael G. Edward Randolph and the American
Colonies, 1676-1703. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1960.
Hart, Albert Bushnell. Commonwealth History of
Massachusetts. New York: States History Co., 1927.
Hurd, Duane H., ed. History of Worcester County,
Massachusetts. 2 vols. Boston: C. F. Jewett and 
Co., 1879.
Innes, Stephen. Labor in a New Land: Economy and Society
in Seventeenth-Century Springfield. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983.
Jennings, Francis. The Invasion of America: Indians, 
Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.
Johnson, Clifton. Hampden County, 1636-1936. 2 vols.
New York: American Historical Society, Inc., 1936.
Johnson, Richard R. "The Search for a Usable Indian: An
Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England."
Journal of American History. 64 (1977/78):
623-651.
Judd, Sylvester. History of Hadley. Springfield:
H. R. Hutting and Co., 1905.
Kawashima, Yasu. "Jurisdiction of the Colonial Courts Over 
the Indians in Massachusetts, 1689-1763." New 
England Quarterly. 42 (1969):532-550.
Kellaway, William. The New England Company, 1649-1776.
New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1961.
Kences, James E. "Some Unexplored Relationships of Essex
County Witchcraft to the Indian Wars of 1675 and 1676." 
Essex Institute Historical Collections. 120 
(1984):179-212.
Koehler, Lyle. "Red-White Power Relationships and Justice in 
the Courts of Seventeenth-Century New England."
American Indian Cultural and Research Journal.
3:4 (1979):1-32.
Lauber, Almon W. Indian Slavery in Colonial Times Within 
the Present Limits of the United States. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1913.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
336
Leach, Douglas. Arms For Empire; A Military History of 
the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763.
New York: MacMillan Company, 1973.
________ . Flintlock and Tomahawk. New York: MacMillan
Company, 1958.
________ . The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763.
New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1966.
Lewis, Theodore B. "Land Speculation and the Dudley Council 
of 1686." William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser.
31 (1973):255-272.
________ . "Massachusetts and the Glorious Revolution, 1660-
1692." PhD Dissertation: University of Wisconsin,
1967.
Lincoln, Charles H., ed. Narratives of the Indian Wars,
1675-1699. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1913.
Lincoln, William. History of Worcester, Massachusetts. 
Worcester: Charles Hersey, 1862.
Lockridge, Kenneth A. A New England Town, The First 
Hundred Years. Expanded Edition. New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., 1985.
________  and Alan Kreider. "The Evolution of Massachusetts
Town Government, 1640 to 1740." William and Mary 
Quarterly. 3rd ser. 23 (1966):549-574.
Lovejoy, David S. The Glorious Revolution in America.
New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
Lucas, Paul R. Valley of Discord: Church and Society
Along the Connecticut River, 1635-1725. Hanover: 
University Press of New England, 1976.
McManis, Douglas R. Colonial New England: A Historical
Geography. New York: Oxford University Press,
1975.
Mank, Russell W., Jr. "Family Structure in Northampton, 
Massachusetts, 1654-1729." PhD Dissertation: 
University of Denver, 1975.
Marks, Joseph E., Ill, ed. The Mathers on Dancing.
Brooklyn: Dance Horizons, 1975.
Marvin, Abijah P. History of the Town of Lancaster,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
337
Massachusetts. Lancaster: Solon Wilder, 1879.
Melvoin, Richard I. "New England Outpost: War and Society
in Colonial Frontier Deerfield, Massachusetts." PhD 
Dissertation: University of Michigan, 1983.
Miller, Perry. Errand into the Wilderness. Cambridge:
Belknap Press, 1956.
________ . Nature*s Nation. Cambridge: Belknap Press,
1967.
________ . The New England Mind, From Colony to Province.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.
Millis, Walter. Military History. Washington:
American Historical Association, Service Center for 
Teachers of History. Publ. #39, 1961.
Morgan, Edmund S., ed. Puritan Political Ideas, 1558- 
1794. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc.,
1965.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. Builders of the Bay Colony.
Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981.
Murdock, Kenneth B., ed. Maqnalia Christi Americana.
by Cotton Mather. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977.
Nash, Gary B. Red, White and Black. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1974.
Parsons, Herbert C. Puritan Outpost: A History of the
Town and People of Northfield, Massachusetts.
New York: MacMillan Company, 1937.
Pope, Robert G. The Half-Way Covenant; Church Membership 
in Puritan New England. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1969.
Powell, Samuel Chilton. Puritan Village: The Formation
of a New England Town. Middletown: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1963.
Powell, Walter L. "Edward Taylor's Westfield: An Edition
of the Westfield 'Town Records.'" PhD Dissertation: 
Kent State University, 1982.
Proceedings and Addresses at the Dedication of the Town 
Hall, in Swansea, Massachusetts. Fall River:
Alney and Milne, 1892.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
338
Proceedings of the Centennial Celebration at Groton, 
Massachusetts. Groton, 1876.
Ray, Sister Mary Augustina, B.V.M. American Opinion of 
Roman Catholicism in the Eighteenth Century.
New York: Octagon Books, 1974.
Rutman, Darrett B. Winthrop1s Boston: A Portrait of a
Puritan Town, 1630-1649. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1965.
Salisbury, Neal E. "Conquest of the 'Savage1: Puritans,
Puritan Misisionaries, and Indians, 1620-1680."
PhD Dissertation: University of California at Los
Angeles, 1972.
________ . "Red Puritans: The 'Praying Indians' of
Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot." William and 
Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser. 31 (1974):27-54.
Segal, Charles M. and David C. Stineback. Puritans,
Indians, and Manifest Destiny. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1977.
Sharp, Morrison. "Leadership and Democracy in the Early 
New England System of Defense." American 
Historical Review. 50 (1944-45):244-260.
Sheldon, George. A History of Deerfield, Massachusetts.
2 vols. Deerfield: Pocumtuck Valley Memorial
Association, 1895.
Sibley, John L. Biographical Sketches of Graduates of 
Harvard University. 17 vols. Cambridge:
University Press, 1873.
Simmons, William S. "Cultural Bias in the New England 
Puritans' Perception of Indians." William and 
Mary Quarterly. 3rd ser. (1981):56-72.
Slotkin, Richard. Regeneration Through Violence: The
Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860. 
Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1973.
________  and James K. Folsom, eds. So Dreadfull a
Judgment, Puritan Responses to King Philip's War,
1676-1677. Middletown: Wesleyan Univeristy
Press, 1978.
Temple, J. H. and George Sheldon. A History of the Town 
of Northfield, Massachusetts. Albany: Joel
Munsell, 1875.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
339
Tichi, Cecelia, intro. The Present State of New-England, 
Being a Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians, 
by William Hubbard. 1677. Reprint. Bainbridge: 
York Mail-Print, Inc., 1972.
Trumbull, Henry. History of the Indian Wars. Boston: 
Phillips and Sampson, 1846.
Trumbull, James Russell. History of Northampton, 
Massachusetts. Northampton: Press of the
Gazette Printing Co., 1898.
Turney-High, Harry H. Primitive War: Its Practice and
Concepts. 2nd ed. Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1971.
Vaughan, Alden T. New England Frontier: Puritans and
Indians, 1620-1675. Rev. ed. New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1979.
_________ and Daniel Richter. "Crossing the Cultural Divide:
Indians and New Englanders, 1605-1763." Proceedings 
of the American Antiguarian Society. 90 (1980): 
23-99.
Walsh, Maurice N., ed. War and the Human Race. New 
York: Elsevies Publishing Co., 1971.
Wright, Carroll D. Report on the Custody and Condition 
of the Public Records of Parishes, Towns and 
Counties. Boston, 1885.
Wright, Quincy. A Study of War. 2 vols. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1942.
________ . A Study of War. Abridged ed. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1967.
Young, Christine Alice. From "Good Order" to Glorious 
Revolution: Salem, Massachusetts, 1628-1689.
Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Michael Joseph Puglisi
The author was born in Arlington, Virginia, October 2, 
1958. He graduated from Bishop Denis J. O'Connell High 
School in Arlington, in June 1977. The author next attended 
James Madison Univeristy, graduating in May 1981, Summa Cum 
Laude, with Distinction in History. In August 1981 he 
entered the graduate program at the College of William and 
Mary, received the M.A. degree in 1982, and attained the 
A.B.D. level in April 1984.
The author has served as a Teaching Fellow at the 
College of William and Mary, and is currently employed in 
the Department of Historical Research of the Colonial 
Williamsburg Foundation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
